

Kolokvium „Bezpečnost a její cena“

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Část I.

Svoboda nebo bezpečnost? Komparativní analýza mediálních diskursů o bezpečnosti

Založeno na kapitole Guasti, P. Mansfeldová, Z.: Safe or Free? Comparative Analysis of Media Discourses on Security, z připravované knihy *Price of Security. Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Interplay between Security, Economy and Society*. Opladen: Barbara Budrich Verlag.

Introduction: Security Risk in late modern societies

- Diffused security risks endemic to the late modern societies;
- Diffused risks are often addressed by implementation of modern security technologies, as well as by (temporary) restriction of freedoms;
- Due to the rising occurrence of terrorist attacks, the political importance of security has increased significantly;
- Attempts to control or minimise diffuse risks represent clear evidence of the trade-offs between security, freedoms, and privacy - in the name of risk reduction and risk prevention, governments are extending the powers of law enforcement and security forces, limiting both individual freedoms and democratic scrutiny;
- **=> the provision of security takes place at the expense of the framework of democracy (Beck 2003);**
- this process is accompanied by shifts from individual to collective security (Duffield 2006) and from active trust to active mistrust (Beck 2002).

Visibility of Risks

- In late modern societies, risks are unprecedented in their complexity, spatial and temporal reach, and their potential effects are often invisible (Beck 1992).;
- **The visibility of risks thus becomes crucial and the media, along with science and politics, constitute an vital actor shaping public perception of security;**
- Like experts and political actors, the press constructs social reality including causal interpretations of events BUT, both experts and political actors depend on the media to provide an arena for the visibility of their arguments (Cottle 1998).
- In the era of terrorism, media coverage not only influences but also shapes public perception of security risks, the acceptance or rejection of security measures (Sjöberg and Wahlberg 2000, Beck 1992);
- In the phrase 'relations of definition' Beck highlights how manufactured uncertainties are constructed within public discourse - for Beck, **the media plays a crucial and a privileged role in the process of manufacturing uncertainties**
- => **Media** as an arena for the social construction of risk, as an actor of social contestation (of both discursive construction of risks and risk prevention) and as an arena for social criticism (Beck 1992, 1997, cf. Cottle 1998);
- **The media plays an essential role in acceptance or contestation of security measures proposed or adopted by governments** (Cottle 1998).

Security and inequality

- In technologically advanced capitalism, old antagonisms and inequalities are reinforced, and new antagonisms and social conflicts arise;
- The nature of this antagonism is a divide between those affected by risks and those who profit from them (Beck 1992:46);
- Example: 3D body scanners, **those affected by the measure are passengers, whose privacy is compromised** & those who benefit are manufacturers of the devices (Welch 2010);
- As Simon Cottle points out: "At the heart of such conflicts is the contestation that surrounds and informs public knowledge and debate about these risks and their consequences." (Cottle 1998: 8);
- In the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks, a number of airports have installed 3D body scanners, **not necessarily contemplating their impact on passenger privacy and health, effectiveness in an open airport system** (the system can be only effective if all airports install the device, or searching for economically viable (i.e. less costly) alternatives (Frimpong 2011);
- This illustrates Beck's point on the social and economic importance of knowledge, and the power of the media to structure and disseminate knowledge, **creating a new divide between those producing definitions of risk and those consuming it** (Beck 1992:46).

The role of the media

- The media is the primary arena in which the contestation of definitions, meanings, and consequences takes place;
- Notwithstanding the commercial pursuit of ratings, readers and revenue, and the subsequent attention to drama and entertainment, the media can cast a spotlight on risks and security measures (Cottle 1998: 8-9);
- Media reporting is a dynamic process, of social construction, contestation, and criticism of risks and "the deficiencies in institutionalized response to these";
- In case of terrorism, the media reporting about risks and security measures changed as public knowledge about these events evolved after the events of 9/11.

The role(s) of the media 1/2

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- Media reporting is a dynamic process, of social construction, contestation, and criticism of risks and "the deficiencies in institutionalized response to these";
- In case of terrorism, the media reporting about risks and security measures changed as public knowledge about these events evolved after the events of 9/11;
- Security and security measures are no longer defined and perceived in static terms, instead, their perception is influenced **by the security context, the mass media, cultural variables, laws, and the specific context of a particular state** (Hansen 1991, Hansen and Linné 1994);
- Simultaneously, the **public is becoming more sensitive not only to security risks associated with terrorism but also to the costs of security** – concerning policies, effective allocation of public resources, the extent to which privacy and civil liberties are negatively influenced by security measures (Welch 2010, Frimpong 2011);
- In this respect, the **media has become an essential resource for studying the public perceptions and its dynamics** (Michailidou and Trenz 2013) vis-à-vis the balance between security, freedom, and privacy.
- And, in more critical terms, **a possible arena for challenging the growing limits of democratic accountability, ethical scrutiny related to surveillance** (Lyon 2006).

The role(s) of the media 2/2

- the notion of the media as market-driven reflection of public demand, shared by some experts on the cultural theory of risk, who define the media as responsive rather than active actors (Kahan 2012), is **mostly overcome in the contemporary literature on the role of the media in the public sphere** (de Wilde et al 2013);
- media **actively contribute to the public perception of security threats by framing the communication about security problems, by focusing on 'what will be discussed, how it will be discussed, and above all, how it will not be discussed'** (Altheide 1997);
- **The media can no longer be viewed as a market-driven actor following public demand; instead, the media constitutes an arena for discursive construction of security, and an independent actor shaping the security discourse.**
- There are extensive studies analyzing media content - typically, these focus on actors, policy positions, the salience of issues and the framing of claims (Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg 1995, Kriesi et al. 2008), as well as capture the interaction among actors (Leifeld, and Haunss 2012);
- **No studies have so far focused on the discourses and claims related to security, freedom, and privacy;**
- **==> our book** aims to fill this gap by presenting and applying a novel methodological approach to media content analysis - we combine discourse and claims analyses;

Research Design

- In the course of the SECONOMICS project, we have developed and applied an instrument for qualitative comparative analysis of security issues in the media, and conducted an in-depth qualitative and quantitative analysis of media coverage;
- by applying and advancing the methods of discourse analysis, we are able to fill the gap in the study of security and security risks by presenting a comparison of the unique data of transnational security issues in three areas of critical infrastructure (air transport, public transport and critical national infrastructures in the form of energy provision networks);
- to demonstrate, we apply this method to the comparative study of three transnational security issues in twenty media outlets in ten countries (old and the new EU member states as well as non-EU member states) over a forty-month period between 2010 and 2013;

Research Design: Conceptualising and operationalizing political discourse 1/2

- Following Chilton, discourse is understood here as a 'cognitive world constructed by actors', and as a 'discursive process' (Chilton 2004, Liebert et al. 2008);
- and following Dryzek and Berejikian, discourse is seen as 'representing a coherent point of view.' Analysing political discourses thus requires de-constructing the examined texts into components of discourse and re-constructing them into a coherent image (Dryzek & Berejikian 1993);
- ==> we see discourses as constructed by actors in a discursive process, but discourse also defines the discursive context of an actor - **actors create and shape discourses, but they are also simultaneously structured and limited by these discourses** (cf. Schukkink & Niemann 2012);

Research Design: Conceptualising and operationalizing political discourse 2/2

- A comparative media analysis can reveal the explicit and implicit ontological entities of the media debates: **it is crucial to identify not only the defining and enabling the power of discourse, but also its ability to exclude and dominate actors, categories, and justifications by withholding recognition and endorsement of them** (Milliken 1999: 229).
- Comparative media analysis presented here goes **beyond merely capturing and describing media debates on risk and security - it highlights how the perception of security is constructed and shaped by knowledge and the mediation of opinion** (cf. Beck 1992, Cottle 1998);
- 'Tracking discourse,' of the selected news media illustrates how the focus and content of 'fear' shift over time (Altheide 1997: 647).
- we claim that these categories are 'not neutral representations of an objective world' (Habermas 1971, 1973, 2015), instead they are dynamic categories that shape and are shaped by actors, whose discursive context they delineate, mold, and transform.

Research Design: Conceptualizing salience

- Salience is a term in public opinion, communication, and policy research which initially developed in semiotics and referred to the relative prominence of signs;
- in communication research salience refers to the accessibility of frames (i.e., narrative structures in which information is presented) in (mass) communication;
- we define **salience as the public perception and reception of security issues and specifically of security measures;**
- salience signifies the degree of acceptance (positive salience) and the degree of rejection (negative salience);
- we conceptualize media salience as a proxy for the potential acceptance or refusal of security measures;
- The key aspects of salience, such as its direction (positive/negative), are measured in a comparative media analysis;

Research Design: Case studies 1/2

- Three issues were identified as transnationally salient in the current media and relevant for comparative analysis: 3D body scanners, CCTV cameras, and Stuxnet;
- 3D body scanners and CCTV cameras are highly relevant to the dilemma of security versus privacy and the debate over 3D body scanners at airports has highlighted the issues of the costs of security;
- CCTV cameras are an example of a technology whose salience and social acceptance varies across different countries (Lyon 2002);
- Stuxnet was selected as an example of a security issue because it introduced cyber-terrorism and particular vulnerabilities in the critical infrastructure to public debate (Collins and McCombie 2012);

Research Design: Case studies 2/2

- CCTV cameras and 3D body scanners are technologies used to prevent crime and terrorism as well as to detect potential perpetrators. In the field of security studies, criminology, and counter-terrorism cyber-crime have become an increasingly silent security risk;
- Stuxnet is not a technology that directly affects the daily life of ordinary people, rather the computer worm which disrupted Iranian nuclear enrichment in 2010, is the first instance of a computer network attack known to cause physical damage across international boundaries' (Lindsay 2013, 365);
- the media labeled Stuxnet as 'the cyber equivalent of the dropping of the atom bomb' and claimed that it heralded 'a new era of warfare' (Lindsay 2013, 365) and a 'revolution in cyber-attacks' (Collins and McCombie 2012, 80).;
- ==> regarding Beck's notion of risk, **Stuxnet is an example of an incredibly complex diffuse risk not bound by spatial boundaries** (cf. Beck 1992, Cottle 1998).

Data

- The articles in our analysis are all drawn from the period between January 2010 and April 2013;
- each article was sourced from the two most widely circulated, quality daily (i.e. mainstream) newspapers;
- Sample includes the following countries: the old and the new EU member states of the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, the UK; non-EU member states either important in shaping the global discussions of the selected issues (the USA) or key in providing relevant cultural diversity (Turkey moreover, Mexico);
- More than 2,800 articles were selected from twenty national newspapers;
- The qualitative sample was analyzed using the Atlas.ti software, and included 40 to 45 articles per country;
- Articles for the qualitative sample were selected in conformity with the following criteria: representativeness regarding coverage over time, per newspaper and per topic;
- For each country, an individual selection matrix was developed, and a supervised selection of articles was performed by national experts;
- In the comparative analysis both the proportion of coverage per topic and the total number of articles per country were considered to maintain representativeness and comparability cross-nationally and over time.

Table 1. List of the analyzed media

Country	Media
Czech Republic	Mladá fronta Dnes, Právo
Germany	Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Great Britain	The Telegraph and The Guardian
Italy	La Repubblica, Il Giornale
Mexico	La Jordana, La Reforma
Poland	Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita
Slovakia	SME, Pravda
Spain	El País, La Vanguardia
Turkey	TIME (ZAMAN), SPOKESMAN (SOZCU)
USA	The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal

Source: SECONOMICS IS AS CR

Method of analysis

- a comparative coding scheme was developed and applied both during the pre-test and during the main coding period;
- the minimum discursive elements of each coded statement included the following:
 - (1) actors: determining which actors were taking part in the communication (both in terms of origin and type) and what the dominant patterns of interaction among them were;
 - (2) topics: the structure of each topic in terms of the individual subjects chosen or focused on was described;
 - (3) argumentative strategies: a description is given of the ways in which statements were structured (definitive, evaluative and advocative strategies) with a focus on the positive and negative aspects of evaluative and advocative statements;
 - (4) motivations and justifications: an analysis of the main motives (for security measures – providing an answer to the question of why a certain statement is used and how it is validated) highlighted or refuted by dominant actors, with special attention paid to ideas about security, privacy, and freedom.
- The coding process was supervised and a regular intercoder reliability test conducted on English language articles (Guardian, The Times, New York Times, Washington Post) covering all three topics. In the intercoder reliability test, we analyzed two elements: unitizing – the ability of each coder to identify the relevant claim, and coding – the ability to assign relevant codes.
- The reliability correlation regarding unitizing ranged between .85 and .90, reliability for coding between .75 and .85. The results of the intercoder reliability test were discussed in-depth with coders and improved over the course of training (cf. De Wilde et al. 2014: 45).

Research hypotheses: H1

- We combine the literature on risk and risk perception and discourse. Our first hypothesis focuses on the role of the media in shaping risk perception and manufacturing uncertainties (Beck 1997):

H1: The more abstract and complex the risk and/or security measure the lower visibility will be found in the mainstream media.

- Among our three cases Stuxnet has the highest level of complexity, as a security risk, followed by 3D body scanners and CCTV cameras. We would thus presume that the volume of reporting on Stuxnet would be significantly lower than on two other issues.
- we expect the Stuxnet reporting to be more technical, dominated by experts, and thus less comprehensible for the readers. The reporting on Stuxnet would thus include less contestation and social criticism (cf. Cottle 1998, Beck 1992).

Research hypotheses: H2

Our second hypothesis focuses on the role of causal factors in the salience of selected issues.

H2: Past experience with a given security risk (terrorism), to which the security measure is related, affects the degree of salience (positive) of that security measure.

- Here, the focus is on the salience and acceptance of 3D body scanners and CCTV cameras; we expect to find: that
 - both security measures will be significantly more salient than Stuxnet, and presented as a measure against terrorism;
 - countries, which experienced domestic and international terrorism, will demonstrate a higher degree of salience than countries without this experience;
 - the discourse on CCTV cameras will also include references to safety;
 - ==> **In this discourse, CCTV cameras would be framed as a security measure against crime. In both cases, involving 3D body scanners and CCTV cameras, we assume that the security/safety discourse will dominate over privacy/freedom discourse.**

The main factors affecting media coverage – hypotheses testing 1/4

- Findings from our qualitative comparative analysis of the media visibility and coverage of security risks and security measures suggest that the way the media portrays different security risks depends on several factors;
- The way the public comes to understand a topic is a balance between the media's portrayal of risk and of the pros and cons of a given technological measure;
- **Technologies portrayed as intrusive receive more negative salience, even if the risks they are designed to mitigate are high.**
- This is particularly true of 3D body scanners - in this debate, alternative, less intrusive technological measures are deemed preferable by the media and presented as such to the public;
- If security measures are forced onto an unwilling public without media debate; or within media coverage dominated by political actors and their line of argument for a certain measure (such as the case of 3D body scanner debate in Italy); **the security measures may come to be seen not as a solution, but as yet another risk.**

The main factors affecting media coverage – hypotheses testing 2/4

- Past experience with a particular security risk (such as terrorism) and the probability of the country being targeted in the future are the main factors that account for the differences in the visibility of security issues in the media;
- in a comparative analysis of the media in ten countries, **we were able to detect the pattern of, salience and justification hinting at a past terrorist attack as one of the main constitutive elements of the public discourse on security;**
- in argumentation for a given security measure, the media in these countries invoke past terrorist attacks (domestic and external terrorism) to justify the need for security measures (verification of H2).
- **However, it is also important to note that the previous experience with terrorist attacks cannot be entirely isolated from cultural patterns – attitudes toward security vs. privacy in a given country:**
- This was demonstrated by a robust negative salience of CCTV cameras in Germany, which has experience of (domestic) terrorism, but where attempts of the broad introduction of CCTV cameras were met with contestation and critique;
- **Future research should focus on unpacking the black box of cultural patterns – attitudes to risk and security – and their cross-country variation.**

The main factors affecting media coverage – hypotheses testing 3/4

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The main factors affecting media coverage – hypotheses testing 4/4

- We found a two-step pattern in the analyzed political communication:
- the first step is the presentation of security risks in general, and the second is the justification for the need for security measures, especially 3D body scanners and CCTV cameras
- Stuxnet does not strictly fit into this framework, as it is presented in part as a security measure against the Iranian nuclear threat, but also framed as a cyber-terrorist threat itself - it remained an external, international issue, of little relevance to the average citizen, especially in the states where a terrorist attack is unlikely, such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and, to a lesser extent, Poland.
- within the two-step pattern, the media coverage of security measures was dominated by the actions and opinions of different foreign states, state institutions, and politicians, as they debated the merits of introducing various security measures and the related regulations necessary to safeguard citizens' privacy and health;
- health, privacy, and dignity concerns prevailed over security risks (the probability of which is seen as low). In countries with more analytical media, discussions included other trade-offs such as costs vs. effectiveness and privacy/freedom vs. security, and the overall debates were more critical;
- German and UK media included such in-depth discussions as well as positive and negative justifications;
- the CEE media – the Czech, Polish and Slovak ones tended to be descriptive and often focused on repeating arguments from the international media adapting these to the domestic context).

Salience and Discourse

- the use of CCTV cameras was the most salient topic in the countries where the probability of terrorist attacks was perceived as low by the media and experts;
- It was framed mainly regarding security and related to the actions and opinions of municipalities, journalists, schools, and citizens about the use and installation of CCTV camera systems;
- the evaluation of the merits of CCTV cameras and the acceptance of their introduction depended primarily on the domain that was being monitored and did not change much over time. These are clear indications of the dominance of safety discourse respecting CCTV cameras.
- **Within this safety CCTV discourse, the risk of crime is imminent; within the security discourse, the world is portrayed as full of global risks, to which only modern technology, presented as an efficient solution, can provide the answer.**
- The second discourse regarding CCTV cameras and observed mainly in Italy, and in those countries where terrorism is perceived as an imminent risk, is security discourse;
- within this discourse, an excessive emphasis was placed by the dominant actors (politicians) on the urgent need for solutions, to avoid contestation;
- to gain support, the political actors often used emotional appeals to citizens' inherent fears - this could be witnessed among the representatives from the Lega Nord party in Italy, who incited/used fear to exploit the political salience of a terrorist risk to increase possible electoral gains by framing the issue as 'simple' and proposing 'simple' solutions often with xenophobic and racist undertones.

Salience and Discourse 1/2

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- this hints to an attempt on the part of some political actors to reframe security discourse into a safety one. In their over-simplified portrayal of reality, facts are less important than emotional appeals, and the surrender of privacy and intimacy in exchange for security is presented as an unquestionable necessity;
- this was the case for the initial phases of the 3D body scanner debate, which underplayed both privacy and health concerns in need to provide security effectively;
- later critical voices gained visibility, the privacy and health concerns were discussed, and the effectiveness of the 3D body scanner questioned.

Conclusions 1/3

- Based on the examination of the role of the media in the political communication of security risks and security measures, our research confirms that the media fulfills two roles – that of an information transmitter and public opinion maker (cf. McNair 2011);
- our analysis shows that the main factors shaping media reporting on security risks and security measures are past experiences with a particular security risk and the probability of the country being targeted in the future (cf. Beck 2000, 2002);
- these factors account for the main differences in the extent of coverage – and therefore the visibility of the security issues across the media landscapes of the ten countries under study (Guasti and Mansfeldová 2015);
- we found that the media landscape, although confined mainly within the boundaries of nation-states in respect to security risks, is undergoing a shift;
- the British and the German media demonstrated signs of moving away from a focus on concrete (domestic) security risks towards awareness and a more general discussion of the possible trade-offs between security measures and health, privacy, and freedom;
- As a result of that, the importance of international context grows.

Conclusions 2/3

- Our analysis sheds some light on how manufactured uncertainties are constructed within the public discourse (Beck 1992, 1997, cf. Cottle 1998);
- in respect to security, the **media are predominantly arenas of the discursive construction of risk and risk prevention;**
- BUT as the public is becoming more sensitive not only to security risks, but also to the costs of security, and the debates are becoming more critical, **the role of the media as an arena of social contestation is growing;**
- in addition to shedding light on the tension that exists between security and freedom, and the costs of security in terms of privacy, the recent whistle-blower cases (Manning, Snowden) further highlighted the role of the media as arenas of contestation and social critique (cf. Cottle 1998);
- the media that provide visibility to the far-reaching surveillance and its shaky legal grounds (Guardian, the New York Times) **act as watchdogs of freedom, privacy, and civil liberties** (cf. McNair 2011).

Conclusions 3/3

- Both the increased level of salience of security issues and the contestation of security measures documented by our analysis has contributed to shifting from active trust to active mistrust in governments by citizens (Beck 2002, Spence 2005);
- in this book, rather than to resolve the dilemma between security and freedom, our goal was to highlight the role of the media in shaping and constructing discourses on security risks and security measures;
- similarly to Alteide (1997), we were able to show that the **ability of citizens to be critical and defend their point of view (and for some their freedom, and privacy) depends on the quality of media coverage and the visibility in the media granted to actors with a variety of opinions, not only, as is the case in Italy, to political actors dominating the debate and thus avoiding contestation and critique;**
- the balance of security and freedom is the crucial task of contemporary governments, and the role of critical media is to provide a platform for the constitution of critical and contesting public opinion.

Část II.

Dopad bezpečnostních opatření na cestující *Případová studie letecké dopravy*

Založeno na kapitole Ugur Turhan, Birsen Yörük Acikel, Petra Guasti, Zdenka Mansfeldová, Nalan Ergün: Security Measures: Impact on Passengers Using Airports, z připravované knihy *Price of Security. Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Interplay between Security, Economy and Society*. Opladen: Barbara Budrich Verlag.

- Bezpečnost je nedílnou součástí letecké dopravy, která byla vždy cílem organizovaného zločinu a terorismu,
- Bezpečnost je v kontextu letecké dopravy komplexní pojem a v této případové studii je definována jako absence nebezpečí - tedy dosažení optimálního stavu a zachování statusu quo),
- Leteckou dopravu je nutné vnímat jako komplexní úzce propojený systém - narušení systému v jednom bodu má vliv na systém jako celek,
- Každý cestující musí projít bezpečnostní kontrolou při vstupu do systému,
- Nárůst objemu bezpečnostních opatření negativně ovlivňuje cenu, ale také to, jak cestující vnímají cestování leteckou dopravou,
- S narůstajícím objemem bezpečnostních opatření je stále obtížnější udržet křehké equilibrium - a zabránit odlivu cestujících - rychlá vlaková doprava je velkým konkurentem pro lety na kratší vzdálenosti.

- 9/11 představovalo pro bezpečnost v letecké dopravě významný zlom - v USA a následně celosvětově došlo k výraznému nárůstu bezpečnostních opatření (objem vynaložených prostředků se více než zdesetinásobil),
- Měřítkem bezpečnosti v letecké dopravě je analýza vynaložených prostředků za jeden zachráněný život,
- Subjektivní vnímání cestujících však toto měřítko nezohledňuje - na vnímání bezpečnosti má u cestujících vliv jejich vzdělání, národnost a osobnost,
- obecně lze říci, že bezpečnostní opatření snižují subjektivní vnímání spokojenosti cestujících,
- Zároveň dochází k nárůstu tenze mezi cestujícími - vzájemná podezřívavost (selektivně především vůči Muslimům, nebo skupinám, které lze opticky identifikovat),
- z tohoto důvodu přispívají bezpečnostní opatření, jejich vnímání a subjektivní pocit bezpečnosti cestujících k nárůstu komplexity letecké dopravy.

- Cílem této případové studie, bylo na základě terénního výzkumu na istanbulsém letišti zkoumat vzájemný vztah mezi bezpečností, vnímáním soukromí a celkovou spokojeností/nespokojeností cestujících,
- Bezpečnost jsme již definovaly jako absenci nebezpečí,
- Ochrana soukromí je zde definována jako zajištění integrity, autonomie a soukromého života cestujících,
- Soukromí je chápáno jako specifická součást svobody jednotlivce - jemuž je ponechána volba toho, co vnímá jako soukromé.
- konflikt mezi mírou svobody a soukromí na straně jedné, a bezpečností na straně druhé je v letecké dopravě velmi zřejmý,
- Fakt, že systém letecké dopravy je mezinárodní, dále komplikují kulturní rozdíly ve vnímání toho, jakou cenu (ve smyslu finančním, ale také ztráty soukromí a omezení svobody) jsme ochotni zaplatit za využití letecké dopravy.

Výzkum cestujících na mezinárodním letišti v Istanbulu

- Výzkum byl realizován v lednu 2013 týmem našich tureckých partnerů, ve spolupráci s vedením letiště, Úřadem pro civilní leteckou dopravu, a bezpečnostními složkami (ochrana letiště a Policie),
- Formou náhodného výběru a face-to-face rozhovory bylo shromážděno 904 odpovědí cestujících - po absolvování bezpečnostní kontroly, a před nástupem do letadla,
- z celkového počtu 904 cestujících 82 národností bylo 398 občanů Turecka a 506 cizinců,
- Bezpečnostní opatření na istanbulsském letišti jsou: CCTV monitoring, ruční prohlídka, průchozí detektor kovů, screening zavazadel, interakce s bezpečnostním personálem a 3D body scanner.

Charakteristiky vzorku cestujících na mezinárodním letišti v Istanbulu

- 904 cestujících
- **Věk:** 14-80 let (60% respondentů ve věku 20-40 let),
- **Gender:** 66,4% mužů a 36,6% žen,
- **Rodinný stav:** 52,5% ženatých/vdaných a 44,1% svobodných,
- **Národnost:** 41% evropských cestujících, 38,4% Blízký východ, 6,5% Asie, 5,5% Severní Amerika, 10,1% Dálný východ,
- **Náboženství:** 47,1% Muslimů, 30,5% Křesťanů, 2,2% Hinduistů, 1,1% Židů, a 18,5% ateistů a ostatních,
- **Vzdělání:** 29,6% středoškolské studium, 39,5% bakalářské studium, a 28,5% magisterské a doktorské studium
- **Zkušenost s leteckou dopravou:** 29,9% velmi zkušených cestujících (min. 10 mezinárodních letů v posledních dvou letech), 15,8% středně zkušených cestujících (7-10 letů), 37,2% méně zkušených cestujících (3-6 letů) a 17,1% nezkušených cestujících (2 a méně letů v posledních dvou letech).

Tabulka 1. Pozitivní postoje cestujících k efektivnosti bezpečnostních opatření

	experienced	medium experienced	less experience	inexperienced
Positive perception of effectiveness	47,7%	48,3%	48,1%	49,5%
Perception of security measures as disturbing	52,3%	51,7%	51,9%	50,5%


N=904

Data source: Anadolu University Survey

Postoje k bezpečnosti

- v této analýze jsme se zaměřili na postoje cestujících k různým formám bezpečnostních opatření,
- graf 1 ukazuje důležitost jednotlivých bezpečnostních opatření: jako nejdůležitější je vnímán detektor kovů (54 procent), následovaný screeningem zavazadel, a 3D body scannerem.
- Analýza poukázala na významný vliv demografických charakteristik na vnímání důležitosti bezpečnostních opatření: cestující ve věkové skupině 20-40 let, muži, Křesťané a Muslimové, a cestující s vyšším vzděláním vnímají bezpečnostní opatření jako velmi důležité.

Graf 1. Celkové vnímání důležitosti bezpečnostních opatření cestujícími (v procentech)




Note: N= 869

Data source: Anadolu University Survey

Pozitivní a negativní hodnocení bezpečnostních opatření

- 3 typy vnímání bezpečnostních opatření:
 1. velmi invazivní bezpečnostní opatření: silné negativní hodnocení ruční prohlídky a 3D body scanneru,
 2. Středně invazivní bezpečnostní opatření: detektor kovů a osobní kontakt s bezpečnostním personálem,
 3. Neinvazivní bezpečnostní opatření: detektor kovů a CCTV.
- Rozdíly v negativním vnímání bezpečnostních opatření jsou nejvíce ovlivněny kulturními a náboženskými charakteristikami cestujících,
- Podobně jako u celkového hodnocení vnímají cestující ve věkově skupině 20-40 let, Křesťané a do menší míry Muslimové, a cestující s vyšším vzděláním bezpečnostní opatření nejvíce negativně,
- Avšak ženy vnímají bezpečnostní opatření, především ta velmi invazivní negativněji než muži.


Graf 2. Pozitivní a negativní vnímání důležitosti bezpečnostních opatření cestujícími (v procentech)



Note: N= 872, red line = positive (acceptance), blue line = negative (rejection)

Source: Anadolu University Survey

Graf 2. Negativní důsledky bezpečnostních opatření (v procentech)



Note: N= 882

Data source: Anadolu University Survey

Závěry

- Náš unikátní výzkum ukázal výrazné rozdíly ve vnímání a hodnocení bezpečnostních opatření,
- Vedení letišť by měla zohlednit subjektivní vnímání bezpečnostních opatření cestujícími při nákupu bezpečnostních technologií - tedy nejen poměrem cena/ochrana života, a při výcviku personálu - v osobním kontaktu je možné významně zlepšit celkový postoj cestujících k bezpečnostním opatřením,
- Především u 3D body scanneru, je třeba zohlednit kulturní rozdíly postojů cestujících k soukromí, spokojenost cestujících a cena bezpečnostních technologií,
- pro vnímání a hodnocení bezpečnostních opatření není důležitá jen invazivnost technologie, ale také komunikace letiště a personálu s cestujícími,
- **Zohlednění subjektivních faktorů může vést k nárůstu spokojenosti cestujících, při snížení nákladů.**

Část III.

Bezpečná městská doprava

Případová studie metra Barcelona

Založeno na kapitole Petra Guasti, Zdenka Mansfeldová, Ricard Munné, Michael Pellot: Acceptance of Security Measures in Urban Public Transport, z připravované knihy *Price of Security. Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Interplay between Security, Economy and Society*. Opladen: Barbara Budrich Verlag.

V éře globalizace vzrůstá organizovaný zločin a terorismus a veřejná bezpečnost nebo bezpečnost hromadné dopravy se stává jednou z dalších bezpečnostních oblastí. Pokusy o teroristické útoky (např. Madrid-Atocha 2004, na vysokorychlostní vlak z Paříže do Amsterdamu v létě 2015) zdůrazňují skutečnost, že v době globalizace otázky bezpečnosti a ochrany veřejné dopravy nejsou omezeny pouze na hranice národního státu.

Veřejná doprava je nedílnou součástí infrastruktury konkrétní komunity, která umožňuje mobilitu osob a pohyb zboží. Jedním z hlavních rysů veřejné dopravy je dostupnost, která zase přitahuje kriminalitu vůči osobám a majetku. Kromě toho je snadným cílem teroristických útoků.

Zaměřujeme se na:

- Akceptaci používání bezpečnostních kamer ve veřejném prostoru a MHD,
 - Konkrétněji pak na použití různých nástrojů zajištění bezpečnosti ve veřejné dopravě.
- Tato analýza se zaměřuje nejen na CCTV kamery, které patří k technickým bezpečnostním zdrojům, ale na širší škálu bezpečnostních opatření, včetně lidských a procedurálních bezpečnostních zdrojů.



Vnímání bezpečnosti a přijetí bezpečnostních opatření závisí na zkušenostech s násilím a terorismem v zemi, na postavení osobní svobody a soukromí v národním hodnotovém systému a také na tom, jak probíhá komunikace s občany o bezpečnostních rizicích a bezpečnostních opatřeních.

Z naší analýzy španělského a katalánského tisku vyplývá, že využití bezpečnostních kamer (CCTV) není příliš kontroverzní. Zdá se, že bezpečnostní kamery jsou akceptovány většinou občanů, pokud není porušen zákon o ochraně údajů. Lidé jsou zvyklí být obklopeni kamerami a berou je přirozeně.

Přispívá k tomu určitě i zkušenost Španělů s teroristickými útoky, které často mířily na veřejnou dopravu. Po následku útoku v Madridu v r. 2004 trvalo vysledování teroristů španělským úřadům skoro tři týdny. Šetření bylo podstatně zpomaleno nedostatkem záznamů z bezpečnostních kamer.

Španělský případ je dobrým příkladem toho, jak zkušenosti z minulosti s terorismem zvyšují význam bezpečnosti v politické agendě vnitrostátního a regionálního řízení a zároveň podporují přijetí bezpečnostních opatření veřejností. Pozornost věnovaná CCTV kamerám ve veřejném prostoru se však podle naší analýzy v jednotlivých zemích liší.

Podle naší analýzy akceptace bezpečnostních kamer zažívá radikální posun k lepšímu pokaždé, když je spáchán nějaký teroristický útok, ale tolerance kontrolních opatření má tendenci zhasnout poměrně rychle poté, co informace o útoku opustí diskurs v médiích.

Městská hromadná doprava - metro

- Základní premisa: každý cestující má právo dostat se bezpečně do své cílové destinace. Pro poskytovatele služby, ani pro decision makers není snadným úkolem dosáhnout rovnováhy mezi bezpečností, efektivitou a náklady. V případě selhání v hromadné dopravě dochází nejen ke ztrátě legitimního nároku na podporu z veřejných finančních zdrojů, ale potenciálně také na menší využívání veřejné dopravy.
- Ekonomický aspekt: Cestující se buď vzdají své cesty, nebo se uchýlí k často dražším a méně pohodlným druhům dopravy. Výsledkem je ekonomická ztráta provozovatele.
- Pro provozovatele veřejné hromadné dopravy je bezpečnost, ale i zlepšení subjektivního pocitu bezpečí, zásadní podmínkou pro poskytování atraktivní služby.
- Znamená to nejen zajistit bezpečí, ale i vhodně komunikovat s občany o bezpečnostních opatřeních. Zákazník, kterému je poskytnuta dobrá služba (v případě MHD je to přesnost, komfort, spolehlivost), je spokojený zákazník.

Model týkající se významu a akceptace bezpečnostních opatření

Model zahrnuje:

1. Náklady

- na lidské zdroje – mzda, rekrutace pracovních sil a jejich školení, strategie personálního rozvoje atd.
- Na technologie – nákup, instalace, údržba technologií

2. Zisk: malý – střední – velký (méně černých pasažérů, technika ušetří pracovní sílu)

3. Vliv na spokojenost cestujících – nízký – vysoký, negativní – neutrální

Pro zpracování modelu týkajícího se významu a akceptace bezpečnostních opatření byly zpracovány informace týkající se vlivu nejčastěji používaných bezpečnostních opatření na spokojenost cestujících:

- bezpečnostní kamery
- dozorce
- dozorce se psem
- automatické zavírací dveře (automatic reversible door)

Dalším faktorem významným pro poskytovatele služby byla cena.

Využili jsme také data o incidentech v metru a o stížnostech cestujících (2011-2013) kategorizovaná podle bezpečnostních problémů.

Graf 1. Model založený na efektech bezpečnostních opatření

TYPE OF SECURITY MEASURE		COST		PROFIT		EFFECT ON CUSTOMER SATISFACTION/ LEVEL OF ACCEPTANCE
DURATION		SHORT-TERM	LONG-TERM	SHORT-TERM	LONG-TERM	N/A
HUMAN RESOURCES	SINGLE GUARD	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	LOW	RATHER NEGATIVE/LOW
	GUARD WITH DOG	HIGH	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	NEGATIVE/LOW
TECHNICAL RESOURCES	CCTV CAMERAS	HIGH	LOW	MEDIUM /HIGH	HIGH	NEUTRAL/HIGH
	TURNSTILES	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	HIGH	NEGATIVE/LOW

Source: IS CAS and TMB

Závěry

- 1) Validace sociálního modelu v oblasti městské hromadné dopravy s experty a zástupci firmy zdůraznila potřebu a důležitost zohlednění sociálních faktorů při řešení bezpečnostních problémů a také diverzitu podmínek, jak domácích, tak globálních. Je třeba vzít v úvahu rostoucí rozmanitost cestujících (etnickou, sociální, jazykovou atd.), zejména pokud jde o komunikaci s cestujícími a školení bezpečnostního personálu.
- 2) Případová studie veřejné dopravy zdůraznila stávající a vznikající hrozby, skutečnou a vnímanou bezpečnost, opatření přijatá k vyloučení těchto hrozeb a poskytování dobrých a spolehlivých služeb. Zároveň zohlednila náklady na bezpečnostní opatření a sociologické dopady bezpečnostních opatření a politických rozhodnutí. Vzala také v úvahu reakce veřejnosti.
- 3) V tomto výzkumu jsme identifikovali následující paradox. Na jedné straně bezpečnostní hrozby a bezpečnostní otázky již nejsou ohraničeny hranicemi národních států, naopak, jsou na celém území Evropy či světa. Na druhé straně zprávy médií o bezpečnostních otázkách zůstávají z velké části psány z národní perspektivy a formovány domácími kontexty.

Děkujeme za pozornost!