Democracy, defined as liberal pluralism, is under stress worldwide. Pluralistic democratic institutions: a free press, civil society and the rule of law all seem to be under attack. Democracies are being hollowed out from within while preserving the fundamental facade of elections.

The strength of this book is in providing a range of perspectives on the study of democracy under stress. The authors, renowned scholars of democratic theory and democracy in the Central and Eastern Europe, highlight the potential of different approaches – from comparative meta-assessment using indices and survey data, to case studies focused on understanding context and causal processes – for a better grasp of the loci of the stress.

Together, we offer the reader the opportunity to assess different conceptual frameworks and approaches, to reflect on their strengths and weaknesses, to advance the study of democracy in the future. This volume is also an invitation for scholars to redirect their attention to the Central and Eastern Europe, which offers an opportunity to deepen our understanding of democracy.

We see the democracy in Central and Eastern Europe under stress but avoid general labels such as the crisis of democracy and deconsolidation. Instead, we argue that to understand the contemporary situation in the CEE region, we need to move beyond the assessment of institutional frameworks and to include citizens in our understanding and measurement of democracy.
DEMOCRACY UNDER STRESS
Petra Guasti and Zdenka Mansfeldová (eds.)
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Democracy Under Stress
Changing Perspectives on Democracy, Governance and Their Measurement

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1. Democracy under Stress:
Changing Perspectives on Democracy,
Governance and Their Measurement

Petra Guasti

Democracy, defined as liberal pluralism, resting on both democratic institutions and citizens sharing democratic values, is under stress worldwide. Pluralistic democratic institutions: a free press, civil society and the rule of law all seem to be under attack. The culprits, however, are not antidemocratic forces seeking regime change employing coups and electoral fraud. Instead, as Bermeo highlights (2016), the changes are incremental – elected leaders seeking to aggrandize executive powers undercut democratic institutions (judicial autonomy, media freedom, elections). Therefore, democracies are not endangered by reversals, but by hollowing out – erosion and decay – while preserving the fundamental facade of electoral democracies.

The case of Central and Eastern Europe exemplifies this trend. Over the last two years, democracy deteriorated in 11 of the 17 countries (BTI 2018, Freedom House 2017). The democratic decline is marked by a steep decline in the stability of democratic institutions ( politicization), as well as in political participation and the rule of law (BTI 2018). Political leaders like Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Jaroslaw Kaczyński in Poland attack the defenders of the liberal order (opposition, media, civil society organisations) as traitors and enemies of the nation and celebrate the success of ‘illiberal democracy’ as the return of the power to the people (Bustikova and Guasti 2017).

The CEE democracies are not undergoing a regime change, but the quality of their democracy is deteriorating. However, the existing diagnoses of the intra-regime change are ambiguous. For some, liberal democracy became the victim of its success (Luce 2017), was killed when gatekeepers

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2 The majority of authors in this volume work explicitly or implicitly within the model of representative democracy. However, as the contribution by Pavol Baboš in this volume, and growing body of contemporary literature (cf. Gagnon 2018, Geissel and Michels 2018, Mayne and Geissel 2018) show, an additional issue for contemporary democracy is the mismatch between the existent model of liberal representative democracy and citizens perceptions, norms and values.
fell asleep behind the wheel (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018) or became inert – forgot how to adapt (Runciman 2018). A growing body of literature focuses on the decline in the quality of democracy under the titles of backsliding (Bermeo 2016), illiberal drift (Rupnik 2016, Csillag and Szélényi 2015, Bruisis 2016), deconsolidation (Foa and Mounk 2016) and swerving (Bustikova and Guasti 2017, Guasti 2018).

The explanation of the causes of the deterioration of democratic quality requires clarification of the following three elements. First, the concept/model of democracy that is under stress (representative, participative, deliberative, liberal); second, the measurement of quality of democracy (democratic indices, attitudinal surveys); and third, the identification of (potential) causes (internal political struggle, top-down strategic manipulation of the public by elites to advance in political competition, economic crises or external shocks).

Conceptual clarification is the key to determine whether democracy is in crisis. As Ercan and Gagnon (2014) underscore, democracy is a contested concept (cf. Gallie 1955, Gagnon 2014, 2018, Collier and Levitsky 1997), and what is a crisis for some (scholars of liberal and representative democracy), can be an opportunity for democratization for others (scholars of radical and deliberative democracy). Most of the contemporary crisis literature operates with the traditional notion of liberal (representative) democracy (Luce 2017, Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, Runciman 2018). Authors within other traditions see contemporary developments as a profound change and a shift to alternative sites, actors, and mechanisms of democratic rule (Saward 2010, Dryzek 2009, Della Porta 2013). The question remains, whether it is possible to democratize democracy (by strengthening/introducing participative and deliberative institutions) while democracy is under stress and democratic institutions are under attack by illiberal forces.

Measurement of democratic quality depends on conceptualization, which in turn determines operationalization, measurement, and analysis. This can range from various democratic indices (Freedom House, Polity, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Sustainable Governance Indicators, for more detail, see Dolný and Malová in this volume), advanced measures (Varieties of Democracy) to domestic and international surveys (World Value Survey, European Value Survey, International Social Survey program, for more detail, see Mayne and Geissel in this volume), to single case studies. Regardless of the concept of democracy, what studies on democratic decline assess is the decline of democratic quality over time (Diamond and Morlino 2005, Ringen 2009, Roberts 2009).

Bermeo identifies six causes of democratic backsliding, which can be roughly subsumed under the category of internal political struggle: coup
d'état, executive coup, election fraud, promissory coups, electoral manipulation, executive aggrandizement (2016). An alternative internal cause of democratic decline is an economic crisis (Habermas 1973, Merkel 2014). The literature on economic crisis as the cause of the decline in the quality of democracy sees an economic crisis as triggering a governance crisis (the inability of governments to cope with the crisis) leading to a crisis of democracy (loss of trust and support by citizens). External shocks might include globalization (in its current neoliberal capitalist form), deepening regional integration and immigration – constituting a threat to (the notion) of national sovereignty (Streeck and Thelen 2009, Merkel 2014, cf. Bustikova and Guasti 2017). This book seeks to explore these topics in greater depth.

This introduction proceeds as follows. First, we briefly outline the main arguments of the contemporary literature regarding the diagnosis and the causes of the decline in democratic quality in contemporary democracies. We then turn to the contributions in this volume, divided into three sets. The first set of contributions focuses on analysing the contemporary developments in Central and Eastern Europe. Two comparative chapters (Brusis and Baboš) and two case studies (Guasti and Mansfeldová and Markowski) highlight the nonlinear democratic development across the CEE region. The next pair of contributions focus on the measurement of democratic quality (Dolný and Malová and Mayne and Geissel). The authors of these contributions revisit the role of citizens in the measurement of democratic quality and suggest avenues for comparative democratization research. The last section returns to the fundamental issue of the legitimacy gap in contemporary representative democracy. Kneip and Merkel advocate adaptation rather than fundamental transformation of contemporary representative democracy and warn against the weaknesses of the alternative (majoritarian) models.

The strength of this book is in providing a range of perspectives on the study of democracy under stress. The introduction maps various approaches in contemporary literature and provides a general frame to study democracy in central and Eastern Europe. Individual chapters do not necessarily share the same conceptual definition of democracy (but all authors work broadly with the concept of representative democracy to provide comparison across the chapters). Individual chapters in this volume provide unique perspectives reflecting the state of the discipline – comparisons are often far from perfect – i.e., conceptually heterogeneous, highlighting various critical dimensions in the study of contemporary democracy. This approach does not seek to give the reader the answers, on which approach is the best. Instead, we offer the reader the opportunity to assess different conceptual frameworks and approaches, to reflect on their strength and weaknesses, to advance the study of democracy in the future.
We see the CEE democracy under stress, but avoid general labels such as crisis of democracy and deconsolidation. We argue that to understand the contemporary situation in the CEE region, we need to move beyond the assessment of institutional frameworks and to include citizens in our understanding of democracy. The authors of this volume also highlight the potential of different approaches – from comparative meta-assessment using indices and survey data, to case studies focused on more profound understanding and causal links between causes and effects – for better grasp of the loci of the stress. Finally, this volume is an invitation for scholars to redirect their attention to the CEE region, which offers an opportunity to deepen our understanding of democracy.

1. Diagnosis: The Future is Uncertain, but the End is Always Near

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a decade after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Iron Curtain liberal democracy seemed to have emerged victorious. It was the most desirable, if not the only game in town. Now the tables have turned, and nothing seems to be as it used to. Democracies around the world are losing the support and trust of their citizens, while authoritarian regimes have proved capable of maintaining citizens’ support by employing technocratic efficiency (Singapore) and empowering the disfranchised (Colombia, Venezuela). Established and new democracies struggle alike. The gap between elites and citizens in representative democracies has continued to grow (legitimation gap, for more, see Kneip and Merkel in this volume). Generational change brought around a surge of post-materialist values and young generations are no longer satisfied with the (perceived) passive nature of representative democracy (Inglehart 2008, Foa and Mounk 2016).

The existence of democracy as a system of government is in danger, the titles of three bestsellers on democratic decline published in 2017 and 2018 would have us believe – The Retreat of Western Liberalism (Luce 2017), How Democracies Die (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018) and How Democracy Ends (Runciman 2018). How precisely the end of democracy (will) look depends on whom you read, but the choice of words – ‘retreat, death and end’ all seek to convey the severity of the contemporary crisis of democracy.

In The Retreat of Western Liberalism (2017) Edward Luce characterizes the contemporary situation as the breakdown of the losers’ consent (cf. Anderson 2005). Liberal democracy was hollowed out, and the main culprits are identity politics, uncivil society and political elites (both current and aspiring – the earlier lack responsiveness, the latter responsibility and commitment to the values of liberal democracy; cf. Mair 2009, Jones 2017). Responsiveness is the only way to overcome democratic discontent. As in the

3 Jim Morrison, The Doors, Roadhouse Blues.

Levitsky and Ziblatt’s *How Democracies Die* is a compelling analysis of the crimes against democracy in America (Jones 2018: 202). Levitsky and Ziblatt show that the demise of contemporary democracy is deceptively uneventful (cf. Bermeo 2016). The road to authoritarianism leads over the ballot box – elections are the beginning of the end of the contemporary democracy. After an aspiring autocrat is elected – often on the ticket of anti-corruption and technocratic efficiency (cf. Bustikova and Guasti 2018), democratic institutions remain nominally present but are hollowed out. Modern autocrats govern under the veneer of electoral democracy, but adversaries (opposition, press, minorities) become enemies, and constitutional checks and balances are undermined. Without organized citizens, responsible political parties and shared democratic norms, democratic institutions fail to constrain the elected autocrats. That is when democracy dies (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018), or better said, is killed (Jones 2018).

In *How Democracy Ends* (2018) David Runciman rejects historical determinism and embraces the notion of failure – history does not repeat itself, so democracy will not fail in the same way it did in the past (c.f. on parallels between the current crisis and the 1930s (see Snyder 2014, Albright 2018). Runciman explores three forms of democratic failure (coup, catastrophe, and technocratic takeover), possible replacements and their likelihood. Drawing on a wide array of historical and contemporary examples, Runciman finds Western democracy undergoing a mid-life crisis, and the outlook rather bleak (2018: 218). The main problem, argues Runciman, is the growing discontent with democratic politics and the broken social contract between the representatives and the represented. Governments, unable to adapt to contemporary change flounder and fail to deliver, this is the recipe for a perfect storm (cf. Habermas 1973).

These three examples demonstrate the broad scope of the contemporary ‘crisis,’ a variety of symptoms and little hope for a cure. It is not our aim to provide an exhaustive review of the existing literature. Instead, we want to ‘take the temperature in the room’. The general mood is rather bleak; democracy is no longer in decline, it is in retreat, dying or ending. Liberal democracy became the victim of its success (Luce 2017), was killed when gatekeepers fell asleep behind the wheel (2018) or forgot how to adapt (Runciman 2018). Democracy is imperfect, messy and often ineffectual, but it is the best form of government we have to sustain free, innovative, peaceful and prosperous societies. Democracy’s strength is its reflexivity and ability to adapt – awareness of its imperfection and the ability to correct its course without bloodshed (ibid.).
In this book, we link the contemporary literature on ‘crisis of democracy’ with case studies on contemporary changes in democratic quality in Central and Eastern Europe. We integrate the CEE research into this framework to highlight the benefits and the need to incorporate CEE into the comparative research on the quality of democracy. We believe the contemporary literature has paid only limited attention to the region. However, the study of Central and Eastern Europe offers rich material for research on the role of democratic institutions and citizens’ attitudes, as well as the impact of methods on more nuanced analysis of democratic quality.

1.1. Democratic institutions and citizen attitudes
Citizens in established democracies are becoming increasingly critical of their leaders (cf. Mair 2009). The discontent has grown beyond the dissatisfaction with political leadership into a decline in support for democracy as a political system (Norris 1999) and increasing support for authoritarian alternatives (Foa and Mounk 2016). This finding leads Foa and Mounk (2016) to announce the deconsolidation of democracy (a decline in the quality of democracy). In the subsequent debate, some authors disputed Foa and Mounk’s (2016) ‘alarmism’ offering their view on the current state of democracy and the dangers of democratic decline (Inglehart 2016, Alexander and Welzel 2017, Norris 2015, 2016).

Inglehart (2016) agrees with part of the Foa and Mounk (2016) diagnosis – the support for democracy is in decline. However, Inglehart rejects Foa and Mounk’s argument for low support for democracy among young generations as a ‘specifically American period effect’ of changing cultural values (cf. Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Welzel 2013). Inglehart links the dissatisfaction with democracy to the inability of political leaders and democratic institutions to address growing inequalities (2016).

Alexander and Welzel (2017) argue that while the dangers for democracy are real, the diagnosis by Foa and Mounk (2016) is incorrect. They question Foa and Mounk (2016) on four accounts: for overstating the age differences in support for democracy (cf. Inglehart 2016); ignoring the lifecycle effect (cf. Norris 2016); ignoring the generational change in values; and for failure to recognize the strength of illiberal support as an indicator of deficiencies in the functioning of contemporary democracies, rather than a rejection of democracy. For Alexander and Welzel (2017) the sources of current democratic decline are increased class polarization and the marginalization of lower classes (Alexander and Welzel 2017).

Norris (2015, 2016) argues that the current situation is not a democratic decline, but a stress-test for democracy. For Norris, democratic consolidation rests on the pillars of widespread public agreement with democratic
values, constitutional arrangements reflecting democratic norms and principles, and the absence of significant groups and parties threatening to undermine democracy. Norris revisits Linz’s (1978) thesis on the breakdown of democratic regimes in three ways. First, culturally, the lower support for democracy among Anglo-American younger generations (millennials) is due to a life-cycle rather than generational effect (cf. Inglehart 2016). Second, constitutionally, there is no evidence of a decline in the quality of institutions protecting civil liberties across Western democracies between 1972 and 2016. Third, behaviourally, the most significant challenges of the democratic order are terrorism and the rise of populist forces feeding on security and economic issues.

Similar to Norris (2015, 2016), Voeten (2017) finds no evidence that people in established democracies became more likely to accept authoritarian institutions. Unlike Foa and Mounk (2016), Voeten (2017) detects an opposite pattern – older people, rather than the younger generations, have grown more sceptical of democratic institutions. For Voeten (2017) the danger for contemporary democracy is in the inability of governments to deal with perceived security and economic threats. The failure of established parties to address these issues tends to erode democratic beliefs further and increases support for authoritarian and illiberal alternatives offering populist nativism as a cure.

Overall, we find little agreement on the symptoms, causes, effects, and trajectory of the on-going change in the quality of democracy (Foa and Mounk 2016, Inglehart 2016, Norris 2015, 2016, Alexander and Welzel 2017, Voeten 2017). Some of the arguments echo the sequential model of a legitimacy crisis, in which Habermas (1973) linked economic crisis, democratic governance, and support for democracy.

In Habermas’ terms, the crisis of democracy is a result of the inadequate handling of the global economic crisis by politics, which causes the loss of trust by citizens, decreases the quality of democracy and ultimately leads to the loss of democratic legitimation (cf. Inglehart 2016, Voeten 2017, Luce 2017). Merkel (2014) recognizes the theoretical contribution of Habermas as a useful instrument to analyse the recent (2008–2010) financial crisis and its effects on democracy. Merkel is critical of Habermas for underestimating the operational capacity of governments, resilience, and survivability of democracy as a political regime and, in particular, the interdependency of the internal developments in the individual stages of the model (Merkel 2014: 3–5).

Both models of ‘democracy in crisis’ focus on the causes and consequences of democratic decline. The main contribution of Habermas’s sequential model is the causal link between economic crises and decline in the quality of democracy (1973). Merkel’s model (2014) is more nuanced – focusing on the main elements of democratic consolidation on macro-, meso- and
micro-levels. Furthermore, unlike the Habermas model, which is defined by its significant degree of linearity, Merkel’s model allows for an analytical assessment of the quality of democracy – both its progress and regress. Even if consolidation is concluded, it remains reversible, as the stable, but fragile democratic equilibrium can be distorted by exogenous shocks (Merkel 2014).

The main problem is not the weakness of democratic institutions. Instead, it is the lack of responsiveness of the (liberal) government to the grievances of the people. It is too simplistic to sum these grievances up as economic – citizens expect their governments not only to deliver economically but also to do so in a more democratic way. Citizens, and especially young voters are no longer satisfied with only having a say at the ballot box (cf. Mouffe 2000).

Thus, what we are observing is not the exit of citizens from democracy. Instead, passive loyalty has been replaced by an active and critical voice empowered and amplified by social media. In the light of increasing insecurity, the past consensus (based on a continuous increase in economic well-being) has been replaced by conflict – not only over the ever scarcer and more unevenly redistributed resources, but also about the democratic processes. This conflict, partially generational, has the potential to undermine democracy by increased polarization or apathy. The new dividing lines can be along generational and class differences, as well as between the winners and the losers of globalization. However, this conflict also has the potential to reinvigorate democracy, by fostering debate about democratic innovations and perhaps to stimulate a new democratic consensus.

2. The decline in democratic quality in Central and Eastern Europe: backsliding, illiberal drifts, turns and swerves

The literature on the democratic decline in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe has been proliferating for the last decade (Ágh 2010, Rupnik 2007, 2016, Innes 2014, Greskovits 2015, Hanley and Vachudova 2018, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017). In the context of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) the concept of backsliding implies falling off or a reversal from a liberal democratic trajectory (Jasiewicz 2007, Greskovits 2015). Backsliding attempts to capture multiple symptoms of democratic decline: declining trust in democratic institutions, emboldened uncivil society, increased political control over media, civic apathy and nationalistic contestation. It is based on the notion of an “illiberal turn” from liberalism and pluralism (cf. Bustikova and Guasti 2017).

The critique of the backsliding/illiberal turn focuses on its underlining presumption of a more or less linear trajectory and a consolidated democratic system from which recent events are seen as reversing (Bustikova and
Guasti 2017), a lack of analytical distinction and precision of the loci of democratic decline (demand or supply side), the resilience of CEE democracy and the counterbalance between strength and weaknesses on different levels of consolidation (Bermeo 2016, Guasti and Mansfeldová 2018), and, moreover, ignoring the role of the external anchoring of CEE democracies via the European Union (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010, Pridham 2008, Dimitrova and Buzogány 2014).

If one cannot ‘lose what one never had,’ what is going on in CEE? Busetikova and Guasti (2017) build on Bernhard’s concept of chronic instability (Bernhard 2015) and propose a novel model of change, characterized by a sequence of ‘episodes,’ some of which can be characterized as an “illiberal swerve.” The notion of swerves – defined as volatile episodes – permits us to identify both similarities and differences across countries and time. In order for a country’s sequence of swerves to become an illiberal turn, three conditions must be satisfied: executive aggrandizement, the contested sovereignty that increases polarization and the dominant party winning two consecutive elections. Developing this argument enables Busetikova and Guasti to investigate the limits of path dependence, to consider the possibility of a path that is inherently uncertain and thereby sharpens the analytical lens on recent developments in the CEE.

In this volume, we focus on the decline in the quality of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. We see the CEE democracy under stress, but avoid general labels such as backsliding, deconsolidation, and crisis of democracy. We argue that to understand the contemporary situation in the CEE region, we need to move beyond the assessment of institutional frameworks and to include citizens and test a variety of approaches (from comparative meta-assessment using indices and survey data, to case studies focused on more profound understanding and causal links between causes and effects).

The volume has three parts. In the first part, individual chapters focus on the diagnosis – assessing and explaining the decline in the quality of democracy in the CEE. In assessing the quality of democracy, our authors identify a range of symptoms and causes. The symptoms include rising nativism, populism, loss of trust in democratic institutions and civic apathy. The causes range from the loss of national sovereignty in connection with the EU integration and migration (or fears thereof), globalization, to the recent economic crisis. In the second part, chapters evaluate existing measures of democratic quality and propose innovative adjustments. Dölný and Malová highlight a disconnect between the theoretical conceptualization of democracy and its operationalization by various indices measuring democracy. Large-scale democratic indices are also a starting point for Mayne and Geissel, who show that the indices traditionally overlooked the role of
citizens as a constitutive component of democratic quality, by overemphasizing institutional (structural) components. In the final part, Wolfgang Merkel and Sasha Kneip make a strong argument for why representative democracy remains the cornerstone of democratic legitimacy.

3. Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe: Liberal democracy and its enemies

In his contribution, Brusis first clarifies the difference between democracy and quality of democracy, by outlining key features of the latter – public accountability and government responsiveness. These are the essential building stones of his focus on capturing and explaining the rise of populist anti-establishment forces and Central and Eastern Europe. For Brusis, the CEE region is experiencing an ‘illiberal drift,’ defined as ‘the rebuilding and re-interpretation of democracy that takes place while fundamental democratic institutions are officially affirmed’. Thus as Brusis shows, we need to move beyond focusing on structural determinants of democracy to the agency of populist leaders, who seek to redefine what democracy is (cf. Orbán’s ‘illiberal democracy,’ Babiš’s technocratic populism, see Bustikova and Guasti 2018).

The causes of the illiberal drift according to Brusis, are structural. Foreign-dependent economic development constrained the domestic political elites, while at the same time provided resources for corruption and clientelism (EU funds). This development, in turn, empowers anti-establishment forces, which mobilize against corruption and ‘Brussels’ and for the return of national sovereignty. Once in power, anti-liberal populist forces weaken accountability to narrow the gap between existing policy options (limited) and voter expectations. Weakened accountability reduces the capacity for protest and a friend/foe playbook focused on ‘Brussels and its allies/the ‘globalists’ (in particular the US philanthropist George Soros) provide alternative sources of legitimacy for further destruction of the rule of law and press freedom. The intensity with which democratic accountability is undermined varies by country, but the wide success of populist and Eurosceptic parties highlight the potential for a further decline in democratic quality across the region.

In his chapter, Pavol Baboš focuses on the interplay between the contemporary (neoliberal) globalization and (support for) liberal democracy. He argues we need to move beyond focusing on the economic crisis as a structural determinant in the decline of democratic quality (cf. Kriesi and Papas 2015). He shows that while the general support for democracy as a form of government is stable across the CEE region, the attitudes towards the principles of liberal democracy are more diverse. In particular, those most affected by the adverse effects of globalization tend to show weaker
support for democracy in general and even weaker support for liberal democracy. Job and income anxiety also increase the fear and rejection of migration, seen as heightening competition and lowering wages. This, in turn, provides the potential for mobilization by anti-establishment populist and radical right forces. Thus, once the ‘loser’s consent’ is broken, and the losers from globalization are mobilized, the dominance of the liberal democratic paradigm is increasingly questioned – especially minority rights protection and freedom of speech, while majoritarian principles tend to be favoured (cf. Anderson et al. 2005).

In their contribution, Petra Guasti and Zdenka Mansfeldová analyse the interplay between the quality of democracy and economic crises. In the case of the Czech Republic, a wealthy and stable democracy, they show that while the economic crisis was mild, it further amplified pre-existing governance issues – the limited steering capability and performance of the government (especially the capacity of the political actors to implement reforms and reach consensus (cf. Brusis 2016). The struggle of domestic political actors centred along the preservation or change of the status quo. In some cases, the veto actors can stall the reform process, but the empowered civil society, supported directly and indirectly by the EU can exercise continuous and effective pressure on domestic policy making (cf. Dimitrova and Buzogány 2014).

The economic crisis strengthened public disenchantment with politics, but not with democracy as such. The economic downturn caused neither the rationality, nor the legitimation, nor the motivational crises predicted by Habermas (1973). Instead, it led to a surge in civic participation on the municipal and national level (Guasti 2016). Democracy as a normative order was not threatened but strengthened as citizens empowered themselves and chose to engage in public affairs actively. However, the disenchantment with the government also provided space for a radical change of the political landscape through the subsequent rise of a new political movement – ANO in the 2013 and 2017 elections. ANO’s technocratic vision of the ‘state as a firm’ and its attack on parliamentary deliberation indicate that there is a clash between the visions of democracy in the contemporary Czech Republic, which can still develop into a full motivational crisis. The rise of technocratic populism represents a danger to liberal democracy by fostering civic apathy and thus weakening democratic accountability and the need for responsiveness (cf. Bustikova and Guasti 2018).

In the final contribution of this section, Radoslaw Markowski tests the explanatory power of various theories on the case of ‘backsliding into authoritarian clientelism’ in Poland. The first two approaches focus on the role of legacies (cf. Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017). First, Markowski argues that the communist legacy which matters is the ‘adaptive resourcefulness’ – the
readiness to subvert existing political power and to establish parallel institutions. Second, is the legacy of the negotiated transition – here Markowski argues that the negotiated transition established the culture of ‘norms flexibility’ rules of the game are negotiable, and the winners make the rules.

The next group of approaches focuses on the impact of (political culture) – first the role of (Polish) Catholicism in establishing the basis on which ideology rather than reason drives a significant part of the population. Second, the coalition between the Catholic Church and the ruling party provides an alternative source of legitimation, while undermining democratic accountability. According to Markowski, Poland is undergoing a conservative revolt against modernity. Under the façade of fostering conservative values, the Polish government has rewritten the rules of the game and commenced the destruction of the non-majoritarian accountability institutions – the media and the courts.

The last group of approaches focuses on actors – both the elite and the voters. First, Markowski looks at the role of personalized loyalty to the leader of the Law and Order Party Jaroslaw Kaczynski. He sees the role of political legacies in explaining the prevalence of personalized rather than formalized relationships and the importance of interpersonal rather than institutional trust. Second, Markowski questions the role of the winners and losers in the electoral success of the Law and Order Party. Here he makes a crucial ontological distinction between winners who are individually-driven, while the losers view their situation as collective faith and attribute the blame to external forces. This predisposition, in turn, provides sound bases for populist mobilization against external forces (i.e. ‘Brussels’).

All four contributions provide a fascinating and convincing diagnosis of the decline in democratic quality across the CEE region. All four contributions show the status quo is being currently redefined in the CEE region. Brusis provides a general framework of the ‘illiberal drift,’ and turns our attention from institutions to the redefinition of democracy. Baboš shows the impact of globalization on support for democracy and Guasti and Mansfeldová the role of economic crises in the decline of democratic quality. Brusis, Baboš as well as Guasti and Mansfeldová show how liberal democracy is increasingly questioned and (populist) alternatives are emerging. Finally, Markowski shows different ways to explain the ongoing dismantling of the liberal democracy in Poland by focussing on historical legacies, political culture and actors.

4. Revisiting measures of democratic quality

This section focuses on the ‘missing ingredients’ in the empirical analysis of democratic quality. In their contribution, Branislav Dolný and Darina Malová outline the limitations of democratic indices. Their analysis shows
that the selected quantitative measures of democracy are not sufficiently capable of responding to the various methodological challenges associated with conceptualization and measurement of democracy. The main issue is a disconnect between the conceptualization of democracy and its measures. Indices tend to be strong on institutional variables, elections, and various rights, but lack the links to the basic democratic values of political equality, popular sovereignty, and the role of citizens in influencing political decision-making (democratic accountability).

Dolný and Malová find various deficiencies among all quality of democracy measurements reducing their validity and replicability. The issues were related to aggregation (selection of the level of aggregation and aggregation rules), selection of indicators, the subjectiveness of the assessment and mutual correlation among various indices. Thus, existing indices provide a reliable basis for distinguishing democracy or liberal democracy from other regime types but provide less reliable insights into how a given democracy is functioning, and whether the quality of democracy is in decline. Dolný and Malová show that these methodological criticisms limit the explanatory power of comparative research. Their chapter is an important contribution to the debate on measuring the quality of democracy (cf. Dolný 2012, Giebler et al. 2018).

The contribution by Quinton Mayne and Brigitte Geissel focusses on the role of citizen disposition in the study of democratic quality. By detailing how different models of democracy understand the three types of citizen capacities Mayne and Geissel provide a valuable foundation for revisiting empirical research on democratic quality (Mayne and Geissel 2016, 2018). Similar to Dolný and Malová, Mayne and Geissel show that institutional and structural components receive disproportional attention in measurements of democratic quality, while the ‘citizen component’ remains under-researched.

The contribution of this chapter to the literature on democratic measurement is three-fold. First, it provides a solid analytical foundation for measuring democratic quality. Second, it develops a sound conceptual framework for incorporating the citizen component into the existing quality of democracy research. Third, it tests the limits of the existing data. The focus on inter-component congruence between the institutional and citizen components of democratic quality leads Mayne and Geissel to distinguish between temporarily static and dynamic forms of congruence within three models of democracy – minimal-elitism, liberal-pluralism, and participatory democracy. The citizen capacities are conceptualized along the lines of democratic commitment, political capacity, and political participation.

In focusing on democratic commitment, Mayne and Geissel highlight the need to move beyond the general support for democracy by including
(model) specific commitments. The chapter by Baboš illustrates this by demonstrating significant differences between the general support for democracy and support for the constituent elements of liberal democracy. The chapter by Guasti and Mansfeldová further shows that in the Czech Republic two understandings of democracy coexist (and occasionally) clash – minimal-elitism and participatory democracy – to use Mayne and Geissel’s models (cf. Guasti 2016, Guasti 2018, Bustikova and Guasti 2018).

Political capacity – a citizen’s ability to know, to choose and to influence political decision making resonates with the findings by Guasti and Mansfeldová and Markowski. The analysis of the Czech case by Guasti and Mansfeldová shows that political capacity can cut both ways – positive and negative. Political capacity can empower citizens to effectively oppose the government – as was the case in the mass mobilization against austerity measures during the economic crisis in the Czech Republic. However, limited knowledge can also lead citizens to choose technocratic populists (cf. Bustikova and Guasti 2018). In the Polish case, Markowski shows how (Polish) Catholicism limits the political capacity of (some) Polish voters by limiting their ability to grasp the fundamental rebuilding of the Polish constitutional order cognitively and, as Brusis shows, the drift from liberal to illiberal democracy.

The political participation element of democratic commitment emphasizes the need to move beyond elections as the only form of political participation and to stress different forms of participation associated with various models of democracy (cf. Geissel 2016). Chapters by Brusis and Markowski show how populist and radical right parties use political polarization to mobilize support and undermine democratic accountability. The chapter by Guasti and Mansfeldová illustrates how protest can lead to the emergence of new political actors on the national and subnational level and profoundly transform the party landscape along new dividing lines.

5. In place of conclusions: What’s next?

In their keynote speech and chapter Sasha Kneip and Wolfgang Merkel focus on the vital issue of contemporary representative democracy – the loss of trust and support for traditional actors (political parties) and modes of participation (elections) in contemporary representative democracy. The editors decided to conclude this volume with their contribution, as the authors concisely connect political theory, the current state of democracy and a possible way forward.

In the absence of viable alternatives, Kneip and Merkel argue, political parties remain ‘institutional guardians’ of the policy-making and decision-making processes. Political parties find themselves between a rock
and a hard place – on the one hand, their standing in society is increasingly challenged, on the other hand, as long as elections remain the dominant legitimation mechanism, political parties maintain their monopoly of power.

This is a pyrrhic victory for political parties, as the ensuing legitimation gap is here to stay. Currently, Kneip and Merkel argue, democratic innovations possess only limited capacity to remedy this situation. Some democratic innovations such as citizens’ councils or digital platforms for campaigns and polls have limited legitimacy but can supplement and invigorate representative democracy by fostering political knowledge and participation. Others, such as general plebiscites are double-edged swords. On one hand their claim to legitimacy is superior to representative democracy. In societies with large differences in citizen’s capacities and participation patterns, plebiscites generate unintended side effects, especially given low or class-differentiated turnout.

According to Kneip and Merkel, the fundamental institutions of representative democracy – political parties, elections, and parliaments are here to stay. If they want to survive, and if democracy as we know it is to survive, they need to adapt by broadening the scope of representation and strengthening participative and deliberative elements (cf. Runciman 2018). However, we need to strengthen representative democracy not by merely adding new participative and deliberative elements. We need to carefully asses the trade-offs and impact of these elements and focus on embedding rather than adding innovative features (cf. Rinne 2018)

The alternatives are perilous – as Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), and numerous chapters in this volume show – the road to illiberalism leads through the ballot box (see Brusis and Markowski in this volume). The cases of CEE democracies such as Hungary and Poland illustrate the consequences of the executive aggrandizement (takeover) and hollowing out of democratic institutions by populist leaders. Viktor Orbán and Jaroslaw Kaczynski might have won democratic elections, but used the ensuing legitimacy to drive executive aggrandizement and redefinition of the democratic order (see Bermeo 2016, Brusis in this volume, cf. Bustikova and Guasti 2017, 2018).

The existing social contract between the representatives and the represented is broken. Without organized citizens, responsible political parties and shared democratic norms, democratic institutions fail to constrain elected autocrats. If the alternatives proposed by populist leaders around the world in the form of nationalism, radical economic redistribution or technocratic rule are unpalatable, democrats need to rediscover their ability to adapt and propose solutions for correcting course.

Empirical chapters in this volume indicate that in Central and Eastern Europe, liberal democracy is an ideal, a horizon to which the reality is sometimes closer, and sometimes (now) more distant. Democratization is
non-linear, and the quality of democracy can change over time – improving, as well as worsening. Many of the ongoing processes described by authors in this volume (Brusis, Baboš, Guasti and Mansfeldová, Markowski) have their roots in the past – the former regime, the type of regime change, transition and consolidation. After a quarter of a century of democratization in CEE, this offers comparative research the opportunity to analyse post-authoritarian democracies around the world side by side. The next generation of scholars can bridge North-South, as well as, East-West divide in theoretically driven and methodologically innovative comparative research.

In 1918, upon the foundation of Czechoslovakia, the founder and the first President Tomas Garrigue Masaryk famously said “So now that we have democracy, we just need some democrats”\(^4\). This quote is very relevant today – for democracy to survive, we need not only the democratic institutions, but also the democrats – elites and citizens sharing democratic norms and attitudes. Without democrats, democracy remains a hollowed empty shell. Without democrats, democracy fails the contemporary stress test.

References


\(^4\) Original quote: “Tož demokracii bychom už měli, teď ještě nějaké ty demokraty.”


Mair, P. 2009. Representative versus responsible government (No. 09/8). MPIfG working paper.
PART I.

Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe: Liberal Democracy and its Enemies
2. The Quality of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

Martin Brusis

1. Introduction

The young democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have been particularly susceptible to the wave of populist, anti-establishment and extremist political forces that now challenge liberal democracy across the globe (Foa and Mounk 2017, Hadiz and Chryssogelos 2017, Krastev 2017, Müller 2016a). These challengers claim to represent the opinion of the ordinary people against a political establishment that is portrayed as corrupt, elitist and controlled by foreign interests. Their polarizing and anti-pluralist ideological stances have contributed to a more confrontational political competition. Several countries have also seen “democratic backsliding” (Bermeo 2016, Waldner and Lust 2018) an erosion of the institutions and mechanisms that constrain and scrutinize the exercise of executive authority. Illiberal policies have targeted opposition parties, parliaments, independent public watchdog institutions, judiciaries, local and regional self-government, mass media, civil society organizations, private business and minority communities. Incumbent elites have justified these policies as measures to strengthen popular democracy and to fulfil the promises of the post-1989 democratic transitions.

These changes may be conceived as drift processes because they do not abolish or fundamentally challenge the key democratic institutions – free and competitive elections, political participation rights and civil liberties, or the separation of powers and the rule of law (Brusis 2016). Instead, these institutions are gradually reinterpreted, with outcomes increasingly deviating from the notions that had guided the democratization processes during the 1990s and the first EU enlargement towards Eastern Europe during the 2000s. The checks and balances of liberal democracy are mainly weakened by governing elites and central executives (Bermeo 2016), but these actors use opportunity structures that are created by institutional settings, political competition, public opinion and citizens’ expectations.

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5 The author thanks the reviewers, the editors and the all participants of the Prague conference for their valuable comments on previous versions of this chapter.
The legitimatory references to popular democracy, the incremental nature of institutional change and the embeddedness of governmental actors suggest an analytic approach that places instances of democratic backsliding into a broader theoretical context. Such a framework should specify criteria of democratic quality that allow to assess legitimatory claims and to analyse how the incremental manipulation of interlocking democratic institutions affects democracy as a whole.

This chapter sets out such a conceptual framework based on democratic theory and the scholarly debate about the quality of democracy. The insights from this debate are applied to identify attributes of democratic quality that are then employed to structure the empirical analysis. Key attributes include public accountability, government responsiveness, and policy performance. The chapter maps selected developments in 17 CEE countries with regard to these three attributes.

Following a qualitative and inductive approach, the chapter tries to integrate individual causal process observations into larger trends that characterized the situation in the region in 2017. The empirical analysis draws mainly on country reports that have been prepared in early 2017 for a global expert survey, the so-called Transformation Index, a comparison and ranking of democratic and economic developments in 128 countries.6

Three main empirical findings are presented in this chapter. Firstly, governing political elites in some countries intentionally weaken the mechanisms and institutions of public accountability. Secondly, political competition has become more confrontational, resulting in more exclusionary government. Thirdly, most CEE countries have failed to achieve an economic performance meeting the expectations of citizens who have associated EU accession with rapid convergence to West European levels and tangible prosperity gains.

These developments have evolved in parallel and are causally linked, but none is fully endogenous. The concluding section suggests an interpretation to account for the reasons that have motivated populist governing parties to weaken public accountability, but the chapter does not aspire to fully disentangle the causal interdependencies linking the three trends. Rather, its aim is more modest, that is, it focuses on providing empirical evidence for the trends and seeks to demonstrate that the proposed conceptualization of democratic quality yields analytic benefits.

2. The quality of democracy and its attributes

Most conceptualizations of the quality of democracy start from the concept of polyarchy, proposed by Robert Dahl to define political regimes with

inclusive political participation rights and competition between political alternatives (Dahl 1971, 1989). Dahl distinguishes “polyarchy”, which represents a minimum standard of democracy, from an ideal democratic process that constitutes the unattained normative reference point for assessing democracies. A polyarchy includes the following necessary attributes: regular, free, fair and competitive elections, inclusive voting rights and rights to compete for public office, freedoms of expression and association, access to alternative sources of information and constitutional powers for elected officials to control governmental decisions. One conceptual strategy complements Dahl’s concept of polyarchy by additional attributes in order to achieve a more ambitious and thus more discriminatory concept of democracy (Lauth 2004, Merkel 2004, Munck 2014). The other strategy retains Dahl’s minimalist concept while distinguishing between the quality and the presence of democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2004, Fishman 2016).

The first strategy has led scholars to construct expanded concepts of a constitutional or a functioning democracy that provide frameworks for coherent typologies of democratic deficiencies. However, these “thick” concepts raise questions about how to classify deficiencies of individual attributes, how to compensate minor with major deficiencies or how to account for interaction effects between attributes. Such conceptualizations tend to set the thresholds for classifying democracies as “constitutional” or “functioning” so high that few countries will be able to cross them (Boegaards 2009). Some scholars also include attributes such as “administrative capacity”, “governmental stability” or the constraints imposed on governments by international markets/organizations (Bühlmann et al. 2008, Lauth 2004, Stoiber 2008). It may be possible to derive these attributes from the basic principles of freedom and equality underpinning Dahl’s more parsimonious concept. But such justifications could also be developed for including further, more far-fetched attributes, such as a state’s activities to support democracy in other countries or its respect for international law (Beetham 2004). Expanding the concept of democracy thus raises the problem of how to establish criteria that enable the selection and rejection of additional conceptual attributes.

To avoid both overstretching the concept of democracy and a discretionary selection of other quality criteria, this chapter opts for a restrictive conceptualization that complements the notion of polyarchy, firstly, by those civil liberties that are preconditions for political participation (such as the rights to life, liberty and security, fair trial and protection against discrimination). Secondly, an effective protection of these political rights and civil liberties requires their codification in a constitution that constrains the exercise of majority rule and entitles an independent judiciary to review and redress infringements of these civil and political rights.
The other conceptual strategy retains a thin concept of democracy, following Sartori’s advice that “what makes democracy possible should not be mixed up with what makes democracy more democratic” (1987: 156). Democratic quality is then defined as a separate concept that refers to aspects of the democratic process (for example, integrity, effectiveness, transparency), substantive outcomes of government decision-making (for example, social justice, human development) and citizens’ expectations (Diamond and Morlino 2004, Morlino 2004). A thin notion of democracy avoids conceptual stretching but raises the question whether “measuring quality requires (or allows the use of) other attributes than for classifying democracy” (Lauth 2004: 326, 2016: 607).

Here, the argument is made that it is necessary to add other attributes in order to conceptualize and measure the quality of democracy. Moreover, a conceptual separation between democracy and the quality of democracy also makes sense because it enables scholars to specify attributes defining the quality while avoiding the complexities of thick democracy definitions. However, these quality attributes can and should be firmly anchored in democratic theory.

To conceptualize and assess the quality of democracy, it is proposed to complement Dahl’s notion of polyarchy by two attributes: accountability and responsiveness. The first attribute, accountability, is implied by the core idea of democratic elections insofar as elections are meant to empower citizens to vote against governing elites who do not act in accordance with popular preferences. Schmitter and Karl have even suggested to place accountability at the centre of democracy by defining democracy as “a regime or system of government in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public domain by citizens acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their representatives.” (Schmitter 2004: 59, Schmitter and Karl 1991: 76)

This definition goes beyond electoral accountability to include the public domain and both elected representatives and other civil society actors who scrutinize and supervise public officeholders during the periods between elections. For such public accountability to become effective, it is necessary to assume that parliaments, courts and independent public watchdog institutions are legally entitled and capable of scrutinizing the actions of state representatives and, ultimately, enforcing sanctions against them (O’Donnell 1999). This “horizontal” accountability is also rooted in the need to effectively protect the political rights and civil liberties underpinning democratic elections. Public accountability comprises horizontal accountability, but also includes the quality of public discourse and deliberation in a mediatized public sphere (Fishman 2016: 300–302).
The second attribute, responsiveness, characterizes a democratic process that “induces the government to form and implement policies that the citizens want.” (Powell 2004: 91, Roberts 2010). It is, however, difficult to assess the extent to which public policies reflect the preferences of citizens since the translation of preferences into policies is not a straightforward process. Voters may hold inconsistent preferences and lack sufficient information, political parties and candidates may represent incoherent programs and use manipulative communication or attract voters through clientelist policies, political bargaining conditions the formation of governing coalitions and their decision making, and there are powerful interest groups, veto players, policy trade-offs, fiscal pressures and external factors that constrain the implementation of government decisions.

In view of these uncertainties, no attempt will be made here to measure responsiveness directly (Powell 2004). Instead, the present chapter will evaluate responsiveness by studying (1) the institutional conditions for responsive government and (2) the extent to which public policies achieve broadly accepted outcomes. Drawing on theories of democratic governance, two conditions facilitating governmental responsiveness may be identified: authority and inclusion (Gerring and Thacker 2008, Pierre and Peters 2005). “Authority” denotes a state’s capacity to make and enforce binding decisions on society by using available resources efficiently and without undue interference from societal actors. “Inclusion” refers to the openness of a state to a wide range of information from domestic and international society and the capacity of governments to use this information in the preparation of policies, to accommodate key stakeholders and to build society-wide coalitions for common goals. The presence of institutional capacities that support authority and inclusion can thus be seen as prerequisites of a responsive democratic process. Policies that deliberately ignore dissenting opinions or exclude larger segments of society tend to weaken responsiveness, as does the misuse of public consultations for pro-governmental propaganda purposes. Neither would majoritarian policies fully satisfy the criterion of inclusion, as long as their claim of responsiveness to the majority of citizens implies an exclusion of numerical and/or other minorities (Gerring and Thacker 2008).

The proposed focus on the institutional arrangements and practices of policy-making is complemented by a measure of responsiveness that takes policy outcomes into account. Policy performance is associated with governmental responsiveness because most citizens view “good” policies as evidence of responsiveness and a high-quality democracy (cf., for example, Magalhães 2014, Markowski 2016). Since the preferences of citizens regarding the relative salience of individual outcomes continue to differ and depend on the persuasion of incumbent governments, a more robust concept
of policy performance should be confined to broadly agreed positive or desirable policy outcomes. Fortunately, defining such outcomes has become easier since concurrent activities of international organizations, such as the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations or the Europe 2020 indicators agreed by the European Union, show that the global and international consensus on a range of desirable policy outcomes has broadened.

The two measures / criteria of responsiveness do not require the assumption that citizens need to share liberal, civic or participatory values for democratic quality (Almond and Verba 1963, Mayne and Geissel in this volume). Rather, the notion of inclusive government focuses on the institutional environment and practices of citizens’ participation. It is assumed that inclusive government encourages and fosters the civic values underpinning high-quality democracy. Similarly, the notion of policy performance assumes that citizens are likely to agree on certain policy outcomes and tend to use these outcomes as yardsticks or proxies to assess the quality of democracy.

Figure 1: Attributes of the quality of democracy

![Figure 1: Attributes of the quality of democracy](image)

Caption: Arrows denote attributes constituting necessary conditions/ components of other attributes

Summarizing this section, Figure 1 visualizes how the quality of democracy is disaggregated into attributes that include political competition and participation rights (polyarchy), civil liberties and the constitutional / judicial protection of these individual rights. These core attributes are complemented by a comprehensive notion of public accountability, institutional capac-
ities of states facilitating responsive government, and policy performance. These attributes could be further disaggregated in order to arrive at more detailed empirical measures of democratic quality. However, they can also be used as a broad framework to analyse political events and developments in a more inductive fashion.

3. Charting trends in Central and Eastern Europe

This section follows an inductive approach by identifying and interpreting major trends and developments in CEE. The conceptual attributes of democracy quality are used to structure and evaluate the empirical evidence. The main data source are country reports produced for a global expert survey (Transformation Index 2018) that was published in early 2018. The reports provide evidence for three main developments affecting the attributes of democratic quality.

3.1. Weakening public accountability

Governing political elites in several CEE countries have attempted to weaken the electoral, media, civil society and judicial institutions that serve to hold executives accountable. One policy has been to employ state resources in order to ensure electoral support. In the period between 1 January 2015 and 30 June 2017, parliamentary elections took place in 12 of 17 CEE states. Bulgaria, Poland and Serbia held direct presidential elections. Most elections were monitored by international observers on behalf of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). While their reports find these elections to generally meet democratic standards, they frequently note complaints about the abuse of state resources to support electoral campaigns of the governing parties or to reward voters (Albania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia). Some reports also mention attempts to buy votes, to intimidate voters (Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia) or biased media coverage in favour of governing parties (Serbia, Slovakia).

Secondly, governing elites in Hungary, Poland and other states have attacked the public media and individual journalists, partially relying on business actors with ties to the political leadership. In 2014, the Hungarian competition and media authorities enforced the sale of Hungary’s leading daily Népszabadság to an Austrian businessman who subsequently decoupled the newspaper’s office building and brand rights. On 8 October 2016, he suddenly ordered the closure of its publishing activities, allegedly due to economic reasons. Observers have, however, argued that Népszabadság constituted a profitable company and that the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been strongly interested in silencing critical media
Previously, business actors affiliated with the governing FIDESZ party had bought one of Hungary’s two largest private TV channels, TV2, and the government had subjected the other major channel, RTL Klub, to a prohibitive tax.

On 31 December 2015, the governing majority in Poland amended the media law to take the public TV and radio station under its control and to constrain the protection and supervisory functions of the independent broadcasting council KRRiT. In December 2017, KRRiT imposed a large fine on TVN24, the largest private TV channel, claiming that TVN24, by covering anti-government demonstrations, had promoted illegal activities and encouraged behaviour that would threaten security. Slovakia’s PM Robert Fico and the leader of the largest Slovenian opposition party, Janez Janša, insulted journalists. In the Czech Republic, Andrej Babiš, a business tycoon and deputy PM from January 2014 to April 2017, has owned two of the country’s leading dailies, Mladá fronta dnes and Lidové noviny, since 2013. This led Babiš’s coalition partner, PM Bohuslav Sobotka, to criticize that the two dailies had lost their independence and had been misused by their owner to campaign against his political adversaries. On 11 January 2017, Sobotka’s party together with opposition parties adopted a law that bans holders of government positions from owning media outlets. In Serbia, the newly elected government of Vojvodina in May 2016 dismissed the editorial team of the public radio and TV program Vojvodina. The decision was criticized as a politically motivated purge by the Independent Association of Journalists.

Following public protests by the powerful organizations of war veterans in January 2016, the Croatian government sought to replace members of the board of the licensing and supervisory Agency for Electronic Media due to alleged irregularities. The protest had been triggered by the Agency’s decision to suspend the license of the local TV station Z1 for three days due to hate speech. The director of this station had warned citizens not to walk near to the Serbian Orthodox Cathedral in Zagreb because their children could become victims of Chetnik (nationalist Serb WW2 fighter) slaughter. Leaders of the protests gave Chetnik and Communist partisan caps to Mirjana Rakić, the Agency’s director (and a self-declared ethnic Serbian

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7 Cf., for example, https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/N%C3%A9pszabads%C3%A1g, accessed 10 Sep 2017.

In Slovenia, in 2015, the industrial company Kolektor, with no prior media business activity, bought the country’s biggest daily, Delo, raising concerns about the newspaper’s independence.

Civil society organizations have been a third target of government actions to undermine accountability. On 13 June 2017 Hungary’s parliament adopted a legislative amendment that obliged non-governmental organizations to register and to declare themselves as foreign-financed if they received financial support from foreign donors.\footnote{Cf., for example, www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/hungary-ngo-law-a-vicious-and-calculated-assault-on-civil-society/, accessed 10 Sep 2017.} The Orbán government combined this stigmatizing policy with a campaign against the Hungarian-Jewish-born US billionaire and philanthropic donor George Soros, using billboards that conveyed an anti-Semitic subtext. On 4 April 2017, the parliament amended the university education law to make the accreditation of non-EU universities in Hungary contingent upon the maintenance of a campus in their home country and the conclusion of a framework treaty between Hungary and the university’s home country. This amendment de facto only targeted the Central European University financed by Soros, forcing it to either invest in a US-based parallel campus or to cease awarding US degrees (Venice Commission 2017b).

The Macedonian government of PM Nikola Gruevski also accused critical NGOs and prominent civic activists of acting on behalf of Soros in order to topple the government. Following the parliamentary elections of December 2016, Gruevski’s party launched a “Stop Operation Soros” initiative, claiming that the Soros Foundation would collaborate with USAID to back the opposition and a change of government in Macedonia.\footnote{Cf., for example, www.rferl.org/a/george-soros-macedonia-witch-hunt/28243738.html, accessed 10 Sep 2017.}

Fourthly, the Polish government sought to take control over the country’s judiciary through a set of actions that resemble the interventions made by the Orbán government in Hungary after 2010. Poland’s president in 2015 refused to appoint five constitutional justices who had been elected by the outgoing parliamentary majority. Following the electoral victory of the national-conservative party PiS, the new Sejm majority elected other justices, although the Constitutional Court had ruled that three of the five new Constitutional Court justices had been elected in accordance with the Constitution. The PiS government refused to publish the Court’s decision
and amended the Law on the Constitutional Court so that the Court had to take all decisions with a two-thirds majority and with all justices present. Furthermore, the amendment forced the Court to review all cases in the order of their submission. These changes violated the Constitution and threatened to paralyze the work of the Court (Venice Commission 2016). In July 2017, after numerous protests of international and civil society actors the governing majority repealed the mandatory chronological review and limited the two-thirds majority requirement.

In January 2016, the governing majority abolished the position of the independent general public prosecutor, assigned the office to the Minister of Justice and endowed him with far-reaching instruction powers over all public prosecutors.14 By limiting the separation of the judicial and executive powers, the government created opportunities to exert political influence on the activities of the prosecution, as can be seen in Hungary. The Hungarian general prosecutor, Péter Polt, refrained from launching investigations against loyal collaborators of the Orbán government despite clear indications of corruption.15

In July 2017, Poland’s governing majority empowered the Justice Minister to replace all court presidents.16 A second legislative amendment, adopted in December 2017, assigned appointment powers over the National Judicial Council, the self-governing body of the judiciary, from the association of judges to the parliament, that is, to the governing majority. A third amendment from December 2017 reduced the retirement age of Supreme Court justices and increased the number of justices in order to create a pro-government majority (Venice Commission 2017a). Control over the Supreme Court enables PiS to influence the adjudication of disputes over the fairness of future parliamentary elections (Nalepa 2017). These legislative amendments closely resembled the legislative changes in Hungary where the governing majority in 2012 dismissed all Supreme Court justices by displacing the Court and forced 194 justices into early retirement by lowering the retirement threshold age.17

In Romania, the governing majority in December 2017 adopted amendments to the laws on judges and public prosecutors, the judiciary and the judicial self-governing body (Superior Council of Magistracy) that raised

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concerns about judicial independence among many judges, the president of Romania and civil society organizations (European Commission 2017). One aim of the reform has been to strengthen the executive’s control over the appointment of top prosecutors, including the Chief Prosecutor of the National Anti-Corruption Directorate. The first chamber of the Romanian parliament also adopted an amendment to the law on the National Integrity Agency (ANI) in order to repeal all ANI decisions that had found parliamentary deputies and senators in conflicts of interests during 2007–2013. These measures continued the attempts by the social democrat-led government to retroactively decriminalize the abuse of public office and to weaken the power of anti-corruption investigators. In January 2017, a government decree introducing an amnesty for corruption cases with a value of damage of less than 45,000 euros triggered a wave of mass protests.

3.2. Confrontation and less responsive government

Partisan political competition has become more confrontational in many CEE countries. One factor driving this trend has been the growth of political parties that position themselves in a principled, bipolar opposition to what they frame as a corrupted political establishment (Hanley and Sikk 2016). Four groups of such anti-establishment and populist parties may be distinguished (see table below). Populist parties are defined here as parties that claim to represent the voice of the ordinary people and tend to reject a pluralism of interests in society (Kriesi 2014, Müller 2016b). Major populist parties include FIDESZ and PiS in Hungary and Poland. These two parties do not fall under Hanley and Sikk’s definition of an anti-establishment party since they are not genuinely new organizations. But FIDESZ and PiS have used anti-elite rhetoric in their electoral campaigns as opposition parties. A newly created populist party has been the left-wing national-populist Vetëvendosje! (Self-determination) movement that doubled its share of the vote to reach 28% in the Kosovar parliamentary elections of 11 June 2017. One of the party’s aims has been the unification of Kosovo with Albania. A subgroup of the populist parties can be classified as right-wing extremist, since these parties represent racist or aggressive nationalist ideologies. Apart from Jobbik (Hungary), this group includes the Slovak People’s Party (L’SNS), the United Patriots (Bulgaria) and the Czech party “Freedom and Direct Democracy” (SPD).

Some of the most successful anti-establishment parties have, however, promoted a centrist or center-right agenda (Pop-Eleches 2010). Examples include the Stranka modernega centra in Slovenia, ANO in the Czech Republic and Most in Croatia. In the Czech Republic, ANO, the party of entrepreneur Andrej Babiš, won the 2017 parliamentary elections by increasing
Table 1: Populist, extremist and anti-establishment parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>% of votes(^{18})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>26/03/2017</td>
<td>Obedineni Patrioti</td>
<td>extremist</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>26/03/2017</td>
<td>Volia</td>
<td>populist</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>11/09/2016</td>
<td>Živi zid</td>
<td>populist</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>11/09/2016</td>
<td>Most</td>
<td>anti-est.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>21/10/2017</td>
<td>ANO</td>
<td>anti-est.</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>21/10/2017</td>
<td>ČPS</td>
<td>anti-est.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>21/10/2017</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>extremist</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>01/03/2015</td>
<td>EKRE</td>
<td>extremist</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>06/04/2014</td>
<td>FIDESZ-KDNP</td>
<td>populist</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>06/04/2014</td>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>extremist</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>06/04/2014</td>
<td>LMP</td>
<td>anti-est.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>11/06/2017</td>
<td>Vetëvendosje!</td>
<td>populist</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>04/10/2014</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>extremist</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>23/10/2016</td>
<td>LVŽS</td>
<td>anti-est.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
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<td>Ključ</td>
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<td>PiS</td>
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<td>SMC</td>
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</table>

Source: National electoral data, compiled by the author

\(^{18}\) Vote shares in Hungary (FIDESZ-KDNP) and Macedonia refer to electoral alliances, first chambers of parliament (Czech Republic, Poland, Romania) and nationwide constituencies (Hungary, Lithuania).
its share of the vote to nearly 30%, 11 percentage points more than in the preceding elections. ANO may be characterized as a populist party (cf., for example, Guasti and Mansfeldová (2018)). A party centred on a successful businessman also prevailed in the Lithuanian parliamentary elections of 9 and 23 October 2016. The Union of Farmers and Greens led by agro-entrepreneur Ramūnas Karbauskis raised its share of the vote from four to 22%. Similar to Babiš’s strategy, the party ran a successful campaign by criticizing the established parties (the conservative Homeland Union and the Social Democrats) and by enlisting a former interior minister and popular anti-corruption fighter as its leading candidate.

A fourth group of anti-establishment parties has focused its campaigning on public integrity and civil rights, while acknowledging societal pluralism. Parties that mainly blamed the corruption of established political elites entered parliaments in the Czech Republic (Piráti), Hungary (LMP), Romania (USR) and Serbia (Dosta je bilo).

The emergence of these new protest parties and the adoption of populist argumentation and mobilization practices by established parties have polarized political competition in numerous states of the region. The conflict between the Polish government and opposition, for example, escalated in December 2016 when the opposition occupied the speaker’s podium in the Sejm.19 This action was triggered by the decision of the Sejm Marshal to ban an opposition deputy from the parliamentary session because he had protested against the governing majority’s decision to exclude journalists from sessions. The deputies of the governing party reacted by leaving the plenary and convened in a neighbouring room to adopt the budget law without the participation of the opposition deputies, inducing them to block the parliament for several weeks.

In Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro, opposition parties boycotted the parliamentary work for several months to demonstrate against alleged electoral manipulations and the governing parties’ abuse of power. In Albania, the main opposition party DP threatened to boycott the parliamentary elections envisaged for 25 June 2017. An international mediation initiative by the EU finally persuaded the party leadership to participate.

Macedonia suffered a protracted crisis that was triggered by leaked information on the government’s illegal wiretapping of approximately 20,000 politicians, civil servants, journalists and civil society representatives (Axt 2016, BiEPAG 2017). The main opposition party SDSM released this information in February 2015, causing a series of protests against the main governing party VMRO-DPMNE. In May 2015, a “National Liberation Army” of armed Albanians, presumably from Kosovo, attacked Macedonian

police units, resulting in more than 20 casualties and increased tensions between Slavic Macedonians and Albanian Macedonians (approximately 25% of the population). In June 2015 PM Nikola Gruevski, SDSM chairman Zoran Zaev and the leaders of two Macedonian Albanian parties signed an EU-mediated agreement that envisaged an independent investigation of the scandal, a transitional government with the participation of the opposition parties and early parliamentary elections in April 2016. In January 2016, SDSM refused to participate in the elections, claiming that the agreement had not been fully implemented. EU and US mediators negotiated a new agreement among the four leading parties that addressed the opposition’s concerns and provided the basis for its participation in the elections, held on 11 December 2016.

Although VMRO-DPMNE won the largest share of votes, it failed to build a majority coalition, enabling the second largest party, SDSM, to form a governing coalition with two Macedonian Albanian parties. However, the state president, closely linked to VMRO-DPMNE, refused to authorize Zaev to establish a government, arguing that SDSM would jeopardize the sovereignty and integrity of Macedonia by accepting excessive demands from their Albanian coalition partners. The president’s concern referred to an agreement among the four Macedonian Albanian parties, which seek to represent the country’s ethnic Albanians. Relying on the Albanian Prime and Foreign Minister’s mediation, the parties had agreed to posit conditions for their participation in a government that included the recognition of Albanian as a second official language, equal development of all of Macedonia’s regions and the participation of international actors in court cases involving ethnic Albanians. Zaev obtained the mandate only after he had committed himself to preserve the unity of the state. The post-election confrontation was accompanied by an escalation of protests as VMRO-DPMNE supporters on 27 April 2017 stormed the parliament and beat opposition deputies because they had elected an ethnic Albanian speaker of parliament.

The Macedonian crisis indicates an increasing readiness of political elites, particularly in Southeast European countries with a recent history of contested statehood and war, to frame inter-elite conflicts in ethnonational terms. Similar tendencies can be seen in Bosnia, Kosovo, Croatia and Montenegro, albeit in varying configurations and intensities. They are also


associated with an increase of politically motivated violence, particularly in Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the governing party of Republika Srpska (RS), the Bosnian-Serb dominated entity, in April 2015 threatened to hold a referendum on the entity’s independence in 2018, if the Bosnian state would not return its “stolen powers” to RS. In July 2015, the RS Parliament decided to announce another referendum on whether decisions of the High Representative and the state-level courts should apply to RS. On 25 September 2016, RS authorities held a referendum on whether the 9th of January, the anniversary of the proclamation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, should remain a national holiday. The referendum was a reaction to the Constitutional Court of BiH that had declared a RS law on this holiday as unconstitutional because it would exclude non-Serbian residents of RS who had not participated in the proclamation. A subsequent Court ruling had also repealed the RS Parliament resolution on the referendum. By enforcing the referendum irrespective of these rulings, the RS leadership violated the BiH Constitution and for the first time misused a referendum to justify its open infringement of the Dayton Framework Agreement. The RS government and most observers viewed this action as a test for a future independence referendum. The staging and announcing of referenda not only served as a reminiscence of the independence referenda preceding the war in 1992, but also applied the populist scheme of opposing the people against a foreign-imposed order (Brusis 2012, Topaloff 2017).

In Kosovo, the Kosovo-Albanian opposition party Vetëvendosje! initiated public protests about the ratification of a border demarcation agreement with Montenegro, claiming an ill-founded abandonment of Kosovar territory. Party activists repeatedly released tear gas in the plenary of the parliament and were accused of firing a rocket-propelled grenade at the parliament building in August 2016. Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serbian political actors failed to agree on a statute for the association of Kosovo-Serb-majority municipalities that had been envisaged by the so-called Brussels Agreement concluded by Belgrade and Prishtina in 2013. According to this EU-mediated Agreement, the municipal association was to be endowed with far-reaching autonomy, while being integrated into the constitutional system of Kosovo. Inter-ethnic tensions escalated in January 2017, when Kosovo-Albanian police stopped a Serbian train, painted with the slogan “Kosovo is Serbia”, and heading to Northern Mitrovica, the urban center of Kosovo Serbs. This prompted Serbia’s president to warn that Serbia would send its army if Kosovo Serbs were killed.

Croatian political elites used ethnonationalist frames referring to the country’s fascist Ustaša regime during the Second World War. In July 2016 ministers from the right-wing conservative governing party HDZ participated in the unveiling of a monument to a Croatian nationalist;\(^ {23}\) PM Tihomir Orešković appointed a Minister of Culture who had glorified the Ustaša regime during the 1990s. In August 2016, the social democratic opposition leader and previous PM Zoran Milanović appealed to rightist voters by proudly declaring that his grandfather had supported the Croatian fascists.\(^ {24}\) Pressured by its powerful associations of war veterans, Croatia blocked the EU accession negotiations with Serbia between April and July 2016. The blockade aimed at forcing Serbia to repeal a law that had authorized judges in Serbia to prosecute war crimes committed outside Serbia, thus also Croatians charged with crimes.

Montenegro has seen an escalating conflict between government and opposition parties since 2013, when leaked tapes indicated that officials of the main governing party DPS promised jobs and loans to DPS supporters. Radical opposition parties united in a “Democratic Front” (DF) organized a series of public protests, resulting in violent clashes with police forces in October 2015. Montenegro’s then PM Milo Đukanović initially succeeded in co-opting three opposition parties into a joint “government of electoral trust” after his longstanding governing coalition with the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro had collapsed in January 2016. The parliamentary elections on 16 October 2016 were overshadowed by the detainment of 20 Serbian citizens who were suspected of preparing a coup against the Đukanović government. The opposition parties did not trust the authorities and refused to recognise the results of the elections because they viewed the news about the coup as a government attempt to intimidate voters. Since then, all opposition parties have boycotted the parliamentary sessions.

In February 2017 the public prosecutor filed indictments against two alleged Russian secret service agents, and the parliament lifted the immunity of two opposition leaders who were accused of supporting the attempted coup. The latter decision caused a series of brawls between DPS and DF deputies and led the opposition to boycott the local elections in Nikšić, Montenegro’s second largest city. The divide between DPS and DF is rooted in an ethnic cleavage between ethnic Montenegrins and Montenegrin Serbs (approximately 30% of the population) that has deepened over the independence referendum in 2006 and the NATO accession in 2016. While


\(^ {24}\) Croatian stagnation. Pining for the partisans. Where politics are stuck in the 1980s, if not the 1940s, Economist, 27 Aug 2016.
DPS does not promote an exclusionary Montenegrin nationalism, it has presented its government and NATO membership as guarantees of Montenegro’s independence. Political violence, ethnonationalist rhetoric, protest mobilization, and intransigent positioning have reinforced zero-sum frames of government-opposition relations. As a consequence, partisan bias has permeated public life and incumbent governments have become less open to divergent societal information which has made the democratic process less responsive.

3.3. Policy performance: Limited and uneven prosperity gains
While polarization has affected responsiveness by rendering governments more partisan and exclusionary, CEE governments have also missed targets on the second measure of responsiveness, that is, to implement public policies meeting the expectations of citizens. This section studies policy performance and policy outcomes by focusing on economic performance. Despite a broad economic recovery occurring in CEE, few countries have made substantial progress in approaching the standards of living in Western Europe. In 2015 and 2016, the gross domestic product in the 17 CEE states grew by 3.0 and 2.8% on average (International Monetary Fund data). Growth rates ranged from 1.6% (Estonia in 2015/16) to 4.8% (Romania in 2016). All states have overcome the recession in the wake of the global economic and financial crisis. Renewed economic growth has contributed to a reduction of unemployment rates from 14.7 (2013) to 11.9% (2016, unweighted average, World Development Indicators (WDI)).

Among the new EU member states, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania have reached employment rates of more than 75%, the target value agreed within the EU. In contrast, the Southeast European states continue to feature high unemployment rates in combination with large informal sectors. Economic growth also enabled most states to reduce their public deficits and their gross public debt in 2015/16. Investment rates (gross fixed capital formation) and inflows of foreign direct investment remained constant at relatively low average levels of approximately 22% and 3% of GDP (unweighted averages, WDI). Relatively weak domestic demand and low energy costs ensured stable consumer prices and deflationary tendencies in nine states during 2016.

Despite these generally positive recent macroeconomic trends, a multianual perspective suggests that the economic convergence with the wealthier EU member states has been very slow. In 2008, before the global economic

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25 Other dimensions of systemic performance might be included into a broader assessment of democratic quality (Jahn and Müller-Rommel 2010, Roller 2006).
and financial crisis and the ensuing Eurozone crisis hit the region, the mean gross national income per capita in purchasing power parities was 51% of the EU average (unweighted average of 17 CEE states, WDI). In 2016, the region had reached only 56% of the EU average. While the Baltic states, Poland and Romania were able to reduce the wealth gap by 8–13 percentage points during these eight years, particularly Slovenia (-6 ppts), but also Croatia and Serbia (-2 and -1 ppts, respectively) fell behind. Among the poorer Southeast European states, Albania and Macedonia converged significantly (+5 ppts), but Albania continued to have the lowest income level in the region. In contrast, Bosnia, Croatia and Montenegro approximated the EU mean by only 1–3 percentage points.

This broad pattern shows that EU accession entailed enhanced economic growth for most new EU member states (Forgó and Jevčák 2015). However, the prospect of EU accession and the accession preparations did not boost growth in Croatia and the so-called Western Balkan candidate states (IMF 2015). Aggregate growth has been associated with increasing disparities between societal groups along the dimensions of education, age and place of residence. Highly educated young people in capitals and other metropolitan areas benefitted disproportionately from the new opportunities provided by the globalization of value chains and the inflows of foreign direct investment. Labour migration from CEE to wealthier EU member states and from rural areas to urban centers within CEE has reinforced the uneven allocation of prosperity gains from EU integration.

An IMF analysis of household surveys has noted that the subjectively perceived extent of poverty in the Western Balkans exceeds the levels of poverty observed by income-based measures (Koczan 2016). These discrepancies partly result, as the study argues, from memories of relative wealth and security people associate with their childhood in the former Yugoslavia. A longitudinal analysis of Eurobarometer surveys has shown that citizens of CEE EU member states express more pessimistic assessments of the state of their national economy than people from North-Western EU member states (Kriesi 2016). The economic crisis after 2008 has caused a further decline of these assessments. In its 2016 household survey covering all CEE countries, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development found that “people have become more worried about income inequality” since 2010, the time of its previous survey (EBRD 2017: 20). This survey has also shown that a majority of the respondents think that the income disparity in their country should be reduced. Taken together, the economic indicators and the perceptions reflected in surveys point to a persistent and partly increasing, real and perceived gap between the economic performance of CEE countries and the West European EU member states which have been important symbolic reference points for the democratization and Europeanization process in CEE.
4. Conclusion

The present chapter has argued for distinguishing between democracy and the quality of democracy, with the latter concept including full public accountability and governmental responsiveness. This notion of quality has allowed to map the ambivalent processes of democratic backsliding that have been characterized as drift: the rebuilding and re-interpretation of democracy that takes place while incumbents affirm their respect for fundamental democratic institutions and even claim to realize the promises of democratization. The chapter has furnished qualitative evidence indicating that (1) governing elites have eroded institutions of public accountability and (2) political competition has become more confrontational, shaped by the zero-sum logic of identity-based conflict. The second trend reduces governmental responsiveness, understood as the capacity for including societal information, accommodating stakeholders and building society-wide coalitions. A third trend has been the limited and uneven economic convergence of CEE countries with Western Europe which has compromised responsiveness insofar as many citizens tend to blame their governments for their failure to deliver the long-term prosperity gains expected from the transition to democracy and accession to the EU.

The proposed conceptualization also allows the analysis of interactions between the three trends and their implications for the quality of democracy. One important structural cause of the illiberal drift processes has been the foreign-dependent economic development of the region, since this dependence has deepened existing socioeconomic disparities in society (Appel and Orenstein 2018, Brusis 2016, Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009). The experiences and concerns of disadvantaged groups have been articulated by right-wing populist and extremist political parties. Right-wing populists have been able to draw on a rich reservoir of collective memories, ideas and narratives that describe the “nation” as existentially threatened, as a victim of foreign powers, as engaged in heroic resistance or in the role of tragically failing martyrs. At the same time, foreign dependence constrains the leeway of national policies to reduce disparities since governments can neither risk incurring excessive budget deficits, nor raising revenues by means of higher corporate tax rates than in neighbouring states.

Once voted into office, populist parties are therefore faced with the problem of how to reconcile their voters’ expectations with the given constraint of foreign dependence and the associated demands of external stakeholders (Mair 2009). Against the background of this dilemma, weakening democratic accountability not only serves to expand power, but also to narrow the gap between voter expectations and the de-facto existing policy options. By depleting the resources of a critical public sphere, governments reduce their susceptibility to domestic critics of their economic and financial policy.
decisions. In addition, constraining media freedom also facilitates the public communication of austerity programs and measures to discriminate foreign investors. Weaker accountability thus contributes to avoid public blame for policy failures and to sustain exclusionary practices of governing. Bipolar confrontation and anti-pluralist “friend or foe” framing strategies serve to legitimize the destruction or capture of non-majoritarian accountability institutions, such as courts or independent media outlets.

Conflicts with the EU can perform functions of domestic political legitimation in this constellation because they enable governments to stage themselves as heroic defenders of existential national interests or as innocent victims of too powerful foreign interests. Hungary’s “Stop Brussels” campaign from April 2017 has been a preliminary culmination of such a legitimation policy. Pretending to promote direct democracy, the Orbán government conducted a “national consultation” by sending to all citizens leading questions that depicted “Brussels” as the adversary of Hungarian employment schemes and tax reductions. Additional questions made the EU responsible for high energy costs, illegal immigration, human trafficking and foreign interference with Hungary’s internal affairs.

The three trends outlined in the previous section have affected some CEE democracies more than others. International public attention has focused mainly on illiberal policy reforms implemented by populist-led governments in Poland and Hungary, whereas changes in other countries have been less noted and also – hitherto – less far-reaching. However, the actions taken by the Polish and other governments strongly resemble the pioneering practices of the Orbán government, indicating the extent of imitation and transfer occurring within the region. The range of populist parties emerging in the region and their recent electoral successes in several countries underscores concerns that such challengers will prevail in other countries, too.

References

26 PiS Chairman Jarosław Kaczyński reportedly told Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán at a meeting in 2016 that “you have given an example and we are learning from your example”, Financial Times, 7 September 2016.


Pavol Baboš

1. Introduction
Several popular votes in 2016 showed that candidates opposing the principles of liberal democracy can gain large support (Hoffer in Austria) or even win elections (Smer-SD in Slovakia, Trump in the USA). What most of these candidates and parties have in common are their clear anti-minority attitudes and disdain of free media and opposition.

In Central and Eastern Europe, the ruling political elites have shown signs of anti-democratic attitudes and behavior for a longer period. The democratic malaise (Rupnik 2007) has been widely discussed and labeled with several names: from hollowed democracy (Mair 2006), via illiberal turn (Jenne and Mudde 2012) to elected autocracy (Ágh 2015). However, most of the authors focus on elite behavior and explain the democratic backslide in CEE by the absence of control mechanisms and limits for the incumbent politicians. However, the question remains, why are the political parties that harm democracy in the region not outvoted? The question is even more pressing if we realize that recent research shows a rather stable support for democracy in both West (cf. Magalhaes 2014, Cordero and Simon 2016) and East (Klingemann 2014, Dalton and Welzel 2014).

This chapter aims to contribute to the debate on the illiberal turn of CEE. We argue that it is necessary to distinguish between general support for democracy, which is indeed stable in the region, and support for the principles of liberal democracy. We also argue that there is a need to go beyond the economic crisis’ effects when studying the link between economic development and support for (liberal) democracy. Borrowing from the globalization literature, we will also study how the process of globalization may be affecting individual people’s well-being and emotional states, which in turn influences support for liberal democracy.

27 This research was made possible due to the generous support of the IMCODED project funded by the Slovak Research and Development Agency, grant number APVV-17-0464.
In the rest of the chapter I present the theoretical base of my research, formulate hypotheses and present data and methods applied in this study. In the last section I discuss the findings and their connection with previous research.

2. Democratic Regress and Support for Democracy

There is a general consensus about the decreasing quality of democracy among scholars studying CEE, although various authors name the issue differently, such as illiberal turn (Jenne and Mudde 2012), authoritarian tendencies and democratic regression (Rupnik and Zielonka 2013), hollowing out and backsliding of democracy (Mair 2006), or elected autocracy in Hungary (Ágh 2015).

Individual states may vary in the degree to which the quality of democracy has deteriorated and particular indicators or measures that suggest this. However, they all have in common the fact that the politicians or parties in power try, to a lesser or greater degree successfully, to limit the checks and balances and distort the rule of law (Epstein and Jacoby 2014: 2). This is done simultaneously with the oligarchization of society (Ágh 2015), or in other words corporate state capture where “public power is exercised primarily for private gain” (Innes 2014: 88).

Scholars studying democratic support in post-communist Europe pointed out that popular support for democracy is rather stable, and was relatively high already in the rather turbulent times of economic transition in the 1990s. Rose and Mishler (1996) found that in the early 1990s most of the post-communist societies supported democracy and were rejecting autocratic regimes or government by economic experts and technocrats (with the exception of Belarus and Ukraine at that time). The authors explain that historical legacies are considerably more conducive to the support of democracy than the political or economic performance of the actual government.

Undoubtedly, there are multiple factors contributing to the support for democracy. Dowley and Silver (2002) studied support for democracy and its relation to ethnic diversity and social capital. The authors found that social capital is supporting pro-democratic attitudes. However, some of the attitudes were just different measures of trust – towards political institutions. Klingemann, Fuchs and Zelionka (2006) focused on CEE and similarly to Inglehart (2003) or Dowley and Silver (2002) the authors found, that the overall support for democracy in Eastern Europe is substantially lower than in the West. Authors identified education, rejection of violence, political motivation and the tendency for protest behaviors to be correlated with support for democracy; however, not all of the factors are equally influential in all of the countries.
The available evidence thus indicates that the support for democracy as a way of governance has been stable and is not in decline. However, the wave of recent popular votes worldwide indicates that the electoral patterns are changing. Dalton and Shin (2014) argue that despite the support for democracy as a regime is stable, trust in parliaments and other political actors is in decline. In their opinion we observe a considerable shift in the political culture. “Contemporary democracies are increasingly characterized by a public that is critical of politicians and political institutions – while embracing democratic norms and holding higher expectations for government” (2014: 108–109). The authors adopt the term “dissatisfied democrats” as coined by Klingemann (1999). In a later work Klingemann (2014) found that the level of dissatisfied democrats was very similar in both Western and Eastern Europe in 2008 (32% in Western and 35% in Eastern Europe). Klingemann argued that the main driver of distinction between the satisfied and dissatisfied democrats is performance evaluation.

There is a seeming conflict between stable popular support for democracy and the actual deterioration of democracy in post-communist Europe. The assumption is that voters supportive of democracy should vote out the parties and politicians who are violating democratic norms in the country. However, if we follow Ágh (2015) and distinguish between a formal, minimalist concept of electoral democracy on the one hand, and liberal democracy protecting minority rights, free speech and division of power on the other hand, a possible explanation suggests itself.

Differentiation between democracy (procedural, or electoral), and liberal democracy is important. Diamond (2003) was rather sceptical about the so-called third wave of democratisation and the development of liberal democracy in post-communist Europe. His claim was in line with the main argument of Fareed Zakaria (2003) that the liberal elements and electoral elements of democracy are moving apart in the 21st century (2003). Møller (2007) revisited Diamond’s main argument and found that the share of liberal democracies as percentage of all democracies was rather stable in 1991–2005, and thus concludes that there is no increasing gap. The author also performed a correlation analysis of the two dimensions, which varies between 0.9 and 0.96 in those years.

Most of the empirical research on support for democracy departs from Schumpeter’s democracy definition, which is purely electoral. According to Møller (2007), only after Dahl’s (1971) addition of the freedom of expression, the freedom of information, and the freedom of association, and O’Donnell’s (2001) stress of the importance of the state’s capability to uphold these rights through the rule of law, can we speak of modern liberal democracy. Based on Dahl’s institutional minimums, Møller employed indicators of freedom of speech, media freedom and right for association in his empirical work.
It is possible that the popular support for democracy only captures the support for the minimalist, electoral form of democracy. After all, the standard surveys used in this field ask about a) support for democracy in general and b) importance of living in a democracy. The survey question usually does not specify what exactly is meant by democracy. Therefore, this research highlights the importance of distinguishing between the liberal democratic principles, and democracy per se.

3. Economy and Globalization

Several authors link democratic deterioration to economic crisis (Rupnik and Zielonka 2013, Ágh 2015). Cordero and Simon (2016) distinguished between countries that received the financial assistance from international institutions and those that had not received it. The authors argue that while lower satisfaction with economic performance goes hand in hand with lower support for democracy, the effect is rather opposite in the countries that had to accept the bailout conditions of the Troika. The reason is, the authors argue, that citizens critically reflect the decisions made by their respective governments as harmful and simultaneously imposed by outside force without democratic legitimacy. Therefore, as a reaction, they show higher support for democracy as a regime.

Dalton and Shin (2014) argue that globalization plays a certain role in increasing support for democracy in economically less developed nations. The reason is that the most developed countries are also the oldest democracies and thus the consequence is that citizens adopt the global view that democracy is superior to other regimes in terms of economic performance and in ensuring high living standards. However, people remain rather critical to the political institutions and elites and do not necessarily realize the importance of liberal democratic principles.

Economic development certainly has impact on support for democracy. However, as we already pointed out, the experience of Visegrad countries show that the story is not straightforward. This chapter argues that the financial crisis should not be treated in isolation from broader economic influences. Globalization as a long-term process is also contributing to the democracy backslide by distorting people’s support for principles of liberal democracy.

Barnes and Hall (2013) highlighted that since the 1980s capital openness and trade openness have been continuously increasing, while employment protection, product market regulation and union density decreased. The authors show that public opinion on several key ideas has shifted towards higher acceptance of the neoliberal policies, especially in the 1980s and early 1990s. More people started to accept competition as something good,
and also support for individualistic, performance-based wages and salaries increased among all income groups. Taking this into account, Barnes and Hall (2013) studied social resilience in the developed democracies during the neoliberal era with a focus on human well-being. They pointed out that it is important to study the subjective measures of well-being, and not purely the financial income, as well-being is subjective in its nature, and the effects of neoliberalism “extend beyond income” (2013: 211). Authors measured well-being in broad terms including health, material circumstances and security, and also life satisfaction. They argue that this indicator is stable across cultures and contexts and correlates with the most important indicators of life quality, such as financial situation and health (Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh 2010, Helliwell, Huang and Harris 2009). Their findings show that the distribution of well-being in the developed democracies became significantly more unequal over the course of recent decades. In short, the differences between winners and losers started to grow. Based on this, the first set of hypotheses reads: We expect people who report feelings of lower general well-being will decrease their support for democracy (H1a), and also display lower appreciation of the principles of liberal democracy (H1b).

The impact of the increasingly globalized competition on individuals is crucial not only for understanding the effects on various political attitudes, such as support for democracy, but also policy preferences and voting behavior. Studying globalization’s impact on policy preferences, Walter (2015) acknowledged previous research showing that globalization has a tendency to produce winners, losers, and a middle category that is “sheltered” from it (2015: 56). However, Walters develops her argument and claims that the loser category is more heterogeneous than previously acknowledged. Walter’s main argument is that the most important factor is the exposure to globalization that influences the distribution of globalization surplus, which in turn makes the mapping of winners and losers more difficult.

As Walters claims, the skill level of a worker and his occupational position are important factors that condition the effects of globalization. People with high skills and high exposure to global competition will be most likely to benefit from globalization and thus perceive a low threat to their income and social status. On the other hand, low-skilled people exposed to globalized competition will feel the most threatened, as their jobs are easily replaceable, which puts them under constant pressure and fear about their future. This indicates the shift of the common denominator from socio-demographics (unemployed vs. employed) to the psycho-social factors (those who feel threatened vs. those who benefit from globalization).

When the fear of losing a job becomes present for a longer time, the feelings of insecurity and uncertainty might evolve into more permanent anxiety, which subsequently strengthen the attitudes that are negative
towards the perceived culprits. As argued above, the perceived blame lies mostly within the political establishment representing the elite structures. The reason is that the political and economic elites invited and uphold the neoliberal policies in the current shape.

Linking the capitalist system of economic governance to the psychological well-being of individuals, Neilson argues that the logic of capitalism under the neoliberal paradigm generates “a variegated and heterogeneous global class structure characterized by unevenly deepening precarity” (2015: 198). In his work, Neilson claims that it is the precarity that establishes the basis of relative anxiety. Renshon, Lee and Tingley (2015) also showed that increased anxiety is related to more extreme political attitudes. Their findings show that higher anxiety leads to extreme political beliefs even if the stimuli behind anxiety are not related to politics. Thus, the second set of hypotheses is as follows. People who regularly experience higher states of anxiety should display lower support for democracy (H2a), and they should also reduce their support for the principles of liberal democracy (H2b).

Globalization is also linked to sharper competition on labor markets and higher individualization in many areas of human life and activities. People who find themselves on the losing side of globalization might therefore have feelings of failure. Therefore, the next hypothesis expects that people who report more intense feelings of failure will not report different support for democracy as a regime, compared to people without such feelings (H3a). On the other hand, we expect intense feelings of failure to lead to lower support for liberal democratic principles (H3b).

A major issue related to globalization and the fear of job losses is immigration. Putting the migration crisis of 2015 aside, the main narrative had been that immigrants are taking low-paid jobs from low-skilled nationals (Hogan and Haltinner 2015, Alba and Foner 2014). To a certain extent, immigration has the same economic rationale as production offshoring, an increased pressure on labor cost downsizing. Economic migration, particularly within Europe, has a similar effect as if the jobs would have gone abroad, as the firms’ aim is to exert a downward price pressure on labor. Therefore, people usually perceive immigrants to be a threat based on competition over resources (e.g. jobs). Son-Hing (2013) pointed out that reducing regulation and fostering competition, together with globalization and immigration, all lead to greater feelings of threat. Consequently, this leads to prejudice, especially if competing with out-group members.

Babos, Vilagi and Oravcova (2016) employed focus groups techniques to study reasons why people in Slovakia reject the idea of immigration and found that the feeling of economic threat is the main reason. The most illustrative is a quote of a respondent who was afraid that the immigration to Germany would push down wages to the extent that her own husband,
a Slovak working weekly shifts in Germany would lose his job there. Simply, the argument that immigrants would steal jobs from local people prevailed in people’s reasoning against migrants. As the data used in this research were collected in 2012, the 2015 migration crisis could not influence these results in any way.

Departing from the reviewed research, the last twin of hypotheses looks at the feelings of threat posed by immigration, as part of the broad globalization process. As the migration issue has been politically discussed for a long time, and the Visegrad countries also experienced strong labor migration from countries as Serbia, Romania and Ukraine, we expect this to have an influence on support for both democracy and its liberal principles. The corresponding hypotheses are as follows. People who feel more threatened by immigration, and thus refuse to allow migrants in the country, will show a decreased support for democracy (H4a) and lower support for liberal democratic principles (H4b). However, we expect the latter relationship to be stronger than the former.

4. Data and Methods

We use the European Social Survey 2012 to test our hypotheses. The ESS 2012 wave has a special rotating module on understanding democracy, which allows for going beyond the basic satisfaction with democracy or trust towards government. The dataset also includes many work- and economy-related items which are important to control for the employment situation and financial difficulties a household might be undergoing. Subjective well-being and the emotional state of respondents are other important factors in the study of globalization effects, and these are included in the 2012 ESS.

Although the individual data in this study are nested within a country context and thus multilevel regression modelling would be an ideal way to proceed (Snijders and Bosker 1999), due to the fact that only four countries are compared, we perform a regression analysis with country dummies and cluster the standard errors on the country level (Cordero and Simon 2016, Bickel 2007, Browne and Draper 2000, Kreft and De Leeuw 1998). The results are robust and comparable with the individual level coefficients based on the multilevel techniques (Walter 2010, Maas and Hox 2005).

4.1. Dependent Variable

The support for democracy is defined in two ways. The first one is diffuse support for democracy as a regime (Easton 1965). The question asks “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?” and the answers run from 0 (not important at all) to 10 (extremely
important). This indicator has been established in the empirical research (Cordero and Simon 2016, Stoycheff and Nisbet 2014, Norris 2011).

The second dimension of support for democracy is acknowledging the importance of various liberal principles for a democratic regime. In this research we followed Dahl’s criteria for polyarchy as a highly liberalized and inclusive form of democracy and we chose three basic principles: minority rights protection, opposition’s rights to criticize government and media freedom. We constructed the indicator based upon the three questionnaire items. Factor analysis confirmed that there is one underlying latent factor driving the answers to these questions. The reliability test also confirmed high scale reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.77).

4.2. Independent Variables
Several independent variables were crucial to testing our hypotheses. General well-being is of high importance as it has been theorized and shown to reflect the impact of globalization. In order to maintain comparability, we operationalize well-being as an answer to the question “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?” The answers run from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely satisfied). This item has been shown to reflect various aspects of general well-being such as health, material circumstances or security (Barnes and Hall 2013, Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh 2010, Helliwell, Huang and Harris 2009). For higher level of anxiety feelings we used the following question: “How much of the time during the past week did you feel anxious?” The answer scale offered four options, however, due to the very small share of answers in the category “All or almost all of the time” we merged it with the category “Most of the time” and treated the anxiety variable as categorical with three values: i) None or almost none of the time; b) Some of the time; c) Most + Almost or all of the time.

As for the feelings of failure, we include an answer to the question: “How much do you agree or disagree with... the following statements: At times I feel as if I am a failure.” The answers were on a 5-point Likert scale. Immigration attitudes were measured as the degree to which people would allow foreigners to come and live in their country. The original three items in the questionnaire ask separately about foreigners of 1) the same ethnic or race group, 2) different ethnic or race group, and 3) poorer non-European countries. Factor analysis confirmed that there is one latent factor driving the responses to all three questions. Therefore, we constructed one composite indicator of immigration attitudes (Cronbach’s alpha equals 0.90).

For the rest of the control variables we used standard socio-demographics such as age, education, gender, employment status and other. Also important
control variables identified from the previous research were used, such as political trust, religiosity, satisfaction with economy, and self-placement in society. The last item is a proxy to self-perceived position in a society (Evans and Kelly 2004). Some scholars may use the term class, although one may object that class affiliation is related with work position, while the used indicator is broader. The exact question reads “There are people who tend to be towards the top of our society and people who tend to be towards the bottom. On this card there is a scale that runs from top to bottom. Where would you place yourself on this scale nowadays?”

5. Findings
Before we proceed to the regression results we briefly review the general state of support for democracy and support for liberal democracy principles in Visegrad countries.

For easier presentation of support for democracy in the region, the 11-point scale was rescaled into three categories. The original answers ranging from 0 to 3 were grouped as “not very important”, answers from 4 to 6 are together in a “neutral” category, and answers 7 to 10 are labelled “Very important”.

According to the European Social Survey 2012, the majority of citizens in the region consider it important to live in a democratic regime (on average, slightly more than 80% of people claimed so). The positive support is lowest in the Czech Republic with only 78% of people saying it is important to live in a democracy. The highest proportion of support for democracy is in Hungary, at the level of 84%.

**Figure 1: Importance of Living in a Democracy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Not important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>84.06%</td>
<td>13.76%</td>
<td>2.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>79.73%</td>
<td>16.36%</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>78.77%</td>
<td>16.73%</td>
<td>9.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>78.44%</td>
<td>16.56%</td>
<td>5.01%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey 2012, author’s calculation
In the second step, support for all three liberal democratic principles was calculated. We calculated two more indicators. First, we estimated how many people consider all three principles to be important, i.e. indicate their answer to lie between 7 and 10 on all three indicators simultaneously. In other words, a person is considered to be generally supportive of liberal democracy if he/she claims minority rights protection, free speech and opposition freedom to be relatively important (seven or above). We call this group soft liberal.

Second, as a new indicator independent from the one above, we also estimate how many citizens stated very clearly that all three of the liberal democratic principles are very important. Put simply, a respondent is seen as a strong supporter of liberal democratic principles only if she answers “very important (value 10 on the original answer scale)” on all three items simultaneously. This group of people we call core liberals. It is important to note that the two groups are not complementary neither mutually exclusive. Rather, the latter is a subset of the former. Put simply, core liberal respondents are included in the group of soft liberals, while soft liberals may not necessarily be in the core liberal group.

Figure 2 presents separately the shares of soft and core liberals in the Visegrad countries. In all four countries the majority of population belongs to soft liberals. Poland has the highest share of soft liberals (65%) in the Visegrad group, while the Czech Republic has the least, yet still the majority of population (51%). The picture changes considerably when we look just at the core liberals. They represent a minority in all countries. Hungary seems to have the most core liberals (34%). On the other hand, only 14% and 15% of population in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, respectively, consider minority rights protection, media freedom and opposition rights as very important.

There is no obvious explanation for differences between the Visegrad four countries in regard to their attitudes towards democracy. Similarity of the Czech and Slovak Republics could be explained to certain extent by their common history and unitary state under the previous, non-democratic communist rule prior to 1989. On the other hand, Polish above-average pro-democratic attitudes are often explained as being another expression of pro-Western orientation caused dominantly by Poland’s attempts to demarcate itself from Russia. However, bringing precise explanation would require a novel research design that is well beyond this chapter.

The rest of this subchapter explains which factors contribute to the lower support for liberal democratic principles on an individual level.

The sample consists of respondents from four Visegrad countries. The average age in the sample is 47.5 years. There were 54% men and 46% women, with the median education being the ISCED level 4 (upper secondary education). The mean political trust is rather low (2.9 on a scale from 0 to 10) and the mean self-placement in society is 5.1, which corresponds to
the numerical average of the scale and it means that neither lower class nor higher class is overrepresented (by subjective self-perception).

In order to test our hypotheses, we built and ran two distinct regression models. We distinguished between the support for democracy and support for the principles of a specific type of democracy, the liberal one. Therefore, we formulated two sets of hypotheses: the factors with hypothesized effects on support for democracy in general, and the effects on support for liberal democratic principles. Table 1 shows the regression coefficients and significance levels of all models.

The overall well-being is related to the support for democracy as well as to the support for its liberal form. The coefficients are significant at the 0.001 level. Therefore, we can say that overall well-being is contributing to the support for democracy, and well-being is also positively associated with liberal democratic principles. Thus, we accept hypotheses 1a and 1b.

The second pair of hypotheses expected a higher intensity of anxiety to lower people’s support for democracy and also support for liberal democratic principles. The analysis shows that there is a significant distinction between people, who don’t feel anxious and people who feel anxious some of the time. People with a lower intensity of anxiety support both democracy and its liberal principles less, on average, by 0.188 and 0.183 points compared to people with no or almost no anxious feelings. With an increasing
### Table 1: Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support for democracy</th>
<th>Appreciation of Liberal Democratic Principles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Well-being</td>
<td>0.170***</td>
<td>0.104***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling as a failure</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.090***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings about household income</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration attitudes</td>
<td>-0.140***</td>
<td>-0.169***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with state of economy</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.078***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-placement in society</td>
<td>0.048*</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political trust</td>
<td>0.036*</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.008**</td>
<td>0.006*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (base: Men)</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (ISCED)</td>
<td>0.143***</td>
<td>0.069***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Status (base: Paid work)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In education</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.258*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety feelings (base: None or almost none of the time)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some of the time</td>
<td>-0.188**</td>
<td>-0.183***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of the time</td>
<td>-0.342**</td>
<td>-0.512***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country (base: Czech Republic)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.954***</td>
<td>0.712***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.270**</td>
<td>0.612***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.221*</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>6.065***</td>
<td>6.870***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6594</td>
<td>6402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey 2012, author’s calculation

Note: (a) p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
intensity of anxiety the support for democracy drops even more, on average by 0.342 points compared to persons with no anxiety. The support for liberal democracy is influenced even more, on average by 0.512 points among people with a high intensity of anxiety, compared to people with no feelings of anxiety. This indicates that a higher intensity of anxiety is distorting support for liberal democracy rather more than the support for democracy in general. Hypotheses 2a and 2b are accepted.

Third, we hypothesized that the subjective perception of self as a failure would not affect the importance of living in democracy, while it will decrease support for liberal democratic principles. The regression analysis supports our expectations. The coefficient in the first model is not statistically significant and thus we cannot say that feelings of failure would influence support for democracy. However, it seems that this feeling is negatively contributing to the support for liberal principles. In other words, people who experience feelings of failure do not change their support for democracy as a regime, but they reduce their support for minority rights protection, opposition rights and media freedom. We accept the hypotheses 3a and 3b.

Our fourth pair of hypotheses expected negative immigration attitudes to reduce (liberal) support for democracy. Regression analysis shows the effect rather clearly, and the influence of immigration attitudes is growing stronger as we move from support for democracy to liberal principles’ support. Hypotheses 4a and 4b are accepted.

6. Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter argues that, although the explanations based on external limits to elite behavior and economic crisis are valuable, there is a need to go beyond the financial crisis of 2008–2009. Doing so, scholars need to look at the more long-term process of globalization, which has distributional consequences and impacts people’s well-being. This study showed that socially and psychologically deprived people tend to display lower support for democracy and even lower support for liberal democratic principles.

In this study we relied on previous research that linked the neoliberal process of globalization and immigration to well-being, job offshoring, feelings about income security and anxiety. The main mechanism linking these issues is sharper competition and higher uncertainty mostly, but not solely, in the labor markets. Departing from that point, we were able to operationalize the impact of globalization on people’s individual lives and thus study its further connection to the support for democracy. At this point, we have to admit that the effects of globalization that we found are to a great extent indirect.

We confirmed most of our hypotheses. The attitudinal and emotional factors that are linked with the consequences of globalization are negatively associated
with both support for democracy in general, as well as its liberal principles. In addition, the relationship between immigration attitudes and anxiety feelings is stronger, i.e. more disruptive for the liberal democratic principles than the democracy as such. Feelings of failure are associated only with support for the principles of liberal democracy, and not for democracy in general.

The main conclusion of this article is as follows. If we accept previous research in that the increasing dominance of globalization has a significant impact on the economic and psychological well-being of citizens on its losing side, then we have to admit that there are significant indications of further negative consequences for the support for democracy, and even stronger negative impacts on the support for its liberal principles – securing freedom of speech and minority rights protection. The global economic crisis might have accelerated the process; however, is not the only economic force behind the falling support for liberal democracy.

An additional finding is noteworthy. This research indicates that the impact of globalization on (liberal) support for democracy is channeled not only through economic factors, but also through the subjective perception of the psychological well-being of citizens. As the regression analysis showed, this holds particularly for the support for liberal democratic principles. Mainly the feelings of failure and intensified anxiety played a substantial role. This might have possibly significant consequences in the real world. If globalization and its redistribution effects intensify their negative psychological consequences we may even witness a further drop in support of liberal democracy in whole Europe.

In addition to the hypotheses drawn from the literature, one more finding is worth discussing. For students it seems to be substantially less important to live in liberal democracy compared to other groups (employed, pensioners, and unemployed and inactive). This finding is in line with recent research on the rise of the popularity of extreme right parties in Slovakia (Gyarfasova and Slosiarik 2016, Babos, Vilagi and Oravcova 2016). Particularly Gyarfasova and Slosiarik (2016) pointed out that it is mostly first-time voters that contributed to the entrance of Kotleba’s Neo-Nazi party into parliament in the 2016 elections.

This research certainly has some limits. First, it is only possible to speak of indications, as the proper design for studying causality would require better, ideally panel data. Strictly speaking, the cross-sectional survey data used in this study only allows us to estimate relationship between socio-economic and psychological attributes of respondents and their support for democracy. Second, larger number of countries in the future would allow for multilevel modelling and thus include various country-level specificities. Future research might also come with more precise conceptualization of the globalization effects on individual life and thus help to find better
indicators to test. However, the main argument that globalization effects, channelled via the economic and emotional well-being of individuals, have consequences for the support for liberal democracy remains upheld.

Recent popular votes in developed democracies witnessed a few efforts of voters to reverse globalization, the Brexit referendum being the most notable example. The challenge therefore remains to include globalization effects on individual lives, and particularly the psychological factors, into our studies of political attitudes and electoral behavior.

References


4. Democracy in Crisis?  
The Czech Republic in Post-Accession and Economic Turmoil

Petra Guasti and Zdenka Mansfeldová

1. Introduction

The fall of communism provided fascinating insights into the potential for, and the limitations of, the large-scale reshaping of society. No uniform patterns of democracy and governance emerged in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Pridham 2008), and the differences among the CEE countries are often ascribed to historical legacies, temporal trends, and previous levels of reform (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010).

External factors played a significant role in supporting CEE democratization (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010). The European Union (EU) was undoubtedly the most important external actor that accelerated the consolidation of democracy – EU conditionality facilitated significant changes in governance and reform capacity and significantly influenced policy choices and the performance of institutions (Pridham 2008, Vachudova 2009).

The onset of the global economic crisis in 2008, which significantly affected most CEE countries, further complicated the post-accession picture (Dutkiewicz and Gorzelak 2013). Following the IMF approach, an economic crisis is defined here as an economic contraction and labour market impacts, leading to a drop in private consumption, GDP formation and subsequent cuts in government expenditures28 (Verick and Islam 2010: 49). The impacts of the economic crisis can be perceived as a stress test for the quality of democracy and the degree of democratic consolidation in CEE region. With the limited impact of external factors such as the EU, domestic actors are now at the focal point.

28 According to IMF data, the impact of the global economic crisis and the subsequent Euro crisis varied across the CEE. There was virtually no negative impact in terms of GDP or labour market indicators in Poland; medium economic contraction and medium labour market impact in the Czech Republic; medium economic contraction and severe labour market impact in Slovakia; Croatia, Slovenia, and Hungary experienced severe economic contraction and medium labour market impact, whilst the Baltic countries were hit the hardest - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania experienced both severe economic contraction and severe labour market impact (Verick and Islam 2010: 29).
For a long time, the Czech Republic was the poster child for economic transition (Myant et al. 1996), the frontrunner of the EU integration process (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, Vachudova 2005), and seen as a fully consolidated democracy (Merkel 2008). Having favorable historical legacies (Pop-Eleches 2007, Kitschelt 2001) and having experienced rather mild effects from the economic crisis regarding its economy and labour market (Verick and Islam 2010). So while, the Czech Republic had one of the best sets of structural conditions among CEE countries for establishing and maintaining consolidated democracy, the quality of democracy in the Czech Republic decreased (BTI 2015, SGI 2016, SGI 2017). This paradox makes the Czech Republic a compelling case for studying the interplay between the quality of democracy and the economic crisis.

We define the quality of democracy following Merkel (2007, 2008) as determined by the procedures, content, and outcomes of democratic governance (Mansfeldová and Guasti 2010). This definition to a large degree also overlaps with the definition provided by Brusis in this volume (Dahl’s notion of polyarchy plus accountability and responsiveness, see Brusis in this volume). The main aim of this chapter is to focus on the development of democracy (its quality) in the Czech Republic during and in the aftermath of the economic crisis (the period from 2008 to today, with the main focus on the time 2009–2014). We seek to answer the question, as to whether the economic crisis contributed to the weakening of Czech democracy, or if the external shock of the economic crisis further amplified pre-existing weaknesses.

In this chapter, we adopt a mixed method approach to the case study of the Czech Republic and combine information from secondary literature, democratic indices and Czech public opinion survey data to assess the extent to which economic crisis contributed to the decline in the quality of Czech democracy and the degree to which the democratic deconsolidation thesis (Ágh 2010) is relevant in the Czech case. We also show that the high dependency of the Czech economy on neighbouring countries, the on-going EU pressure to respect the Maastricht criteria and permanent oversight from the European Central Bank played a significant – anchoring role – during the crisis. Czech governments’ chaotic policy choices, their effects and lack of communication highlighted the weaknesses of Czech governance and further undermined the public perception of the government’s executive capacity, leading to a dramatic decrease of trust in government.

In order to analytically capture the changes in quality of democracy, we apply Merkel’s model of democratic consolidation the four levels which are: 1) constitutional consolidation – referring to the macro-level structural setup and interplay between democratic institutions; 2) representative
consolidation – concerning the territorial and functional representation of interests – focused on the meso-level of actors – in particular parties and interest groups; 3) behavioural consolidation – focused on formal and informal actors and 4) democratic consolidation of political culture – the micro level of citizen participation and active citizenship (Merkel 2008: 12–15).

2. Analytical Framework

The underpinning of our theoretical framework is the notion that economic crises challenge the stability and quality of democracy, and undermine the legitimacy of the democratic political order (Habermas 2008). To test the extent to which the economic crisis and its aftermath negatively affected the quality of democracy in the Czech Republic, we apply the notion of democracy in crisis from Habermas (1973) and Merkel (2014).

In his sequential model of a legitimacy crisis, Habermas links economic crisis (a periodical feature of capitalism) and democracy (1973). According to Habermas, an economic crisis triggers a rationality crisis – the failure of the administrative-political system to cope with the impact of economic crisis. This triggers a legitimation crisis – mass withdrawal of support for formal democracy; and finally to the motivational crisis – the decline of support for democracy as a normative order, erosion of work ethics and the rejection of capitalism. Thus according to Habermas, it is the inadequate handling of the economic crisis by politics, rather than the economic crisis itself, which causes the loss of trust by citizens, decreases the quality of democracy and ultimately leads to the loss of democratic legitimation (ibid.).

Merkel recognizes the theoretical contribution of Habermas’s model and sees it as a useful instrument to analyse the recent financial crisis and its effects on the quality of democracy (2014). However, Merkel claims Habermas underestimates the operational capacity of governments, resilience, and survivability of democracy as a political regime and in particular the interdependency of the internal developments in the individual stages of the model (Merkel 2014: 3–5). For the empirical study of the interplay between economic crisis and democracy, Merkel recommends a mixed methods approach – the combination of democratic indices, secondary analysis of existing surveys and single case studies (Merkel 2014).

Applied to the decline of democratic indicators in the Czech Republic in the recent years, this would mean that it is not the economic crisis or its

29 Here informal refers to outside the institutional scope – these actors are military (relevant in Latin American transition countries but not in CEE), major land owners (again not as pertinent in the Czech Republic), business, radical movements.
depth and impact *per se*, but the inability of the government to address the crisis\(^{30}\), which caused the disenchantment of the population\(^{31}\).

As for the role of external factors (EU), according to many scholars, the post-accession CEE picture is more complex (Epstein/Sedelmeier 2008, Sedelmeier 2012). Given the significant reduction in EU leverage after the accession, many rationalist (instrumentalist) scholars asserted that after the enlargement, EU democratic conditionality would be marginalized (Sedelmeier 2012) and domestic conditions will be a key factor ensuring the continuation of compliance and prevent backsliding (Gati 2007, Sedelmeier 2014). However, empirical analyses of the initial post-accession period have shown some to no signs of backsliding of CEE democracies, as the EU influence, while becoming more diffuse, persisted (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010, Pridham 2008).

Neither rationalist nor constructivist EU scholars hypothesized the effects of severe economic downturn within the CEE region. The most recent literature seems to contradict the earlier findings of the lasting effects of EU leverage. It shows that the economic crises and their aftermath reinforced the weaknesses within the CEE region, leading some authors to claim backsliding (Rupnik 2007, Greskovits 2015, Vachudova and Henley 2017, Ugur 2013) and even deconsolidation of the CEE political order (Ágh 2010)\(^{32}\). The post-accession and post-economic crises CEE picture is rather gloomy. Ugur (2013) shows that EU conditionality did not have (statistically) a significant effect on reform efforts and governance in CEE in the post-accession period.

Across the CEE region the decline of democratic indicators such as the functioning of checks and balances, stability and representation capacity of the party system, citizens’ approval of democratic norms and procedures, and media freedom sharpened during the economic crisis. The recent (2015–2017) developments in Poland provide further evidence of the significant role of domestic forces, the ease with which reforms can be reversed, and the relative weakness of the EU as an anchoring mechanism in the CEE member states.

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30 This is, however, going beyond the notion of steering capability, as it involves not only the ability of the government to cope – steer the crisis but also the loss of public support – legitimacy.

31 As Brusis notes “the crises challenged the nexus between economic integration and prosperity and widened the gap between responsive and responsible government” (Brusis 2016).

32 This pessimistic account is based on the persistence and weakening of CEE democracies regarding effectiveness, efficiency, and efficacy (Ágh 2010) and their mutual reinforcement (Hacek et al. 2013). Others have disagreed (Bustikova and Guasti 2017) proposing a more nuanced account of the recent changes in the CEE region instead. The backsliding literature contradicts the norm-driven constructivist account (cf. Börzel 2005, Pridham 2008) and questions the extent to which the lock-in of EU conditionality-induced institutional change acted as an adequate safeguard for pre-accession institutional changes (Sedelmaier 2012).
In contrast to Habermas’s sequential model, whose main contribution is the link between economic crises and changes in the quality of democracy (1973) we see Merkel’s model (2014) as more nuanced, and focused on the main elements of democratic consolidation on macro-, meso- and micro-levels. Furthermore, unlike Habermas’s model, which is defined by a significant degree of linearity, Merkel’s model allows for an analytical assessment of the quality of democracy – both its progress and regress. Even if consolidation is concluded, it remains reversible, as the stable, but fragile democratic equilibrium can be distorted by exogenous shocks of economic or foreign-policy crisis (ibid.).

We recognize that the degree of democratic consolidation and the quality of democracy are not identical, but view these as overlapping concepts. Here, quality of democracy is understood as a conceptual tool to capture the variation of democratic quality over time. The focus on the quality of democracy allows us to analytically capture the changes on the various levels (macro, meso, and micro), and to overcome the contradictory assertions in the literature on CEE outlined above.

To analyse the effects of the recently ended economic crisis on the quality of democracy in the Czech Republic, we draw on literature on the degree of consolidation in CEE in general and in the Czech Republic in particular (Merkel 2007, 2008, Pridham 2008, Vachudova 2005). We also draw on existing surveys – the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), which analyse and evaluates the quality of democracy, market economy, and political management; the Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) – a cross-national survey of governance in the OECD countries; and Czech public opinion polls and Eurobarometer data for the period under study.

Our hypothesis stipulates that the decrease in the quality of democracy in the Czech Republic during and after the economic crisis is a temporary crisis of the political and administrative system and does not indicate deconsolidation. Meaning, that one (or more) level(s) of consolidation (macro, meso, micro) can be (temporarily) weakened, but the Czech political system still possesses a satisfactory degree of resistance to the external (and domestic) effects of the economic crisis.

In the first part of our analysis, we will outline the trajectory of the economic crisis in the Czech Republic and the government’s response. In the second part of our analysis we will follow Merkel’s model of democratic consolidation assessing first, the degree of constitutional consolidation in the Czech Republic (and its resilience); second, evaluating the representative consolidation, focus on the development of the functional representation of interest by political parties; third, outline changes in behavioural consolidation focusing on support for democracy; and fourth, assess democratic
consolidation of political culture focusing on the role of civil society as a possible counterbalance to the motivational crisis.

In the conclusions, we highlight that the Czech democracy after the economic crisis, while shaken and the quality of democracy visibly decreased, is not in a legitimacy crisis. We show that the main problem lies in the struggle of expectations about what democracy should deliver within parts of Czech society. We also find that for the time being, the key domestic factors contributing to the resilience of Czech democracy are the relative strength of Czech political culture, the absence of viable political alternatives (including radical movements). Key external factors (EU) are weakened (especially vis-à-vis democracy), but the EU remains an important stabilizing economic element.

3. Trajectory of the economic crisis in the Czech Republic and the government’s response

The Czech Republic is one of the most prosperous post-communist CEE states (Merkel 2008). It is characterized by high human development, very low poverty rate and still low inequalities (Mansfeldová, Rakušanová Guasti 2010). The global economic crisis and the slowdown in the global economy in late 2008 had a delayed and indeed a mild impact on the Czech economy. The effects of the crisis were first felt in the country in 2009 – the orientation of the Czech economy toward exports and its dependence on the automotive industry made the domestic economy vulnerable to the economic downturn in international markets (Guasti et al. 2014).

The growth of the Czech economy, as measured by GDP, slowed down in 2009 due to a decline in industrial production, an increase in unemployment and a decrease in foreign direct investment (Verick and Islam 2010). With some delay, the Czech economy slowed down, and the consequences of the economic recession were reflected in the labour market (Höhne et al. 2015). Nonetheless, throughout the crisis, the Czech unemployment rate remained under the average level of the EU-27 (and later EU-28), and the situation on the labour market improved in 2013 and 2014 (harmonized unemployment rate in the Czech Republic was 7%; 10.8% in EU28). Current unemployment (2017) is under 4% in the CR and around 8% in the EU.

In 2010, the worsening state of public finances led the PM Nečas government to adopt a fiscal consolidation package, to temporarily stall mandatory spending and increase tax revenues. The intended effects of these measures were rather limited – a positive balance of trade did not adequately compensate for the decrease in demand for consumers’ goods and services

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(Guasti et al. 2014). Still, the unintended consequences were significant – the stagnation or lowering of living standards for a significant proportion of the population, a sharp decrease in citizens’ trust in government and its steering capability to manage the crisis.

The level of economic growth slowed down again in 2012 and 2013 (Verick and Islam 2010). The Czech National Bank reacted by lowering interest rates; the government introduced savings in the public sector simplifying administrative procedures and structures; temporarily reducing valorisation of pensions to decrease expenditures. Most additional expenses for 2013 were halted, including the reduction of investment in renewable energy resources, an essential part of the country’s agreements with the EU aiming at reducing the environmental damages of the Communist era.

And while the austerity measures and restrictive policies of the government lowered the budget deficit in 2012, their effects were short-lived, and the deficit grew again in 2013, and the Czech Republic (intentionally) failed to fulfil the criteria for entering into the Eurozone. The abstention of the Czech Republic from the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, indicated the further distancing of the Czech political representation from the European integration project, leaving the Czech Republic on the side-lines of further integration driven by closer cooperation within the Eurozone.

In March 2014 the PM Sobotka government attempted to reverse this trend by approving accession to the EU fiscal pact. The government aims to join the treaty so that budget constraints will be effective for the Czech Republic after the adoption of the Euro. The Senate has approved the accession to the EU fiscal pact smoothly; the consent of the Chamber of Deputies is a matter of further political negotiations.

Overall, the impact of the economic crisis on the Czech economy was mild in economic terms, but significant politically. The post-crisis economic recovery has been rather slow and nonlinear. The economy pulled out of recession in the second half of 2013 which started to be more evident in 2014, with a modest growth of GDP (2.6%) and foreign direct investment (FDI).

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34 According to leading Czech economists, the Czech Republic was better prepared for the adoption of the EURO than for example Slovakia. However, in the Czech Republic, only 45% supported the adoption of the EURO in 2008–2009, and the governing parties were against this idea (Naše společnost 2017).

35 Initially, together with the UK, the Czech Republic did not sign the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union; but the PM, Nečas, did not exclude, that the country would sign the treaty in the future. The main reasons for the opt-out were objections to the increased liabilities and the fact that non-Eurozone states are not granted observer status at all Eurogroup and Euro-summit meetings. The (then) President Václav Klaus was an opponent, the newly elected president Miloš Zeman, inaugurated in March 2013, expressed his support.
In the aftermath of the economic crisis, Czech economic policy focused on the single overriding objective of reducing the state budget deficit and thereby limiting the growth of public debt. Both were low by European standards, but the policy mix and severity of austerity measures were similar to those in Eurozone member states facing severe debt crises (Mansfeldová 2015).

4. Democracy in the Czech Republic

4.1. Constitutional consolidation

From an international comparative perspective, the Czech Republic belongs to a category of countries with a rather successful political transformation and a consolidated market economy (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002, Merkel 2004). The transformation process had clear aims and proceeded consecutively – the essential features of democratic political life are firmly established in the Czech Republic institutional setup is stable and there is a clear separation of the individual institutions. Free and fair elections are held on a regular basis, and the freedom of expression; press as well as the right of association are guaranteed. There are no significant forces that would preclude the execution of state powers. Control mechanisms (checks and balances) and constitutional order are guaranteed (Mansfeldová and Guasti 2010, Pridham 2009) Civil rights are protected, although the record on anti-discrimination measures suggests that this issue is not given much priority (ibid.). Civil society is numerous, growing and increasingly mobile, nationally and transnationally (Rakušanová 2007, Cisař and Vráblíková 2012).

The Czech Republic has had a series of fragile minimum winning coalition governments (Mansfeldová and Lacina 2015). Between 1993 and 2017, the Czech Republic has experienced 14 cabinets36; however, two of them did not pass a parliamentary inauguration vote (Topolánek I. and Rusnok). Only three of the fourteen appointed cabinets lasted a full four-year term (Klaus I., Zeman and Sobotka). After the 2006, 2010, and 2013 general elections, the political situation in the Czech Republic has been marked by a continuous struggle between a weak center-right (and in the case of 2013 election center-left) coalition government and a strengthened but divided opposition as well as by growing internal divisions among and within the coalition parties (Guasti and Mansfeldová 2017).

The result of the October 2017 parliamentary elections is similar – ANO won by a landslide (almost 30%), but the only parties willing to support

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36 Any change in the set of parties holding cabinet membership is counted as a change of cabinet.
its minority ‘semi-technocratic’ government are the Social Democrats (as a minor coalition partner) and the Communists (as a ‘silent’ partner in the investiture vote and subsequent key votes). This government is likely to be as fragile as the previous coalition governments (cf. Bustikova and Guasti 2017) and the divided opposition is unlikely to unite (cf. Guasti and Mansfeldová 2018).

4.2. Representative consolidation

Regarding its quality, the main weakness of the Czech democracy lays within the second level of consolidation – the representative consolidation, in particular, the political parties. Initially, the Czech party system stabilized quickly (Kostelecký 1994). The structures of political parties in the Parliament have been consolidated since the 1992 elections (Kostelecký 2002, Kitschelt et al. 1999). Extremist parties exist in the CR, but until 2017 they were not a part of governing coalition as in other CEE countries. There were and are authoritarian types of leaders, but they were split across parties. However, from the very beginning, the party system was accompanied by two problems – permanent exclusion of some parties from cooperation and cabinet formation, and personal ambitions and animosities. The exclusion of certain parties had an impact on coalition and cabinet formation and stability.

The second problem, the personal animosities – not only between ‘political camps,’ but also within individual parties – significantly hinders coalition formation, and coalition governance (Vlachová 2001). As a consequence, unstable cabinets governing with very narrow majorities emerged and often failed to complete their electoral terms.

Until 2006, both the degree of fragmentation and the effective number of parties continuously declined. This pattern stemmed from the ability of the two largest political parties Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and Civic Democratic Party (ODS) to secure more than two-thirds of the popular vote in 2006, hence weakening the role of the smaller political parties (with the exception of the KSČM which continued to attract a strong protest vote). However, most parties faced deep internal divisions and power struggles (Mansfeldová 2013).

37 In the nineties continuously; it was a right-wing extremist Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ) and Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). SPR-RSČ was represented in the Chamber of Deputies in 1992–1998, and in 2013 was dissolved, as another radical right party, Dawn of Direct Democracy entered parliament (with zero coalition potential, the same as its predecessor). On the other hand, KSČM is a continuous parliamentary party, with a stable gain of votes and a very stable electoral base.
Today, the Czech party system is consolidated, but fluid and inherently unstable (Hanley 2012, Bustikova and Guasti 2017). New, often protest, parties emerge; enter into the parliament shortly after being established; new political groupings and splinter parties are also formed within the parliament during a single electoral term (Linek 2010). Survival of the new parties is limited, as they focus on power and fail to establish linkages to society (Linek and Lyons 2013). However, these small political parties play a crucial role in building coalition governments. One exception is ANO, who entered parliament as a strong newcomer and whose support has been continuously growing, through until their landslide victory in October 2017, when ANO received almost thirty percent of the votes (Bustikova and Guasti 2017).

In the last seven years, the Czech Republic is experiencing the surge of populism both among major political parties (in particular Public Affairs in 2010 with its slogan “It is the end of the dinosaurs, do not vote for the lesser evil!”; ANO with its 2014 (local elections) abstract campaign “We just fix it!”, and with its vision of technocratic populism “We will run the state as a firm!” in 2017) and among smaller non-parliamentary subjects (Úsvit, SPD). And although strong tendencies towards radicalization cannot be observed, the Czech political system, and in particular its (former) significant players – the Social Democratic Party and the Civic Democratic Party are facing profound struggles (Mareš 2011) and declining support. In October 2017, Social Democrats lost more than 70% of their support compared to the previous elections (2013).

Between 2011 and 2013 these growing tensions within the main political parties further contributed to the instability of the governing coalition. The major change of the political landscape was the replacement of the scandal-ridden ODS on the right-side of the political spectra, by ANO formed by entrepreneur Andrej Babiš in 2013. Unlike the past, when new political

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38 By 2010 general election the degree of fragmentation increased (0.68 in 2006 and 0.78 in 2010) and so did the effective number of parties (3.17 – in 2006, 4.54 in 2010 and 5.6 in 2013). In 2010 two of the five parties represented in the Czech parliament were new, while the Green Party which was in parliament and government in the period 2006–2010, lost their position after the 2010 elections. Furthermore, the position of the two biggest parties, ČSSD and ODS weakened significantly over time; in the 2006 elections, they together obtained 77.5% of the seats, but in the 2010 elections only 54.5% of the seats, while the two new parties in the Chamber together received 32.5% of seats. This trend continued in the 2013 early elections; ČSSD and ODS received together only 33% of the seats while the two new parties Action of Unsatisfied Citizens (ANO) and Úsvit captured 30.5% of the seats. The traditional and well-established ODS, which was a constitutive force of the right for two decades, barely crossed the threshold for entering parliament.

39 A new political party Úsvit - the Dawn of Direct Democracy of the Senator Tomio Okamura, which emerged in 2012, was not able to gather broad public support for its covert xenophobic agenda and sank into obscurity in 2014. Okamura’s new party Freedom and Direct Democracy surged in 2017 thanks to anti-refugee and anti-Muslim sentiments, ignoring the accusation of embezzlement of party funds from Down by Okamura (cf. Bustikova and Guasti 2017).
parties emerged and faded within one electoral term, ANO was able to repeat its success from the 2013 parliamentary elections in the 2014 local elections and the 2017 parliamentary elections. The 2014 Senate elections also saw the return of the Christian Democrats to national politics (a change facilitated by the return of voters which in previous elections shifted to the splinter conservative party TOP 09).

The major cleavage of intra- and inter-party competition stems from disagreements over (1) all significant reforms, in particular taxes \(^{40}\) and (2) attitudes towards deepening of the process of European integration (in particular the speed of adoption of the Euro) (Bakke and Sitter 2013). These political developments are accompanied by an increasing public disenchantment with political parties and government performance (Tworzecki and Semetko 2012).

However, while these factors hint towards a crisis of rationality, and further contribute to the fluidity of the political system and growing populism, we do not detect the onset of a legitimation crisis (cf. Habermas 1973). Disenfranchised voters do not turn against democracy, instead, the success of VV in 2010 and even more ANO can be traced to the disenchantment with the current political elite and a belief that the root of the current crisis lays in the inability of the political elite to govern, rather than in the failure of democracy to cope (cf. Linek 2013, Bustikova, Guasti and Stanley 2017). This is instrumentalized by ANO populist campaigns portraying Andrej Babiš – a successful businessman – as a savior of the corruption-ridden ineffective Czech state, which, so the electorate are promised, Andrej Babiš will run as competently and efficiently as his business empire.

Furthermore, the support of rank and file social democrats and a significant part of the general population for Bohuslav Sobotka, during the internal party power struggle after the 2013 parliamentary elections \(^{41}\), indicate support for the normative order of democracy and rejection of any attempts by veto players to pursue their interests outside the democratic norms and

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40 In November 2013 Bohuslav Sobotka commenced coalition negotiations with ANO and KDU-ČSL and in late December 2013 agreement on all important issues – progressive taxation, the abolition of Nečas government social reform, and adoption of a law on property origin were agreed upon, and in January 2014 Sobotka Government was sworn into office.

41 The political battle further escalated after the 2013 elections in which President Zeman (former chairman of the ČSSD) attempted to sideline the party leader Bohuslav Sobotka and delegate the formation of a government to Michal Hašek (Vice Chairman of the party and Zeman’s ally). Zeman’s justification was that the party won the election by too small a margin. In this intra-party leadership coup d’état, in which rogue Social Democratic party leadership appointed Hašek in October as the lead negotiator in coalition talks (encouraged and backed by the President, at whose premises the rogue party wing met), social democrats in major cities organised public meetings and rallies in support of Bohuslav Sobotka. Due to the popular and rank and file social democrats’ rejection of Hašek and their strong support for Sobotka, Hašek was deserted by his allies.
institutions (Mansfeldová et al. 2004). In the 2017 elections, this sentiment brought the Pirate Party to Parliament, which made its name in some local municipalities as a force against political corruption.

4.3. Behavioural consolidation

In the Czech Republic, a clear disparity between a stable and high degree of general support for democracy and satisfaction with the democratic system and poor satisfaction with the current political situation and distrust of the political elite can be identified (Mansfeldová and Rakušanová Guasti 2010, Klingemann, Fuchs, Zielonka 2006). The Czechs associate democracy with freedom, participation, and socio-economic security. The level of satisfaction is higher among young and middle-aged people, with higher levels of education and good living standards (ibid.).

Between 2010 and 2012, the percentage of citizens satisfied with the political situation in the country ranged according to public opinion polls from 8% to 4% (December 2012) and the percentage of dissatisfied respondents rose from 58% to 79%. The growing societal dissatisfaction was accompanied by a slight downfall in the belief in equality, justice, and respect for human rights. More than half of the population (55%) thought their freedom of expression is respected. Only 38% believed they could have any influence over problems facing their municipality and only 8% thought they have any say in society in general. According to recent surveys (May 2017), the percentage of citizens satisfied with the current political situation decreased to 12%, the percentage of dissatisfied grew from 44% in May 2014 to 59% in May 2017.

Looking at institutional trust, in May 2017 the most trusted were the judiciary (48.6%) and the EU (28.6%). Only 17.7% of citizens trusted the government and 12.2% trusted the Lower Chamber of the Parliament. Only 9.5% of Czechs trusted political parties. This is a significant change as compared to May 2010: a decrease in trust of the EU, government and political parties (-23.2%, -14% and -2.6% respectively), an increase in trust of the judiciary and (slightly) the parliament (+14.5% and +0.1% respectively).

Citizens tend to trust municipal governments and mayors (61% and 60% respectively), regional governments and regional governors (44% and 42% respectively), and the President (48%).

The shifts in public opinion outlined here suggest that it is not only the performance of government and parliament but also a lack of information about public policy making and ineffective communication between the government and citizens. More than half of the citizens share the opinion that they cannot influence the government at all (Mansfeldová and Rakušanová Guasti 2010). Contrasting with the ineffective governmental communication, the ANO Chairman Andrej Babiš, communicates with citizens via multiple channels (face to face encounters around the country, social media – Twitter, Youtube, and last but not least via two printed and online dailies).

Mishler and Rose stress that for a government to function effectively, a minimum level of trust is necessary (2001: 418–419). Acknowledging Mishler and Roses’ argument on the relevance of trust as a key feature for gaining acceptance for the regime and its institutions, which is impeding the full consolidation of democracy, the general mistrust in institutions among the Czech population undermines the quality of Czech democracy. The main factor undermining trust in democratic institutions cited in the CEE is corruption, more precisely perception of corruption (Hacek et al. 2013). In the Czech Republic, corruption is a highly salient issue in the media and electoral campaigns (2010 and 2013, and less so in 2017, as the frontrunner Andrej Babiš, was facing police investigation for corruption). Both general public and experts view corruption as a major weakness of Czech democracy – gradually spreading through all areas of political and economic life, and so far unsuccessfully fought against (Dvorakova 2012, Bustikova and Guasti 2017).

The government’s ability to implement effective anti-corruption measures has been at best limited. The main impediment is the lack of political consensus – divergent views on anti-corruption policies among governing coalitions and even within the governing parties. This allows veto players from business and politics to successfully use formal and informal channels to hamper effective control of corruption (Guasti 2011). This is evidence pointing towards unfinished behavioural consolidation, which can only be counterbalanced by strong mobilization of reform actors – in the Czech case of civil society.

After large-scale scandals uncovered the extent to which EU funds were being targeted by corrupt practices, the EU froze structural funds for two Czech regions for several months and organized civil society decided to act. In 2013, twenty domestic and international NGOs formed a joint project

45 The economic sector established a close and often clientelistic connection with politics; the legislative regulation which should prevent such processes was only implemented slowly or was absent because of insufficient political will.
Reconstruction of the State aiming at developing effective anticorruption measures. Unlike previous NGO projects, Reconstruction of the State continuously monitors the voting behaviour of MPs. The NGO names and shames politicians in the media and social media. They solicited support of a group of Senators in the 2014 elections (19 elected Senators are committed to the support of anti-corruption measures pursued by the project). This binding of hands ensures that the political commitment is maintained.

One of the laws proposed by Reconstruction of the State was a law to limit financing of political parties. Babiš strongly opposes this proposition claiming that this law “would be designed against the ANO movement.” In March 2015 interview, Babiš also rejected the notion that regulations should be put in place to limit donations from sponsors or firms to political parties. Some of the attempts of Reconstruction of the State, were, however, a success. The first success of this new broader attempt to limit corruption is the adoption of the 2015 law that requires the publishing of public procurement contracts online. This law significantly transforms the currently non-transparent public procurement process.

After a significant political turmoil, the bill was adopted by the plenary of the Chamber of Deputies in September 2015. The Senate returned the bill to the Chamber of Deputies in October 2015 with significant amendments; however, the Chamber of Deputies retained its version and upheld the bill by absolute majority. In December 2015, the President (Miloš Zeman) signed the bill. The law came to effect on 1 July 2016.

46 The main goals of this coalition are: transparent party finance, asset declaration of elected officials, publishing of public procurement contracts online, the abolition of anonymous shares, transparent appointment procedures for the boards of state companies, independent public administration, protection of police investigations from political inference, transparent legislative process (removal of ad hoc amendments - so-called riders) and extension of the powers of the Supreme Audit Office.


48 Some anti-corruption NGOs have been attempting to introduce this legislation for years, but repeatedly, the commitment of political representatives continued to wither. The adopted version of the law (proposed by a group of MPs from the governing coalition including the two Vice-Chairmen of the Government Andrej Babiš and Pavel Bělobrádek) has been subject to some amendments. The final version is significantly less strict than the originally proposed bill.

49 The legislative process of the bill from committee to plenary stage was closely followed by NGOs and the media. The degree of political polarization – not only between the governing coalition and the opposition but also between the parties of the governing coalition was very high. Minority partners of the governing coalition threatened to leave the government if the bill did not pass.

to the original bill, the law exempts 10% of contracts from the need to be transparent, monitored and subject to legal oversight.\textsuperscript{51}

Nonetheless, this is progress. Even if selected state institutions exempt themselves from public scrutiny – thus hinting about the presence of the main veto players capable of blocking any anti-corruption legislation, the law introduces more transparency. Subsequently, data published in summer 2017 also shed light on ANO finances: Babiš is the sole donor to ANO, and the party is significantly in his debt. Also in respect of EU funding, in August 2017 Babiš was stripped of parliamentary immunity as police are taking a close look at the use of EU funds in the building of his “Stork’s Nest” center.

Another example is the changes in the rules for party and campaign financing. In April 2015, the Ministry of Interior eventually submitted an amendment to the law on political parties to parliament. The proposal was based on the Group of States against Corruption of the Council of Europe (GRECO) recommendations to the Czech Republic issued in 2011. The amendment was adopted by the Chamber of Deputies in June 2016, by the Senate in August 2016 and subsequently signed by the president. The Law (Act No. 302/2016 Coll.) came to force in January 2017. President Zeman named the first President of the Office for the Oversight of Political Parties and Political Movements (UHHPSH)\textsuperscript{52}. For individual political parties, the biggest changes brought by the law are the introduction of financial limits for party financing and electoral campaigns, the mandatory establishment of transparent accounts, greater revenue regulation of political parties and movements. To a lesser degree, the oversight will affect entities established by political parties and movements (think tanks). The website of the UHHPSH includes direct links to the transparent accounts of all parties (in their respective banks), where all transactions can be viewed in real time. As of November 2017, 98 parties are registered with transparent accounts, including all parliamentary parties.

\textsuperscript{51} The political concessions made in the process include the introduction of minimal contractual value (CZK 50,000, the equivalent of EUR 1,800). Exemption from the need to publish contracts in the Central Public Procurement Registry for small municipalities, the Parliament and the Office of the President, Constitutional Court, Supreme Audit Office, and the Office of the Ombudsman.

\textsuperscript{52} The UHHPSH is the independent regulatory authority, for the monitoring and oversight of party and campaign finance. It replaces parliament, which until 2017 was the oversight body. The UHHPSH is also responsible for the control of political institutes (think tanks established by political parties). In addition to the UHHPSH, the law also introduced limits on the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns. The first campaign scrutinized by the UHHPSH was the October 2017 parliamentary elections. As of November 2017, two relatively small fines were issued, one against ANO leader Andrej Babiš for breaching campaign rules by disseminating his book ‘What I dream about when I sleep,’ the other against a group of ANO opponents for dissemination of an anti-Babiš movie “Yellow Baron.”
This highlights an interesting paradox – a long-term inability of the government to effectively tackle corruption combined with a high response by civil society which strengthens anti-establishment forces. The populist anti-establishment ANO rode the anti-corruption narrative to coalition government in 2013, and in 2017 to its landslide victory in parliamentary elections. It offered both the diagnosis (established parties are corrupt) and the cure (‘we will solve it’). The voters chose to ignore that Andrej Babiš himself was entangled in alleged fraud regarding EU funds and instead chose to believe that ‘wealthy people do not need to steal.’ For Babiš, who was stripped of parliamentary immunity during the investigation of the Stork’s Nest in summer 2016, the bonus of the 2017 election is a new parliamentary immunity. The fragmented parliament is unlikely to strip him of parliamentary immunity again. Hence, Babiš successfully rode the anti-corruption narrative to personal impunity.

4.4. Democratic consolidation

Moving on to the consolidation of political culture – civil society in the Czech Republic, has a long tradition and has been successful in creating a space between the spheres of private interest and the state. Interest groups have mushroomed in the Czech Republic since 1990. In 2017, there are around 130,000 autonomous, self-organized groups, associations, foundations and organizations registered in the Czech Republic (not all are active). The number of NGOs in individual regions of the Czech Republic differs, whereby there are “more” and “less” active regions. The difference between these regions is based on structural, cultural, historical and institutional factors. Nongovernmental organizations play an important role in local planning and the creation of regional strategies (Rakusanova 2007, Mansfeldová et al. 2004, Mansfeldová and Rakušanová Guasti 2010).

The economic crisis has negatively affected the level of funding of many civil society organizations, especially organizations focused on public services, which are funded through local budgets, this has been partially replaced by access to EU funding (Císař and Vráblíková 2013). As of 2014, a new Civil Code came into force, providing legal regulation of non-governmental and non-profit organizations, i.e., civil associations, clubs, foundations and other civil society organizations. The aim is to improve accountability and transparent funding (Bertelsmann 2014).

The most influential interest groups are business associations and trade unions that also have considerable competences regarding labour relations and economic policy. During the economic crises, the economic interest groups became important partners for the government to seek solutions to
boost economic prosperity and national societal cohesion, while simultaneously actively organizing anti-governmental protests and protests against governmental measures (Mansfeldová 2015).

New platforms, such as Stop Government (Stop Vlade), ProAlt, Real Democracy (Skutečná demokracie), joined forces with trade unions in organizing public demonstrations during the economic crises (most notably in 2010 and 2011). Protests also continued in 2012, when in April around 100,000 people gathered in Prague to protest against austerity measures and neoliberal governmental policies, demanding the resignation of the government and early elections (Císař and Vráblíková 2013, Mansfeldová 2015).

In November 2012, during the twenty-third anniversary of the Velvet Revolution, trade unions organized demonstrations in Prague and other Czech cities under the motto “Democracy looks different,” caused by dissatisfaction with pension reform, increasing VAT, increasing economic gaps in society and restitution of church property. Apart from trade unions, students also took to the streets. During the so-called “week of unrest” in 2012 over 10,000 students demonstrated in front of the seat of the government in Prague against the proposed educational reforms, which would lead to restrictions on academic freedom and the introduction of university fees.

Further and significantly larger protests took place in November 2014, during the ceremony commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution. The main target of the protests was President Miloš Zeman and his pro-Russian statements, as well as the political representation which was criticized for being inefficient and unable to perform significant reforms. However, smaller demonstrations also took place supporting the President.

Between 2011 and 2017 the Czech Republic experienced a surge in the competence of groups and associations, new active and media savvy NGOs emerged addressing important issues such as transparency, corruption, city planning, etc. Numerous public initiatives developed focusing on issues in line with post-materialist values such as tolerance, gay and lesbian rights, food safety and organic food, participative budgeting on a local level (cf. Císař and Vráblíková 2013, Guasti 2016, Guasti 2017).

Many citizen initiatives were successful in 2014 local elections; most notably in Brno (Live Brno with the support of Pirates gained 11.89% of the vote and became the third most important party in the Brno Municipality). Overall, independent candidates, often backed by citizen initiatives became the third most powerful political parties on the local level (after ANO and Social Democrats). This is an important attest to the strength of Czech civil society, active citizenship and political culture, which is to a great extent, able to mitigate the weaknesses of political party competences and intra-party democracy.
5. Conclusions

In the Czech Republic, the economic crisis is mirrored in deepening governance issues and a decline in the quality of democracy. In the evaluation of government’s steering capability and its performance during the economic crisis, the Czech Republic significantly lags behind some countries in the region regarding the capacity of its political actors to implement reforms and reach consensus (Brusis 2016). This led to the surge of anti-establishment forces, most notably ANO, which won the 2017 parliamentary elections with a landslide (almost 30%).

Czech political life is still characterized by a polarization between left and right, and from 2017 also by significant fragmentation. After October 2017 elections eight parties entered parliament – the center-right is fragmented, radical right (SPD) and populists (ANO) strengthened and the left was decimated (the Communists lost almost half of their support, the Social Democrats nearly 70%).

The most important political actors recognize the necessity for reforms; however, the experience to date suggests that small governing majorities, together with the relative fluidity of the party system, do not facilitate the adoption and implementation of major long-term reform plans (Guasti and Mansfeldová 2017). This has led to poor or partial solutions on some important policy areas (pension and health care reform), and facilitated the rise of Andrej Babiš, whose technocratic vision of running the state as a firm appealed to the voters, tired of the meagre outcomes of party politics.

The 2017 elections show that the stabilization of the party system and a gradual reduction in the number of relevant parties and the apparent domination of a right-left axis represented by two dominant parties, ODS and CSSD, are over. The political system has become more fluid, new parties emerge, and the voters have repeatedly been inclined to vote for new parties promising competence and progress.

The low levels of trust reported here demonstrate that the economic crisis further undermined representative consolidation – the government’s steering problems and the inability to cope with the crisis led to a crisis of trust rather than to a legitimation crisis as predicted by Habermas (1973). The Czech citizens lost confidence in the ability of the administrative-political system to cope with the impact of the economic crisis but did not lose faith in formal democracy. This distinction points to the need to treat trust in government and belief in democracy as two separate factors (missing in Habermas 1973).

This claim is illustrated by the developments in the Czech Republic. A significant decrease in trust was observed from 2009 to 2012 during the economic crisis and the subsequent austerity. The trend reversed from 2012 onwards, and the Sobotka government was able to regain citizens’ trust, by modifying some of the austerity measures and improving communica-
tion. The improvement of the economic situation also contributed to the regaining of trust in key democratic institutions, hinting at the strong link between democracy and economic well-being. Thus further research ought to consider the effect of economic performance on trust in political institutions and satisfaction with democracy.

The subsequent decrease in trust (2014–2016), during a period of economic growth, was a result of the media war, by Andrej Babiš against the government (as tape recordings surfaced in summer 2017 confirm) and a public power struggle within the Social Democratic Party.

The economic crisis strengthened public disenchantment with politics, but not with democracy as such. Thus, the economic downturn caused neither the rationality, nor the legitimation, nor the motivational crises predicted by Habermas (1973). Instead, it led to a surge in civic participation on the municipal and national level. Democracy as a normative order was not threatened but strengthened as citizens empowered themselves and chose to actively engage in public affairs.

However, the 2017 success of ANO’s technocratic vision of the ‘state as a firm’ and its attack on parliamentary deliberation indicate that there is a clash between the visions of democracy in the contemporary Czech Republic, which can still develop into a full motivational crisis.

We were able to show that both linearity of democratization and consolidation and EU conditionality have their limits. EU conditionality after the accession changed and significantly weakened, but the EU continues to be an important anchoring factor in CEE countries, both economically and politically (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010, Pridham 2008, Haughton 2011). The struggle of domestic political actors centers along the preservation or change of the status quo. In some cases, the veto actors can stall the reform process, but the empowered civil society, supported directly and indirectly by the EU can exercise continuous and effective pressure on domestic policy making (cf. Dimitrova and Buzogány 2014).

Our findings support those of Innes (2014) who also showed that countries viewed as democratic success stories are facing problems in democratic consolidation, as well as the conclusions of Epstein and Jacoby (2014) and Ugur (2013), who show that EU had a stronger economic than political effect in the CEE countries. However, in stark contrast to Ágh’s prediction of the post-accession crisis in the CEE countries (2010), we do not find a deconsolidation of democracy in the Czech Republic. Our study shows that rigorous theoretically grounded analysis can identify weaknesses on individual levels of consolidation, and assess the degree of the overall resilience of CEE democracy (cf. Bermeo 2016).

Unlike scholars detecting or predicting an illiberal turn (Ágh 2010, Rupnik 2007, Greskovits 2015, Vachudova and Henley 2017) we find that the
economic crisis and the subsequent steering problems led to general dissatisfaction and a significant loss of trust. It strongly affected and (temporarily) weakened representative consolidation and to some degree also behavioural consolidation. However, the strength of constitutional consolidation and in particular of the political culture was able to counter-act these trends (cf. Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010 for an argument against backsliding, Bustikova and Guasti 2017 for differentiation between illiberal turns and illiberal swerves). We can verify our hypothesis, and show that Czech democracy passed the stress test of the economic downturn and proved its resilience. This does not mean that Czech democracy is perfect, rather it shows its strong fundamentals – institutional and civil society, which makes it resistant to the backsliding seen elsewhere in the region – Poland, Hungary.

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5. Backsliding into Authoritarian Clientelism: The Case of Poland

Radoslaw Markowski

1. Introduction
The Polish developments since October 2015 are one of those unexpected processes that raise legitimate questions about the predictive capabilities of the political sciences. In a nutshell, compared to other CEE cases Poland was a real success story regarding political stability and democratic consolidation (for details see Markowski 2016, Markowski, Kotnarowski 2016). Yet, as of early 2018, it is in the midst of democratic decay. Moreover, in Poland, the destruction of the democratic foundations came – quite unexpectedly – not from the allegedly politically unsophisticated and democratically unprepared ordinary citizen, but from part of the elites. In October 2015 in a free and fair election, somewhat accidentally, the 18.6% of the eligible (or 37.5% of the active) voters, due to 17% of wasted votes, turned out to be enough to form a single-party parliamentary 51% majority.

2. The Polish parliamentary election of 2015
The Polish 2015 parliamentary election resulted in the victory of a single party, Law and Justice (PiS). For the first time in the history of democratic Poland, the victor was able to create a government without having to negotiate with coalition partners. This was due not so much to significant switches in the preferences of voters, but rather the result of a very high number of wasted votes (more than 16% of active voters) due to thresholds for parties (5%) and party coalitions (8%). As a consequence, Gallagher’s disproportionality index surged to 11% (see Table 2). In three of the seven previous parliamentary elections, the victorious party attracted a higher percentage of active voters than that achieved by PiS in 2015 (37.6%) but was unable to form a single-party government (Markowski et al. 2015: 19–23). The senior coalition partner in the 2011–2015 government Civic Platform (PO) lost a significant share of the vote, but if the newly established party Nowoczesna (Modern) is considered to be a direct heir of the liberal policy platform proposed by the early (i.e., 2001) PO, then the centre-liberal
camp together obtained 32% of the vote. It should also be borne in mind that the 2015 PiS party list also contained candidates from two other parties, Polska Razem (PR) and Solidarna Polska (SP), and was in point of fact a three-party coalition. Two additional phenomena are worth mentioning: the absence of parties of the left in the new parliament, and the poor result of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). The poor result of the agrarian PSL in the countryside, among peasants and farmers has undoubtedly made a significant contribution to PiS’s strong showing.

The 2015 parliamentary election had some specific features. Above all, it was not primarily about the economy: indeed, evaluations of Poland’s economic performance seem not to have been relevant for the decisions made by voters.

Yet the response of Poles was ambiguous: by the end of 2015, 70% and 80%, respectively of Poles were satisfied with their jobs and lives in general as well as with their household situation (CBOS 2015, 2016) but remained dissatisfied from a political perspective, distrusting elites, parties and parliamentarians, and expressing a preoccupation with alleged threats to Poland and the Polish way of life emanating from wider global forces (Markowski and Tworzecki 2016).

This mood of political distrust and suspicion played a significant role in the campaign. PiS, the major opposition party during the 2007–15 period sought to persuade voters that Poland is in the hands of a corrupt elite; that Polish economic development, while good, is nevertheless proceeding more slowly than it might have; that Poland is a ‘German-Russian condominium’ and has been left ‘in ruins’ by the maladministration of previous government; and that former prime minister Donald Tusk and ex-President Bronislaw Komorowski are ‘traitors’ who deliberately conspired to bring about the death of former President Lech Kaczyński in the Smolensk plane crash of April 2010. The relentless repetition of these narratives worked to demobilize part of the electorate of the governing coalition, which came to believe in the existence of widespread corruption in spite of the fact that – according to internationally recognized institutions – the last decade has seen significant improvement in Poland’s standing. This demobilization was most clearly in evidence among the rural population, yet was also present among the urban population of previous PO supporters.

PiS also benefited from offering many irresponsibly costly but popular pledges: a universal child benefit; reversing the PO-PSL government’s unpopular but necessary plan to increase the retirement age to 67 for people of both sexes, and increasing the tax-free income thresholds. These and other less significant promises were aimed at attracting those who had, even if relatively, lost out as a result of the otherwise successful modernization of Poland. Also, alleged corruption scandals attributed to government
personalities plus the unexpected defeat of the President B. Komorowski in May 2015 were also contributory factors.

Finally, the Catholic Church also played an important role, conveying clear partisan preferences. According to a poll conducted after the 2011 election, of those respondents who reported that parish priests had openly indicated the party for which a Catholic should vote, 9 out of 10 said that the party in question was PiS. In the 2015 election, the political interference of the Church was more overt, including open mobilization of the electorate of their favoured party as well as assisting voters in getting to the polls.

Journalistic accounts of the 2015 election have tended toward the interpretation that this was a landslide victory for PiS, and indicative of a fundamental change in the political preferences of Poles. However, this is not borne out by the overall figures. In fact, PiS as a sole party gained – compared to the 2011 election – only about two percentage points of votes (increase from 30 to 32%). This result compared to the result of PO and its splinter new liberal competitor – Nowoczesna – is almost equal; also about 31–32%. (for details see Markowski 2016). Briefly, the Polish parliamentary election of 2015 has been – unexpectedly and somewhat procedurally – lost by the governing coalition rather than won by the contenders.

As a result, my main argument on the ‘supply side revolution’ that took place in Poland in the fall of 2015 – presented in detail elsewhere (Markowski 2016, 2017a, 2017b) – is based on the fact that hardly any evidence existed in the fall of 2015 of a social ‘demand’ for radical change.

2.1. Selected determinants of the 2015 vote choice

At this point, let me present selected results of the analyses aimed at interpreting the vote choice in the 2015 election in Poland. The aim of this part is to check the extent to which economic factors did play a role. From the previous part, we know that the overall economic context has been extremely favourable for incumbents (the PO/PSL coalition in power since 2007), both when analysing the macro-results as well as household evaluations and other individual-level satisfactions: with job, dwelling, incomes and the like. So far, however, the direct link between economic situation and vote has not been discussed. In what follows, I will test two broad expectations: (a) that economic factors did not play an important role in party choice in 2015, in particular for the winning party, and (b) if anything it was instead a macro-evaluation of the economy as a whole, rather than individual subjective evaluation of

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53 In the election their electoral committee was composed of three parties, among which obviously PiS was the dominant actor, yet the two other parties contributed at least 700 thousands votes to the overall figure of 5.7 millions voters supporting them, out of almost 31 millions eligible.
individuals’ household. Briefly – and somewhat paradoxically – because the individual fortunes of Poles (en masse) had been significantly improving, both during the whole quarter of a century since the transformation as well as during the last eight years (relative to other EU countries in particular) it is expected that egotropic, subjective evaluations of what one knows best – his/her economic lot – should only play a minor role in their vote choice. However, because of an enormous effort made during the 2007–2015 period by the then opposition party in effectively persuading many Poles that the “country is in ruins” (their main slogan repeated over and over again in all circumstances), one can expect that evaluations of macro-economic fortunes of the country might play a role in their vote choice.

The results are presented below in three tables, plus graphs; the first displays the impact of classical socio-demographic factors, some of them closely related to economy, others – to socio-cultural domain. The second shows the impact of selected issues (again divided into economic and non-economic ones) on the vote, in terms of voters’ policy preferences as determinants of the vote choice. The third reveals a general model of the vote choice between two main parties, with numerous controls aimed at decontaminating the blurring effects of partisanship, former vote, social position of an individual, individuals’ political sophistication and so on.

Table 1. The impact of social status of individuals on their vote choice in the 2015 parliamentary election in Poland (multinomial logistic regression; reference category – non-voters).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Law &amp; Justice PiS</th>
<th>Civic Platform, PO</th>
<th>Peoples Party, PSL</th>
<th>United Left, ZL</th>
<th>Kukiz’15</th>
<th>Modern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.53**</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.98**</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>1.26***</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.93*</td>
<td>-0.93</td>
<td>1.17***</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.49***</td>
<td>0.96***</td>
<td>0.79**</td>
<td>1.14***</td>
<td>0.5**</td>
<td>1.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pl of Residence</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.17*</td>
<td>-0.44*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.295**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>0.44**</td>
<td>0.37**</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>-1.63</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioner</td>
<td>-0.60*</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Polish NES 2015
Table 1 is interesting for our story only as far as comparison of the impact of economic vs. cultural factors is concerned. Support for Law and Justice (PiS) comes mostly from variance in socio-cultural (religiosity, education, age, sex and being a pensioner) rather than from economic factors such as income or position on the labour market – being unemployed or in a high professional position – supervisor.

Another approach to testing the extent to which economic factors have contributed to PiS’s taking over power in Poland is to look at their issue/policy preferences as determinants of voting. Table 2 shows the issue positioning of individuals as determinants of the vote.

**Table 2. The impact of socio-cultural and economic issues on vote choice in 2015 parliamentary elections (multinomial logistic regression; reference category – Non-voters)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues/policies</th>
<th>PiS</th>
<th>PO</th>
<th>Nowoczesna</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State-church</td>
<td>0.22**</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax policy</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social network</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU integration</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
<td>-0.40***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatization</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
<td>-0.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Const</td>
<td>-1.88***</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>1.00***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Polish NES 2015

For the sake of simplicity, I present only the two main parties and the new splinter from the governing PO – Nowoczesna. The main message is lucid – what matters in the choice to support PiS are exclusively the socio-cultural issues of religion in public life, abortion and EU integration, the latter in Poland – and for PiS electorate in particular – is more about cultural autonomy, state sovereignty, defence of traditional/family values rather than purely economic issues. Economy-related issues do not matter for the PiS electorate as far as their vote choice is concerned.

Finally, the test of direct evaluations of (a) the state of the country’s economy and (b) the state of the household situation on the vote choice, which is part of the theory of economic voting, sociotropic vs. egotropic voting, is presented in table 3.

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54 Pensioner status is subsumed here into a socio-cultural category as it focuses more on the lifestyle and value-set of pensioners rather than on their income status (pension).
Table 3. Discrete choice model.  
**DV: (1) = voting for PO; (0) = voting for PiS in 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vote for PO (1) vs PiS (0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta coefficient (S.E.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of political knowledge (IPK)</td>
<td>-0.534 (0.292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic evaluation</td>
<td>-0.699 (0.413)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egotropic evaluation</td>
<td>0.232 (0.384)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPK * sociotropic evaluation</td>
<td><strong>0.139</strong> * (0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPK * egotropic evaluation</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Vote: Other Parties:</td>
<td>0.116 (0.648)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Vote: PiS (ref cat → N-Voters)</td>
<td><strong>-2.875</strong> <strong>” (0.629)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Vote: PO (ref cat → N-Voters)</td>
<td><strong>2.330</strong> <strong>” (0.365)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Vote: PSL (ref cat → N-Voters)</td>
<td>-0.944 (1.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue: State – Church relationship</td>
<td><strong>-0.206</strong> * (0.117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue: Progressive vs Linear tax</td>
<td>-0.007 (0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue: Poland’s independence from EU</td>
<td><strong>-0.223</strong> <strong>” (0.072)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue: approval of settlement of immigrants</td>
<td><strong>-0.192</strong> * (0.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue: social safety net generosity</td>
<td>0.022 (0.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue: privatization of state enterprises</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue: abortion</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex: male</td>
<td>-0.442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.318)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 25-39 (ref cat → 18-24)</td>
<td>-0.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.881)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 40-60 (ref cat → 18-24)</td>
<td>-0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.844)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 61+ (ref cat → 18-24)</td>
<td>0.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.881)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: Vocational (ref cat → primary)</td>
<td>1.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.663)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: High (ref cat → primary)</td>
<td>1.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.683)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: University (ref cat → primary)</td>
<td>1.805*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.809)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.420)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N=                                        | 591    |
| Log Likelihood                           | -155.315 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit.                        | 360.629 |
| McFadden Pseudo R2                       | 0.68   |

*Sign Level*  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01*

Source: Polish NES 2015
Table 3 results show several things: (a) in 2015 Poles’ electoral choices were driven by sociotropic evaluations of the economy, whereas the egotropic evaluations did not play a role whatsoever. This result points to stability among Polish electorate as a similar result was obtained in the 2011 election and presented elsewhere (Kotnarowski, Markowski 2014). (b) Many control variables were applied to test the robustness of this result, among them, the most important one is the previous vote, which allows us to claim that the relationship between economic evaluations and vote choice in 2015 are cleared from the contamination of partisan effects. In technical terms, only part of the variance of these variables are taken into account, the ones that are void of affective party attachment. (c) Because the assessment of “be it economic fortune of the country, be it one’s household financial situation”, the same logic was applied to arrive at the net effects of the SES of the individual – the model controls for the impact of education and SES. As a consequence, the unveiled link between the evaluation of the economic situation and vote decision is cleaned from the effects of an individual’s social position. (d) The discrete model of economic voting hypothesis depends on the cost of obtaining and processing of information. The hypothesis assumes that the higher the level of political sophistication (knowledge) the higher the probability to vote sociotropically than egotropically (data not shown – available upon request). In our case of the 2015 parliamentary election, this expectation has been confirmed. This also means that political knowledge does not influence subjective egotropic evaluations. The interactions of sociotropic evaluations and political knowledge level, however, show clear effects, in that with the decline of political knowledge voters are more inclined to evaluate negatively the sociotropic evaluation of the macro-economic standing of the country and move away from voting for the main governmental party. An important result combined with the overall results presented before.

2.2. Partial Summary

The overall picture thus looks as follows: in terms of objective macro-economic data and its contextual consequences, Poland’s performance has been considerably more impressive than any other country of the CEE region. Not surprisingly, the general social mood concerning many aspects of life,

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55 In the study of the impact of economic factors, empirical political science has invented two ontologically different ways of depicting peoples’ evaluations of the economy, first – sociotropic – pertains to the macro evaluation of the country’s economy, and second – egotropic – to the individual respondent’s household situation (for details see Conover et al. 1986, Gomez and Wilson 2006).

56 SES variable is comprised of – profession, income and supervisory position.
including economic ones, among Poles has been pretty positive. Moreover, the general message from direct testing of the links between economic factors and evaluations and vote choice points to a similar relationship.

Selected empirical results presented so far suggest that economic concerns and economic issues were not the decisive ones underpinning the support for PiS. And most importantly, if any of the economic evaluations matter, it is rather the more abstract sociotropic macro-economic evaluations (“country in ruins”), than the personally experienced, everyday household assessments. This latter result happened to be correctly predicted.

Let me reiterate: The Polish elections of 2015 are hardly indicative of a “demand side revolt” of the voters. Poles supported PiS only marginally more than on previous electoral occasions. Next, the data presented shows that, if anything, it was not the economy that contributed to the defeat of the incumbents in Poland. Yet, once in power PiS launched a radical package of changes that have changed the political reality from which it had sprung. We are witnessing a classical “supply side” nationalistic/authoritarian/conservative revolution. The social reaction – even if widespread and determined – so far (as of early 2018) was unable to stop the deep and broad destruction of liberal democratic norms and values. As a consequence, although PiS’s standing in public opinion polls is more or less the same as at the time of the election, it is still ahead of its main competitor, PO, by at least clear 15–20 percentage points.

This calls for an explanation of what the deep foundations of support are for such a party, in a society that is (still) the most pro-European among the CEE countries and normatively massively supporting democracy as a regime type? On the other hand, it seems that PiS’s readiness to stick to their illiberal solutions and continue towards authoritarian clientelism (in the making) is grounded in their deep conviction that indeed the one-fifth of Poles eligible to vote, which – at times – can translate into about 35–40% active support for them at elections is the absolute maximum that they can count on given their programmatic (and emotional-clientelistic) appeal. In a nutshell, their deeds witness that they are not ready to treat (and accept) democracy – in Przeworski’s parlance – as an “institutionalized uncertainty” of stable rules of the electoral game and unknown results. If anything, the reverse relationship between the two is being implemented, that is, destabilization of the existing, binding rules to achieve predictable results.

As a consequence, one has to be able to explain the reasons for this support that must derive from deeply rooted phenomena, apart from PiS’s skillful manipulative electoral tactics. For this we need to focus on Polish historical-cultural legacies, in particular on the peculiarities of the Polish communist period.
3. Theoretical Assets and Tentative Explanations

This part of the chapter is mostly speculative, with glances at selected available empirical results.

First, let me reiterate that Polish democracy experienced a – sort of – critical juncture in the fall of 2015. Second, there are however two stories that can be told about it; one is a story of immense success of the quarter of a century development that ended in a “procedural incident” in which 18.6% of the will of the people has been translated into a 51% parliamentary majority. The other story, however, pertains to the post-2015 developments and call for an explanation of who the supporters of the current incumbent political camp are and how the selective demobilization of the centre, liberal-democratic forces came about and persisted until 2018.

Before I offer selected theoretical explanations of the Polish post-2015 case, let me formulate few caveats: (a) social sciences in general and political science in particular, are pretty impatient – they insist on an immediate narrative of universal and theoretical explanations; this is rarely possible, and the Polish case is one of them – for universal clarifications to be offered, time is needed, much longer than two years; (b) We should also bear in mind that political science is not particularly good at predicting future trends, probably because it is traditionally – more than other social sciences – focused on stability rather than change and because the former – somehow tacitly, between the lines – is considered normatively more valued than the latter; (c) Contemporary debate about democratic decay, challenges to democracy and the like phenomena are – pretty uncritically – thrown into the ‘populist basket’. In my view it is too broad a basket and might explode soon as all ademocratic, anti-democratic and illiberal phenomena are in it, whereas only some of them are genuinely indicative of populism proper; (d) Polish developments of the last two years can just partly be explained by the notion of populism, as it had apparently popped up during the electoral campaign, yet is present only marginally in the governing and policy implementation phase.

3.1. Theoretical legacies and patterns of transition in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)

It is not the aim of this chapter to elaborate on the details with the travelling capacity problem of transitologist theories, at this point let me just emphasize that a revision of the theoretical assumptions of the transformation/consolidation literature is needed. Many approaches of the latter were a bit too uncritically “borrowed” from Latin American and Southern European cases.

In what follows, an attempt is being made to answer the question of why the PiS government has embarked on a political action that violates the basic
principles not only of an abstract liberal democracy but very concrete, precisely written binding constitutional provisions. In other words, why would political insiders, representatives and leadership of a well-established party benefiting for the last quarter of a century from access to state resources, democratic security, public sector jobs and relative prestige among part of the population decide to abandon a low-risk political democratic behaviour and embark on a very hazardous strategy of a – de facto – coup against the binding constitution? The rationale behind such a decision is weakly entrenched in theories of democracy, ideas about political responsiveness and accountability, as well as probably the major democratic attraction, namely that it regularly at the same intervals gives a chance for the losers of the electoral game to win next time around following the same rules of the game. Przeworski’s (2005) dictum that democracy is an “institutionalized uncertainty” is the crux of the matter. Moreover, democracy allows political conflicts to be solved in a moderate way and avoid transferring them into uncontrollable political violence that creates victims, imprisonment of enemies and restoring permanently to coercion. To be sure, as I’ve indicated in the previous parts of the chapter, this decision can hardly be attributed to an alleged political demand by the people.

Some of the proposals discussed below evidently fall into the category of ‘theories,’ other belong to well-tested empirical findings. Still, others are – for the time being – hypothetical speculations. In some cases, discussed below, the critical question pertains to the phenomenon of discretion, namely whether a given action, decision or development should be attributed to one of the broad categories of “fate” or “choice.” This distinction, so far neglected or overlooked in the literature on transitions and consolidations, should – in my view – be given its proper, prominent place in the approaches such as the one this chapter is pursuing.

In what follows, I present six approaches that seem plausible as potential explanation of the Polish political developments.

Legacies 1: Homo Sovieticus or other legacies or interactive response to the communist blueprint?

In case of the Polish real-existing socialism (its important idiosyncrasies have been described elsewhere – see Markowski 2017a), I submit that partial causes of the current democratic decay do not stem directly from the socialist system’s blueprint and its allegedly lasting legacy in the form of Polish *Homo Sovieticus*, but rather indirectly from the enduring effects of the Poles’ successful subversion of real-socialism through various form of “adaptive resourcefulness”. These adaptations ranged from entrepreneurial activities in the shadow economy to the construction of social support networks based around close-knit groups of family and friends, to turning
to the Catholic Church as an ideological (also political) alternative to the socialist party-state. Polish civil society of the 1970s and 1980s was fairly well organised. Virtually all spheres of societal activity were covered by grass-roots, informal institutions of the ‘alternative, second’ society, ‘shadow economy,’ etc. (Ramet 1991, Staniszkis 1991). Precisely this trait (a lack of formal legitimacy yet strong social basis) proved to be the source of its viability and para-political power, crucial in times of authoritarian backlashes (i.e., under martial law).

And still another phenomenon needs to be emphasised. The 16 months of Solidarity’s official existence marks an unprecedented period for Poland and communism in general. The experience gained by Solidarity leaders during this period proved decisive later. It was an experience of a non-violent movement that started off as a classical trade union concerned with job-related and redistributive issues, later forced to become a national movement fighting for civil and political rights that ultimately had to play the role of a national liberation force aimed at dismantling ties to the Soviet Bloc. The conviction that debate and negotiations were possible without the use of violence became an important directive for Poles.

These and other adaptations played a part in the breakdown of the old system, yet they simultaneously left, as their legacy, a number of traits and dispositions unconducive to high-quality democratic governance: widespread and deep individualism, low trust, low bridging social capital, an almost exclusive focus on the family as a supreme value (combined with indifference to the public good), and resulting ethical dualism concerning the public versus private spheres – all related to the high trust in Church under communism and the experience of operating in a significant private sector in the economy.

Selected empirical results have been shown elsewhere (Markowski 2017b), and can be summarized as follows:

a) Generally, we can support findings (also present in other countries) indicating that – if anything – high religiosity and catholic denomination are unconducive (i.e., no positive impact detected) to the level of all three aspects of social capital under scrutiny. Yet, there is clear evidence of the negative impact of religiosity on selected aspects of social capital. Moreover, Polish NES 2011 data documents that – unlike frequent expectations assume – links to the communist past (operationalized as Communist party membership) seem to be positively related to social capital; of course, after controlling for all usual suspects – education, income, place of residence.

57 These were: (a) trust in institutional norms and infrastructure; (b) participation in social institutions; (c) axiological bases of social capital – tolerance, deliberation, individualism as values.
In particular, there is a clear relationship between party membership and participation in social networks and in cherishing individualistic values (Markowski, Czesnik, Kotnarowski 2015: 191–212).

b) A distinct pattern linking the three, key for social capital, values—high levels of tolerance, individualism and deliberativeness—that coincide with low religiosity and vice versa.

c) The test of the relationship between trust and religiosity shows weak (a bit curvilinear), though significant relationship—nonbelievers unveil considerably higher trust than the most numerous group of moderate believers, yet they do not differ in this respect from devout believers.

d) Our main interest, however, is in the linkage between social capital (in this part a cumulative index of the three dimensions is taken into account)\textsuperscript{58} moreover, political reality—party choice, individuals’ parents family ideological traditions and selected attitudes towards democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote for:</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>sd</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 PO</td>
<td>.214</td>
<td>.924</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 PIS</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>1.257</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 RP</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.687</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 PSL</td>
<td>.272</td>
<td>.862</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 SLD</td>
<td>.218</td>
<td>.940</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 N-V</td>
<td>-.204</td>
<td>.972</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>1.013</td>
<td>1681</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{F=12.34, p>.000, eta=.19, eta-sq=.04}

Source: Polish NES 2011

\textsuperscript{58} Due to collinearities and other purely statistical problems composed, as a factor score, of—trust, membership in organizations and dogmatism-deliberativeness scale.
Table 5: Mean scores of the composite index of social capital among citizens raised under different ideological traditions at parental home

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological tradition</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>sd</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 national-catholic</td>
<td>-.027</td>
<td>1.112</td>
<td>789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 socialist / socialdemocratic</td>
<td>.373</td>
<td>1.116</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 patriotic</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.989</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 atheist</td>
<td>-.101</td>
<td>1.728</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 communist</td>
<td>.240</td>
<td>.796</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 liberal</td>
<td>.178</td>
<td>.667</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 conservative</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>.628</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 christian-democratic</td>
<td>-.038</td>
<td>.883</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 peoples'</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.558</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 feminist</td>
<td>-.079</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 other</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.910</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 unspecified</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.820</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97 DK – Hard to say</td>
<td>-.139</td>
<td>1.169</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>.996</td>
<td>1816</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( F=1.34; \text{sign}=.19; \text{eta}=.09; \text{eta-sq}=.01 \)

Source: Polish NES 2011

Entries of simple analyses of tables 4 and 5 indicate that (i) social capital is lowest among the most numerous group of Poles – the non-voters, but also among the electorate of the governing party – PiS; (ii) and is apparently negatively related to another dominant group in Polish society – those who claim to be raised in the “national-catholic” traditions at parental home, as well as “Christian-democratic” and “conservative”\(^{59}\). These groups are linked either directly (the first one) or more loosely (the remaining two) to the Catholic

\(^{59}\) The other negatively related to high scores of social capital groups are two small (“feminist” and “atheist”) to take their results for granted.
church and are juxtaposed in this respect to those who claim being raised under “social-democratic,” “liberal” or “communist” traditions at home.

e) Finally, general normative evaluation of democracy as an ideal[^60] is – as expected – strongly and positively related to the level of social capital. Numerous, more detailed, tests of the link between certain normative expectations towards constitutive elements of democracy, in particular concerning the rule of law and the role of constitutional tribunals in democracies (another hot potato in Poland today), responsiveness of governments to peoples’ preferences as well as securing appropriate levels of inequalities, all indicate positive relationship between high support for these democratic foundations and higher levels of social capital than in the reverse case.

Polish 2011 NES includes a battery of five items concerning clientelism. They range from a simple question regarding citizens’ perception of the scope of clientelistic relationships offered by parties in their immediate social milieu via issues pertinent to the alleged capacity by political parties to monitor citizens’ voting behaviour to questions aimed at evaluating parties’ ability to punish voters for disloyal electoral behaviour as well as assessment of the social institutions network’s capacity to perform the controlling functions.

The objective of the simple analyses has been to answer the following questions:

1) Do Polish electorates differ in their exposure to clientelistic phenomena?
2) Do parties’ electorates differ in this respect more than major socio-demographic (age, educational, etc.) groups? In other words, is the subjectively perceived exposure to clientelism more of an evidently political phenomenon or more of a social one?
3) Is this clientelism (as we expect) systematically related to particular political-cultural (ideological) traditions in which individuals were raised during their childhood rather than other?

Overall analyses (data not shown available upon request from the author) permit us to convey the following:

Ad 1) Yes, the electorate of the governing PiS party shows a significantly higher composite index of clientelism than the remaining four parliamentary parties in the 2011–2015 parliamentary term[^61].

[^60]: The classical wording “Democracy may have problems buts it’s better than any other form of government.”
[^61]: Even when among the latter the peasant/peoples party, PSL is included with as high a clientelistic index as that of PiS.
Ad 2) A higher composite clientelistic index is detected among the youngest generation (up to 35) and the poorest quantile of the population. Comparing these two social aggregates to electorates, the differences are more pronounced among the former. Yet, if one concentrates on religiousness, education, and place of residence, party electorates differ more in their clientelism than social groups distinguished by the latter three criteria. As a result, there is no simple answer to the broad question – whether political or social aggregation of citizens unveils higher clientelism, yet it is clear that the level of clientelism differs significantly once PiS is juxtaposed vis a vis electorates of other mainstream democratic parties in Poland.

Ad 3) Among the political-cultural traditions of parental home, the one that has been our suspect #1 – the “national-catholic one (“narodowo-katolicka”) – Indeed shows a very strong relationship with our composite clientelistic score, and is only slightly lower than the most closely related “communist/athiest” tradition (.21 and .24, respectively). By comparison the composite clientelistic index for “liberal”, “patriotic-independent” or “socialist/social-democratic” scores are .15, .19, .19, respectively.

The selected initial analyses of past electoral studies confirms my expectation that a thorough test of the support for the clientelistic authoritarian project in Poland comes not so much from the heritage of communism as from either the deep historical traditions or from recent reactions to the socialist blueprint in the form of distrust towards institutions, negligible participation in social institutions and their axiological foundations in the form of low tolerance, dogmatism and paternalism in social relations. All those traditions that turned detrimental to high social capital are at the same time closely linked to the dominant religious legacies and their normative foundations, in particular, the almost exclusive concentration on private and family life at the expense of public sphere concerns.

Political clientelism also seems to correlate strongly with social consequences of religious dogmas dominant among those who were raised in nationalist/authoritarian/Catholic traditions. This clientelism happens to be distinctly associated with low social capital and is related to partisan attachment, and moreover, seems to be more a politically than socially driven phenomenon.

The current, post-2015 election, developments and the gradual emergence in Poland of a system I tentatively call authoritarian clientelism, I submit are not a reproduction of the socialist blueprint, but rather an effect of accumulated societal, cultural and institutional reactions to this blueprint;

62 The ‘national-catholic’ is the tradition that is absolutely prevailing among Poles and is indicated by almost 60% of all traditions mentioned as the one that dominated in their parental homes.
reactions which once so powerfully contributed to socialism’s demise, now are proving harmful to democracy as well.

**Legacies 2: peculiarities of the transition itself – the overlapping of the three phases of transition (Huntington 1991)**

Let me reiterate at this point the importance of Poland’s status as a ‘first-comer’ in the transition and as a consequence the country’s prolonged period of transition to, what seemed to be, democratic consolidation. To be sure, analytically it is worth distinguishing the three distinct phases of the process as described by Samuel Huntington (1991) – (i) the ‘mode of the authoritarian exit’; (ii) embarking on a particular ‘political, institutional infrastructure’; and (iii) specific traits of ‘consolidation’. Poland – unlike the other CEE (save Hungary) countries – had undergone a very prolonged period for each of these phases and a certain degree of their overlap.

Moreover, most of the events before, during and after the Round Table negotiations in early 1989 were very fluid and their ultimate shape unpredictable. When the Round Table started on February 6, 1989, the two sides and the mediator – representatives of the Catholic Church – started the negotiations with a completely different agenda than that which turned out ultimately to be the Round Table accord, not to mention the final results of the June election and its consequences. There were clearly several significant points on the agenda at the beginning: (a) re-registration of “Solidarity” trade union, (b) vague ideas about economic liberalization, (c) media and association freedoms, (d) self-government and self-management, (e) obscure ideas about democratization (though not full democracy) of the political system.

As the Round Table subcommittees started working, very soon it became clear that the communists were ready to give up much more than that expected and predicted by the opposition, especially in the economic domain. Limited space restricts us from an in-depth analysis of the Round Table procedures; I rather refer to some of the RT interpretations (for more details see Markowski 2006, Elster 1996). Since the certainty that the Soviets would remain neutral to the events going on in Poland was pretty low, RT negotiators had to design a political system that accounted for this fact. And even at the end of the RT talks what was agreed upon could have been called, as many did, a ‘historical compromise,’ but it was certainly an experiment that was supposed to take at least few years before Poland enjoyed full-blown liberal democracy and a real, unconstrained market economy. The contract, to put it simply, was fairly vague, very dynamic, its consequences unpredictable and very path-dependent. Numerous examples of unexpected turnabouts happened during negotiations. To name just a few: a sudden proposal by the communist side to allow for the creation of a bi-cameral parliament with a Senate elected through a fully free election; L. Walesa’s
Civic Committee decision to allow 33 communist politicians running from the so-called “National List” (that did not clear the 50% threshold of support necessary to win a seat) to enter the June post-1989 parliament in order to stick to the main agreement of the Round Table that the Lower House is dominated by the representatives of the ancient regime; active support by the same Civic Committee of selected communist candidates in the second round of the Sejm elections, in order to enhance the more reformist political composition of the Lower House and the like.

The ultimate result of this prolonged period of transition via institution-building to consolidation did create a culture of ‘rules negotiability,’ ‘norms flexibility,’ growth of pragmatic instrumentalization of political domain and – if you will – a mood of ‘temporariness’ of the enacted solutions. Ultimately it seems that the likely simple answer to the question whether ruptura or pactada is a more promising way out of authoritarianism is complicated by the fact that average citizens need to see a clear ‘critical juncture,’ separating the Old from the New. The blurring of such political thresholds seems unconducive to the ultimate success of democratic consolidation. Both the Polish and Hungarian cases are clear indications of the problem.

All these contribute today to the poor level of already moderate – to say the least – public virtues of Poles.

**Culture and social disorganization**

Almost a century ago William Ogburn (1922) offered us a broad theoretical explanation of the cultural determinants of social disorganization. Briefly and oversimplifying his insightful proposal, the content of his theory proposes that there are four universal steps in technological development: 1 invention, 2 accumulations, 3 diffusions, and 4 adjustments. Technological inventions – material culture – are rapid and come first. Non-material culture lags behind; it takes time to catch up with innovations, especially if this happens predominantly via diffusion. Cultural lag is a common societal phenomenon, as material culture is ontologically innovative, whereas non-material culture is resistant to change. Cultural lag theory suggests that a period of maladjustment occurs when the non-material culture is struggling to adapt to new material conditions and that this is typical. The real problem arises when the lag is too big, in other words, when the adjustment of the non-material culture lags too much, the gap becomes too wide and social disorganization results. Periods of maladjustments could be shorter or longer but are always a threat to smooth social development. Due to the conflicting nature of these two aspects of culture, adaptation of innovations usually proves rather difficult.

Now, I submit that we can treat the political infrastructure of democracy as a set of “technological innovations,” invented in the North Western part
of the globe and transplanted by way of diffusion to an area of the world where the political culture was only partially conducive to its smooth implementation. There are numerous examples: Polish semi-presidentialism has typically been misconceived equally by both the elites, and by citizens, the “openness” of the PR electoral rules are hardly exploited by non-partisan political actors to their benefit, the very essence of the idea of separation of powers is far from being widely supported and the current inability to successfully defend the demolition of the Constitutional Tribunal are only a few of the numerous examples of this wider phenomenon.

Briefly, the essence and the logic of the institutional opportunity structure of democracy have evidently failed to become ‘nested’ in public, moreover, the political culture at large. In other words, the mechanical and the psychological effects (Duverger 1954) of institutional design have become temporally detached from one another. Alternatively, and in David Easton’s (1965) parlance, the diffuse political support for liberal democracies has obviously not been deeply embedded and still remains contextually determined.

Another, similar yet more economically-based phenomenon has to do with the generosity of EU structural funds. Underdeveloped regions, the poor and the excluded, unsuccessful on the labour market and inhabitants of rural areas, in particular, have benefited disproportionately from these funds. Very little conditionality and too fast a change of people’s lives occurred without proper understanding of the mechanisms of how affluence has historically typically been created. These funds have not been utilized for socializing the beneficiaries to the culture of contract, professional responsibility and entrepreneurial culture of cooperation for the public benefit, etc. etc. To be sure, these funds have positively changed peoples’ lives and improved the social environments they live in, nevertheless they have simultaneously contributed to deepening the beliefs in economic miracles and have allowed irresponsible outbidding (promising even more of such unconditional avalanches of funds) by the political contenders in order to be rewarded in the form of electoral support.

The above described phenomenon coupled with cultural foundations of (Polish) Catholicism – its disrespect for empirical proof, disbelief in causality, mistrust in science in general, profound belief in miracles and the like – lie at the heart of the problem of the support for a political camp that is ready to embark on unconstrained, unrealistic socio-economic pledges.

**Parties as “social coalitions” (Bawn et al. 2012)**

An ontological approach to political parties identifies them in a number of ways, from the classical Rokkanian proposal of treating them as outbursts of social conflicts and divisions that (due to the talented political agency of
party entrepreneurs) materialize in stable organizational structures to classical office-seeking institutions in the hands of professional politicians. The idea that parties are organizations widely and deeply rooted in relationships with the socio-economic environment they happen to operate in or too long has been – if not overlooked entirely – indeed neglected. From their nascent period of separating, be it from trade unions, churches or parishes to the subsequent phases of organizational development from mass and cadre and other forms. In a nutshell, additionally, parties ought to be treated as extended networks that include not only politicians as office-seekers and their apparatus but also should consist of financial sponsors of different pedigree, organized interests, professional associations, media outlets and other groups of organized citizens.

The current Polish developments can be defined as – known from the past – another conservative revolt against modernity, in which the Catholic Church happens to be the main social coalition partner. Current Polish politics cannot be adequately described and explained without accounting for the role of the Catholic Church, which influences it indirectly and directly, from their profound impact on the educational system via direct assistance during voting to blackmailing MPs. In the last quarter of a century the prestige of the Polish Catholic Church has declined significantly, Sunday church attendance has dropped from very high in the early 1980s by about 20 percentage points, down to below 37% in 2017 (official statistics of the Catholic Church); similar to other more subjective indicators of secular upsurge. Briefly, traditional and religious values are in decline. In contemporary Poland we witness a phenomenon present in other settings in which the hitherto majority envisages that soon it will become a minority, which creates a sort of “revolting neurosis” against the to date binding rules of the game. As a consequence, the currently governing party PiS has decided to embark on an assault against the constitutional order. This leads us to the main question.

Why revolt against democratic principles? Is it fate or choice? Why would part of a well-established political elite take such risky course of action? PiS party has long been benefiting from access to state and public sector jobs and other resources in a system that had already witnessed several electoral changes of power. Why would they abandon the relatively safe political functioning under democracy for an extremely risky strategy of a constitutional coup? The answer is complicated and multi-layered, yet could be summarized as follows.

Personalized loyalty to a leader is a well-known political phenomenon, more prominent and common however in an authoritarian rather than a democratic setting. In the communist underground activity, such person-
alized relationships based on interpersonal trust and loyalty had been the most typical binding relationships. It had, however, an evident spillover effect on the early post-communist political culture and in some instances – as PiS party and its leader witness – at times pretty durable. These legacies are accompanied by a lack of public transparency and malfunctioning of institutions as designed by law and regulations. Instead, key political decisions are taken in closely trusted circles, hidden from public supervision.

In more detail, the subjective device behind this is the autocratically run party and its internal mechanism which turn individually rational behaviour in within-party competition and advancement into a collectively irrational trail of radicalization. Ultimately, it leads to a transfer of the radical authoritarian mechanism from the internal party mechanism to state and governmental policies (Hardin 1968, Huntington 1991).

On the other hand – as described at the beginning – the barely 19% of eligible votes attracted during the 2015 election and its “incidental” translation into 51% of parliamentary seats, indicated that the party might never again be in a position to form a single-party government. Consequently, the decision was made to start manipulating the rules of the game. In a way, the question of whether it is choice or fate remains unanswered.

**Winners and losers**

More than a decade ago we were attracted by a new interpretation of the interaction between winners and losers in democracies. Its convincing argument that democracies are working because of “losers’ consent,” can also be traced in the new democracies of the CEE region, Poland in particular. Specifically, the idea that the losers of the electoral game are unaware that they are de facto in a majority and the reason why they cannot turn this fact into a majoritarian force is due to their higher heterogeneity (than that of the winners) and consequently their inability to mobilize themselves around a single programmatic appeal. I submit however that there are equally powerful mechanisms that might allow them to win in elections.

Losers of the transformation differ from the winners in two fundamental ways: (a) they perceive their lot typically as a collective fate and not an individually-driven one, and (b) they attribute (they blame) this lot on ‘external’ forces, not themselves. The reverse is – most of the time – true for winners: they consider their success to be their own and they are convinced that their (what Rotter calls) ‘internal locus of control’ is at work. As a corollary losers face a situation that is intellectually easier and behaviourally more conducive to mobilization by political entrepreneurs. Since their lot is perceived as collective and once a talented political force decides to attract them, alongside the fact that there is someone out there to be blamed for it (and moreover there are potent institutions – church,
trade unions, media – keen to support this interpretation) their readiness to mobilize and self-organize themselves increases and is understandable from a psychological point of view. In the Polish 2015 elections, this did not contribute to the landslide change, yet it certainly helped the winning party enlarge its electoral support by 2–3%.

4. Summary and preliminary conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to test the explanatory power of various theories on the case of ‘backsliding into authoritarian clientelism’ in Poland. The first two approaches focus on the role of legacies (cf. Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017). Two legacies are explored – ‘adaptive resourcefulness and negotiated transitions. The aim here is to trace the effect of these two specific legacies playing an increasingly important role in enabling the contemporary backsliding in Poland.

The second group of approaches (potential explanatory factors) focuses on the impact of political culture and the role Catholicism (as an ideology) and the Catholic Church (as an institutional actor) play as drivers of the backsliding. The (Polish) Catholicism establishes the basis on which ideology rather than reason drives a significant part of the population. The coalition between the Catholic Church and the ruling party (PiS) provides an alternative source of legitimation while undermining democratic accountability. Together, Catholicism and the (Polish) Catholic Church are the drivers of the conservative revolt against modernity. Under the façade of fostering conservative values, the Polish government has rewritten the rules of the game and commenced the destruction of the non-majoritarian accountability institutions – the media and the courts.

The third set of approaches focuses on actors – on the supply side personalized loyalty to the leader is assessed; on the demand side, winners and losers of the Polish democratization are assessed. In assessing the personalized loyalty to the leader of the Law and Order Party Jaroslaw Kaczynski, it becomes clear that personalized rather than formalized relationships prevail – and the interpersonal rather than institutional trust drives the loyalty. In assessing the supply side of the support for the Law and Order, it is also necessary to make the ontological distinction between winners and losers. Winners are individually-driven, but individualist tendencies do not drive the losers. On the contrary, losers view their situation as collective faith and attribute the blame to external forces. The latter predisposition of the PiS voters provides sound bases for populist mobilization against external forces (i.e. ‘Brussels’).

This chapter explored three very different approaches to explain the ongoing dismantling of the liberal democracy in Poland. In assessing the contemporary situation in Poland, it becomes clear that the past continues to
shape the present, through legacies, political culture and actors. Those seeking to stop or reverse the continuous backsliding in Poland need to start by understanding these constraints, in order to find ways for overcoming them.

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PART II.

Revisiting Measures of Democratic Quality
6. Missing Ingredients in the Study of CEE Democracies

Branislav Dolný and Darina Malová

1. Introduction

After the Cold War, democracy became the accepted form of government across the world (Diamond 2008: 13), manifest in both the expansion of democracy in an ever-greater number of countries and the increased support for democratic values. The recent, and moreover unexpected, turn to ‘illiberal’ forms of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) – propagated, somewhat paradoxically, by key critics of the Communist regimes in Hungary and Poland (Rupnik and Zielonka 2013, Ágh 2016, Matthes 2016) – leads us to question what has caused this change. Critical reviews of the recent political changes pointed to the lack of sustainability of the transformative power of the EU in these countries (Guasti and Mansfeldová 2013). The general starting point is to review the literature and research on the systematic measuring and study of the quality of democracy over the years (Ringen 2007: 15, Plattner 2005, Diamond and Morlino 2005, Roberts 2010, Munck 2016, Pinto, Magalhães and de Sousa 2012). The key issue when measuring and empirically investigating (the quality of) democracy is conceptualization. The literature offers us the following three basic attributes: (1) collectively binding decision-making (Beetham 1994), (2) the central role of the citizen in governance (Roberts 2010), which in turn implies (3) the values of political equality and sovereignty of the people (Dahl 1956). The debate has centred on determining specific ways in which the people or citizens govern, and this has generated various models of democracy ranging from a technocratic view of government to conceptions of extensive political participation and deliberation (Held 2006: 259).

There is no single agreed definition of democracy nor of how we should determine its essential or minimum conditions; however, the literature suggests a range of characteristics, focusing on majority decision-making, responsiveness, liberalism, participation, and deliberation, among others. Magaloni et al. (2013) formulate four necessary conditions of democracy: contestation, participation, a civilian government, and executive constraints.

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Determining the content and quality of democracy is complicated by the fact it tends to be normatively associated with positively perceived phenomena, values, and goals (Przeworski 1999, Roberts 2010, Mazucca 2010), despite these not being directly related to the concept.

Alongside the continued discussion on the essence and quality of democracy exist various empirical measures that are used to gather extensive data on a great many countries. These indices serve as a data source for further comparative analysis, in which democracy is used as a dependent or independent variable (see Dolný 2012). Our aim is to analyse selected quantitative measures whilst considering three key issues. The first is conceptualization, where the primary concern is to select a basic concept of democracy and then identify its attributes. There is no single correct concept of democracy, so its conceptualization must be clearly justified and suitable for assessing the quality of democracy, which entails accurately deriving its attributes from the selected theory/model and explaining how they relate to democracy. There are two risks associated with this – maximization and minimization (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Maximalist definitions are ones that contain too many attributes, making it hard to measure democracy. Minimalist definitions leave out, or fail to accurately capture, the important attributes of democracy, so the measure cannot be used to adequately distinguish its quality. The second key issue concerns the operationalization of the concept, which affects the validity of the results and so care must be taken with the operationalization of the indicators, the reliability and replicability of the measure, and the aggregation method (level of aggregation and selection of aggregation rule). The third issue relates to the ability of the indices analysed here to capture processes indicating the onset of democratic backsliding in our selected sample of the Visegrad Four, i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. We investigate the question of which index is capable of best responding to the current shift away from (liberal) democracy in these countries. We also explore some of the strengths and questionable (or problematic) aspects of the indices when measuring and rating similar countries.

For our analysis, we selected five quality of democracy indices most commonly used in empirical studies. They include what are known as the ‘big three’ (Bühlmann et al. 2012), or the most popular (and relatively old) measures: Freedom in the World by Freedom House, Polity, and the Vanchanen Index of Democratization. To these we added two newer ones: The Transformation Index by the Bertelsmann Foundation (BTI – Bertelsmann Transformation Index) and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy (EIUID). Other indices exist but are omitted from our analysis since we are concerned with whether the indices are capable of capturing differences in the quality of democracy.
2. Freedom House – Freedom in the World

The best-known and frequently used measure of democracy is the *Freedom in the World* index compiled by Freedom House in the US (FH), which underpins the international discourse on democracy (Merkel 2004, Cameron 2005, Welzel 2006, Norris 2008, Ieraci and Paulon 2008, Giannone 2010, Knutsen 2010). These measures are used by scholars, journalists, political commentators, and decision-makers, as well as by international organizations seeking to allocate development aid (Giannone 2010).

Freedom House (2016) assesses freedom in selected countries based on two basic dimensions: a country’s political rights (contestation and participation) and civil liberties (e.g. freedom of expression and belief; associational and organizational rights; rule of law; personal autonomy and individual rights). Both dimensions are coded on a 7-point scale, where a higher number indicates that a greater number of restrictions are imposed on that particular dimension. However, the FH assessment also reflects aspects that determine the conditions for the effective upholding of the freedom of individuals, including institutions that constrain the executive and ensure legislative representation and inclusivity, the independence of the judiciary, and the rule of law.

The advantage of FH is the available data it contains on the state of freedom in many countries over a relatively long period. The disadvantage is it is weak on transparency and subjective in nature, since it is based only on expert judgements of broadly formulated questions and no clear assessment parameters have been set. It cannot therefore be independently verified and the assessments must be accepted ‘largely on faith’ (Munck and Verkuilen 2002: 21). The broadly formulated questions and unclear coding increase the risk of the components overlapping and influencing one another; the resulting scores are therefore assessor-dependent. The high correlation between the assessments of the dimensions is indicative of this (Coppedge et al. 2012). The evaluation scale reflects efforts to achieve symmetry rather than a balanced data structure. There is no explanation of the aggregation rule and it could lead to bias (or even misinterpretations) in country assessment comparisons. A country with a zero score on civil liberties could find itself ranked among partly-free countries if it receives a sufficiently high score on political rights (Ieraci and Paulon 2008).

Consequently, the FH in fact primarily measures degree of freedom and – not being explicitly derived from a particular conception of democracy – cannot be directly considered a tool for measuring democracy. However, the FH (2016) methodology does use a concept of democracy and produces conclusions as to the state of democracy based on its measure, since it assumes that complete freedom is only achievable in a liberal democracy. Our view is that the FH is implicitly based on the concept of electoral democracy,
in that it focuses on regular, competitive, confidential, and fair elections as the minimal grounds for labelling a country democratic. In addition, a free/democratic country has to fulfil three further criteria: (1) the existence of a competitive multi-party system and (2) a general electoral law; and (3) ensure political party access to voters via the media and political campaigns. The FH index’s emphasis on political rights and civil liberties indicates it is based on an implicit concept of liberal democracy. Hence the FH clearly links its measure of freedom to (liberal) democracy.

The main conceptual problem here is that democracy then becomes conflated with freedom; it is a problem that is found primarily amongst the index’s users rather than its creators. These concepts only partially overlap. If we wish to use freedom as an approximation of democracy then we need to explain and justify the way in which freedom is capable of adequately capturing the core attributes of democracy, as for example Bollen (1990) does. Besides this conceptual weakness, there is also an issue with some of the indicators used in the index, such as the extent of violent crime, willingness to grant political asylum, right to purchase and sell land, distribution of state enterprise profits (Coppedge et al. 2012), property ownership, choice of life partner, and absence of economic exploitation (Norris 2008), since none of these directly relate to either freedom or democracy.

The FH index also has empirical limitations: the extent of political rights and civil rights is a clearly defined and therefore fulfillable condition (partly because of the overall emphasis on negative freedom), and so established democracies generally gain the maximum score possible. The dimension of freedom is not capable of pinpointing and expressing differences between established democracies, casting doubt on the extent to which FH is in fact a measure of democracy (Norris 2008, Ieraci and Paulon 2008, Coppedge et al. 2012). The FH measure therefore appears to be a problematic tool for assessing democracy and the quality of democracy. Nonetheless, there are a number of scholars who do consider FH to be a good measure of democracy (e.g. Bollen and Paxton 2000, Knutsen 2010). For our purpose, which is to compare assessments of the quality of democracy in the Visegrad Four in terms of their internal differences, the FH index is unsatisfactory, as Figure 1 shows.

3. Polity
The second example of an established and frequently used measure of democracy (Norris 2008) is the Polity project – the most recent version being Polity IV – which assesses democracy in over 160 countries over the long term (Polity IV project: Dataset Users’ Manual 2017). It sees democracy as the combination of three entwined elements. The first is the presence of
institutions and procedures that can effectively express alternative citizen preferences. The second is the existence of institutional constraints on executive power. The third is the guarantee of the civil liberties of all citizens (these are not included in the data coding and so do not affect the final scores). Democracy is calculated on an 11-point scale using three indicators. The first indicator is competitiveness of executive recruitment. A maximum of two points is awarded for electoral competition. Open elections attract a further point as part of the total awarded. The second indicator is competitiveness of political participation, for a maximum of three points, awarded if there is open participation in competitive elections in the country. The third indicator of democracy, for a maximum of four points, is constraints on the power of the chief executive. Hence an established democracy can therefore be defined as such if (1) there are no constraints on political participation and it is open and fully competitive; (2) the executive is formed on the basis of (competitive) elections; and (3) there are substantial constraints on the chief executive (Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual 2017).

The second part of Polity measures autocracy, which is indicated by the negation of democracy and negative scores on the indicators measured. The final value of the index is then calculated by subtracting the autocracy scores from the democracy scores, which leads to the creation of a 21-point scale.
of autocracy/democracy, on which -10 is the minimum (hereditary absolute monarchy) and +10 the maximum (consolidated democracy). The Polity index produces three basic types of regime – ‘autocracies,’ with a score of -10 to -6; ‘anocracies’ with a score of -5 to +5; and democracies, with a score of +6 to +10. This classification is based on the view that democratic and autocratic authority are concomitant qualities of governance rather than different and alternative methods of government (Polity IV Project 2017). This partly explains the choice of aggregation rule, but does not entirely correspond to the original theory, and this has been judged an ‘analytic convenience’ in the literature (Marshall 2011: 29). The values that are attributed to each dimension of the measure remain unexplained and theoretically unsubstantiated, as do their various weights in relation to the overall value of the index.

The institutional focus of the Polity index weakens the conception of democracy used in the index. This is to some extent understandable, but, although the highly controversial methodological decision not to measure one of the dimensions of democracy (civil liberties) may have enabled an exceptionally rich data set to emerge and be collected, it has come at the cost of a loss in the measure’s credibility. The concept of democracy used thus lacks greater theoretical substantiation. The Polity index has not been able to avoid the risks associated with a minimalist concept of democracy, since the indicators selected are not capable of satisfactorily capturing the concept of democracy, and in some cases in fact have a problematic relationship to it. In particular, the indicator showing the existence of constraints on the chief executive has an impact on the assessment (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, Norris 2008, Hadenius and Teorell 2005), yet it is only with great difficulty that this can be considered a core indicator of the quality of democracy. The coding manual has now been published, and an attempt has been made to provide a detailed description of the variables, making the Polity index more transparent; however, it still does not enable replication, which would make it possible to check the results and include any problematic and ambiguous cases (Munck and Verkuilen 2002).

In terms of measuring democracy, the basic problem with the Polity index is its conceptualization of democracy, which remains ‘trapped’ in its original intention to monitor political stability and changes in regime. It would therefore appear to be an appropriate tool for distinguishing between different forms of autocracies or undemocratic regimes and, to a limited extent, for determining whether a country is democratic. It is, however, far less adequate for making any deeper distinctions between democratic states or for determining democratic quality, as the director of the project is well-aware (see Marshall 2011). So as Figure 2 indicates Polity index is not capable of distinguishing clearly between our four democracies nor can it record with any precision changes in the quality of democracy in Hungary
and Poland. Institutional constraints can after all easily be altered if a party has a (constitutional) majority in parliament.

4. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy

The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of Democracy (EIUID) is a relatively new quantitative measure of democracy that forms part of more comprehensive country assessments and represents an investor-targeted information resource. Despite its largely commercial nature, it is a scientifically credible assessment of quality of democracy (Coppedge et al. 2012).

It takes into account the methodological criticisms of the previous indices (Kekic 2007) and has a broader conceptualization of democracy, based on five categories: (1) free, fair and competitive elections; (2) civil liberties; (3) functioning of government; (4) political culture; and (5) participation. Democracy is measured on a scale of 0–10, as is each dimension. The assessment index contains a total of 60 questions and the result is calculated as an arithmetic mean. Part of the assessment is carried out by experts but most of it is based on various surveys (most frequently the World Values Survey), in an attempt to reduce the subjectivism of the measure.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on Polity IV reports
The conceptualization of democracy used in the EIUID is wider, but there is no theoretical explanation of why the five dimensions were selected, and they are not fully interlinked (see Fish 2006, Kekic 2007). The problem with the index is that it has a low level of transparency and replicability, as the expert assessments are not published. Furthermore, the findings from public opinion surveys, election results, and other measures are categorized (e.g. electoral participation has three categories: one point for a turnout of over 70% of eligible voters, half a point for a turnout of 50–70% and zero for a turnout of less than 50%), but there is no explanation of this. This also applies to other indicators, especially those measuring political culture, which – paradoxically – increases the level of subjectivism in the index as a whole, since it affects 17 of the 60 questions.

The choice of aggregation rule in the EIUID is not explained either, and since it is an arithmetic mean in which all dimensions are equally weighted, the index does not determine the essential conditions for democracy. It is possible therefore for a country with one very low assessment to obtain an overall status as a flawed democracy.

The basic advantage of this measure, stemming from its wider conceptualization of democracy, is that it captures differences between ‘full de-
mocracies’ (Kekic 2007), but these are identified in three areas – political participation, democratic political culture, and functioning of government. The remaining areas of electoral process and pluralism and civil liberties show similar values close to the maximum. This measurement is therefore unable to properly pinpoint changes in the status of democracy in established democracies, and only in part does it minimally captures recent differences among the Visegrad Four countries, as can be seen in Figure 3.

5. Bertelsmann Transformation Index

As the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) evaluates political and economic transformation, it does not deal with consolidated democracies, and the sample contains transition countries only. Its goal is to identify best practices in the transition to democracy and market economy. The BTI comprises two basic sub-indices. The first is the status index, which assesses the state of democracy and market economy, while the second is the management index, which evaluates the effectiveness of governance. Since democracy and market economy are assessed separately within the status index, the BTI can also be considered a tool for measuring the level of democracy.

The BTI is based on a broad conception of democracy and assesses areas such as rule of law; separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers; checks and balances; and society’s acceptance of the rules of democracy. Democracy is assessed on the basis of five dimensions: the first is stateness (intended to guarantee the existence of a state with adequate and distinct power structures in place); the second is political participation (ascertains whether the population determines who governs and the existence of other political liberties; the third is rule of law (the existence of checks and balances underpinning civil rights); the fourth is stability of democratic institutions (ability to operate and acceptance of); and political and social integration (the existence of stable models connecting society and state) is the fifth dimension (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016). The resulting democracy status is the average of the points awarded for each dimension; the maximum a country can obtain is 10 points. The BTI does not address the issue relating to selection of aggregation level, and this can be considered a methodological inadequacy.

The BTI classifies countries into four types: (1) autocracies; (2) highly defective democracies; (3) defective democracies; and (4) democracies. The categorization is problematic in that, while the various categories are described, the materials lack any further information (e.g. numerical) providing greater detail on the categorization or that would justify it theoretically. It is therefore unclear what precisely its creators consider to be the essential conditions for the existence of democracy.
Compared to the FH and Polity IV indices, the BTI attempts to capture broader attributes of democracy, not just human rights and civil liberties or institutional characteristics; however, it is unclear which concept of democracy it is based on and why the dimensions described above were selected to assess it. The aim of the BTI is to make it possible to observe whether the fundamental conditions and premises of a democracy are fulfilled, such as a functioning state and government, the existence of basic democratic institutions, and guarantees of human rights and civil liberties, in accordance with the theories of democracy. It is a suitable tool for distinguishing democracies from non-democracies, and for assessing progress in countries transitioning to democracy. But if the countries fulfil the basic conditions and standards of a democracy, then the BTI has little ability to distinguish between them.

The BTI is based on expert judgements, so subjectivism is a methodological issue. However, it attempts to minimize this in two ways. The first is the measurement’s high degree of transparency and the second is the multi-level checks on the assessments. The scores the experts give a country are reviewed by a second assessor and the resulting assessment is checked at two further levels – by regional coordinators and the BTI board. It is not replicable, but it is relatively transparent, which is a clear step forward compared to the similar expert-based assessments of the FH.

Figure 4: Assessment of Democracy in the Visegrad Four countries

![Graph showing BTI Status Index for Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland over the years 2006 to 2016](image)

Source: Authors’ calculations based on BTI reports
Compared to FH and Polity, the BTI provides a broader conceptualization of democracy, but its weakness lies in the fact that it excludes established democracies and the short term. It is not a suitable tool for capturing the quality of democracy in countries close to the level of an established democracy. This is documented in Figure 3 showing that the V4 countries obtain values close to the maximum.

Out of the five dimensions, they differ (and trail behind the maximum) on the dimension of political and social integration, where they lose points because they have unstable, fragmented party systems that are weakly embedded in society and have low levels of social trust. The relationship between trust and quality of democracy is disputed – in most theories of democracies – and apart from these the BTI contains few other criteria, making it difficult for it to cover the relevant differences between countries that are close to being established democracies, as is the case with the countries of Central Europe.

6. Tatu Vanhanen Index of Democratization

A different approach to measuring democracy, based on a minimalist definition of democracy, was developed by Tatu Vanhanen. The proportion of votes received by the strongest party in a parliamentary election is used to measure the pluralism of the party system. A further indicator – electoral participation – was later added (for more details on how the index has developed, see e.g. Vanhanen (2003: 53–56)). In this index democracy is seen as a system in which different ideological and social groups are legally entitled to compete for political power and in which the institutional power holders are voted in by the people and are accountable to the people (Vanhanen 2003: 49). It is based on R. Dahl’s (1971) theory and defines democracy using two dimensions – political competition and participation. The higher the level of participation and political competition, the higher the level of democracy.

These two dimensions are operationalized in relation to electoral data. Political competition is measured as the proportion of votes the strongest party receives or as the share of seats the strongest party gains in parliament. Measured thus, political competition should directly indicate the presence of a number of democratic attributes: (1) free elections, (2) political rights and freedoms, and (3) political equality, which enable competition between various groups. Participation is measured as the ratio between voter participation and the total population (Vanhanen 2003: 56), and is intended to indicate the extent of popular political participation (Vanhanen 2000). Vanhanen (2003: 63) considers the two components to be equally important and so gives them equal weight. However, the two
dimensions were operationalized as essential conditions of democracy, so to prevent errors, he multiplied them and then divided the result by 100, thereby obtaining the final value of the index of democratization (Vanhanen 2003: 64). To achieve accurate measurements, both the data on the election results and a certain degree of knowledge of the country in question are required.

Vanhanen’s index of democratization explains the extent to which a regime is democratic since it enables country ranking, but it does not automatically distinguish democracies from autocracies. Vanhanen therefore set thresholds to determine democratic regimes from non-democratic ones. Firstly, the political competition threshold is set at a maximum of 70% for the winner, which means the remaining smaller parties combined have less than 30% of the vote, indicating a fundamentally weak opposition and indirectly implying the existence of undemocratic barriers and non-competitive elections (Vanhanen 2003: 65). Secondly, at least 20% of the adult population must participate in the elections (Vanhanen 2003: 65), which makes this a ‘meaningful’ threshold in an era in which almost all countries have universal franchise.

Only objective data is used in the Index of Democratization, eliminating the problem of subjective evaluations (Bollen 1990, Bollen and Paxton 2000) and enabling replication. It is perhaps worth highlighting the conceptual simplicity of the index: it measures only two dimensions (Vanhanen 2003: 64). However, concerns may arise over its very narrow, minimalist understanding of democracy (see Norris 2008). Vanhanen himself accepts it overlooks some of the essential characteristics of democracy (political rights and liberties), but argues that they cannot be captured using reliable empirical data (Vanhanen 2003: 60–61). There are also problems with the operationalization of the indicators, as they introduce systematic bias into the measure (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Political competition is measured in terms of concentration of power and fragmentation of the party system, which is higher in countries with proportional representation (Lijphart 1999, Norris 2008), and requires further theoretical explanation. The index of democratization disadvantages developing countries with high birth rates and where the non-adult population represents a higher proportion of inhabitants. It is capable of capturing differences between established democracies, but the value differences tend to reflect the distribution of political party support rather than any real differences in quality of democracy. It appears the indicators have been designed to reflect the degree of party system fragmentation (or the value of the votes obtained by the winning candidate in presidential elections) and electoral participation but only minimally reflect differences in aspects of and quality of democracy.
Our findings also indicate that a further problem with this measurement is in its ability to correctly determine the weight of elections in a country. In Slovakia’s case, for example, Vanhanen attributes equal weight to both the presidential elections and the parliamentary elections, resulting in Slovakia being ranked amongst semi-presidential regimes. This is probably because the president is directly elected, but it is not an accurate depiction of the constitutional arrangements in Slovakia (see Malová and Rybář 2008). If Slovakia was categorized as a parliamentary system, the overall index value would be quite different and the index value for the year 2000 would be even higher. The referendum held that year would raise the participation value by an additional five points, producing a total score of 47.1 (96.1% of the maximum value), which would give it the highest index value of all countries in 2000.

Creating ‘objective’ indicators and measures of democracy is, as we seen in the Vanhanen case, extremely difficult and the results so far are at best controversial if not a direct failure. The problem of subjectivity in measurements and assessments of democracy has yet to be resolved.

**Figure 5: Assessment of Democracy in the Visegrad Four countries**

![Graph showing assessment of democracy in Visegrad Four countries](image)

Source: Authors’ calculations

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64 Official published index values were used for calculations except for the Vanhanen Index of Democratization where the values were calculated by the authors using the shares of seats for the strongest party in parliament as a measure of political competition and considering Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary as parliamentary systems and Poland as a semi-presidential system.
7. Measuring quality of democracy – overall evaluation and conclusions

The analysis has shown that the selected quantitative measures of democracy are not sufficiently capable of responding to the various methodological challenges associated with conceptualization and measurement.

As we have indicated, the main weakness in the indices analysed is the way democracy is conceptualized; this is despite some authors’ claims that the quality of the theoretical concepts is much higher than the quality of the measures (Giebler 2012: 516). Our survey shows that a quality measure cannot be created without a well-thought out conceptualization. The indices are all based on concepts of democracy that are not clearly defined. They tend to use ad-hoc definitions that are predetermined by the nature of the measure (Lauth 2011). They concentrate on human rights and competitive elections or the separation of the institutions and constraints on powers, but do not include or explain links to the basic democratic values of political equality, popular sovereignty, and extent to which citizens can influence political decision-making. Since pinpointing key democratic principles is crucial, it is disputable as to how good these tools are for measuring the quality of democracy. Each of the measures we analysed was deficient to some degree, be it in relation to aggregation (selection of the level of aggregation and aggregation rules), selection of indicators or the subjectiveness of the assessment, all of which reduce the validity and replicability of the measure. Vanhanen’s attempt at using more objective indicators has not proved fully satisfactory, since it is still very hard to find credible objective indicators capable of sufficiently capturing the basic democratic values.

This also places limitations on the results. The indices are broad-strokes measures primarily capable of determining whether a country can be classified as a democracy (or liberal democracy). However, they are generally ineffective at distinguishing between the functioning of established democracies in the sense of whether they function better or worse on the key dimensions of democracy or quality of democracy. The two most frequently used indices (FH FIW and Polity) award the maximum score to almost all established democracies, suggesting that the quality of democracy is the same in all these countries and that there is no room for improvement. This serious limitation in the current quantitative measures of democracy has been flagged up by a number of theorists over the years (e.g. Ieraci and Paulon 2008, Bühlmann et al. 2008, Knutsen 2010, Coppedge et al. 2011). It has led to repeated attempts to create new, more appropriate tools for surveying, comparing, and measuring democracies, such as the Varieties of Democracy project or Democratic Barometer for Established Democracies.

The indices we have investigated are not capable of accurately capturing quality of democracy – with the exception of the VIoD – nor the potential
Table 1. Analysis of democracy measures – key characteristics and evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FH</th>
<th>POLITY</th>
<th>VloD</th>
<th>BTI</th>
<th>EIUUD</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scope of measure</strong></td>
<td>1972–present, almost all the world’s population</td>
<td>1800–present, independent states with over 500 thousand inhabitants</td>
<td>Limited only by accessibility of election results</td>
<td>2003–present, transition countries</td>
<td>2006–present, independent states excluding micro-states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concept of democracy</strong></td>
<td>minimalist – human rights</td>
<td>minimalist – institutional characteristics</td>
<td>minimalist – electoral competition for political power</td>
<td>wider</td>
<td>wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explanation of concept</strong></td>
<td>not explained</td>
<td>not explained</td>
<td>Explained</td>
<td>not explained</td>
<td>not explained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dimensions measured</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>– political rights</td>
<td>– competitiveness of executive selection</td>
<td>– political competition</td>
<td>– stateness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– civil liberties</td>
<td>– competitiveness of political participation</td>
<td>– participation</td>
<td>– participation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– constraints on chief executive</td>
<td>– competitiveness of political participation</td>
<td>– rule of law</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>– political competition</td>
<td>– stability of democratic institutions</td>
<td>– stability of democratic institutions</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>– political participation</td>
<td>– political and social integration</td>
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<td>– constraints on chief executive</td>
<td>– political participation</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>– political competition</td>
<td>– electoral process</td>
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<td>– political participation</td>
<td>– functioning of government</td>
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<td>– constraints on chief executive</td>
<td>– political participation</td>
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<td>– political competition</td>
<td>– political culture</td>
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<td></td>
<td>– political participation</td>
<td>– civil liberties</td>
<td>– civil liberties</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Differentiation between established democracies</strong></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>partly</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
<td>– scope</td>
<td>– scope</td>
<td>– scope</td>
<td>– broad conception of democracy</td>
<td>– scope</td>
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<td></td>
<td>– reputation of measure</td>
<td>(especially over time)</td>
<td>– scope</td>
<td>– transparency</td>
<td>– broader conception of democracy</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>– objective indicators</td>
<td>– scope</td>
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<td>– simplicity of measure</td>
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<td>– replicability</td>
<td>– broad conception of democracy</td>
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<td>– aggregation</td>
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### Weaknesses

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<th>FH</th>
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<th>VioD</th>
<th>BTI</th>
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<td>– narrow conception of democracy</td>
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Onset of democratic backsliding. This serious limitation in the current quantitative measures of democracy has been flagged up by a number of theorists over the years (e.g. Ieraci and Paulon 2008, Bühlmann et al.2008, Knutsen 2010, Coppedge et al. 2011). It has led to repeated attempts to create new, more appropriate tools for surveying, comparing, and measuring democracies, such as the Varieties of Democracy project or Democratic Barometer for Established Democracies.

None of the indices we have investigated are not fully capable of accurately capturing quality of democracy. Our example of the values of the V4 countries shows (see Figures 1–5) that the results of the quality of democracy provided by these indices are very static and cannot sufficiently differentiate between individual cases. Likewise, they report the democratic backsliding only in very limited way and do not give cause for concern about the development of democracy in these countries in recent years. It shows that their focus on the basic aspects of democracy is not sufficiently sensitive to capture specific changes in some countries that may affect the way how democracy works there. However, we can see a certain difference between the indices. Some of them are virtually unchanged in all countries (Polity, EUID), but some suggest a slight decline in the quality of democracy in recent years in Hungary (FH, BTI). Difference stems not from the different conceptualization of democracy, but in particular from the presence of expert assessments. While these tend to be criticized for subjectivity, but on the other hand allow greater sensitivity to changes in the fulfilment of democratic standards.
However, VIoD measurement is an interesting exception capable of identifying the onset of democratic backsliding. Despite the controversial minimalist conceptualization of democracy, its measure of political competition is able to detect the concentration of power which may – but need not – indicate the beginnings of political decision-making that weakens democracy, or disrupts the rule of law and restricts political freedoms and liberties. This may serve as an early warning sign of more systemic attempts at backsliding, such as has been recently observed in Hungary and Poland. In Slovakia, by contrast, the previous single-party government – despite concerns and problems – did not enact decisions leading to substantial violation of its (liberal) democracy. These findings point to both fascinating and important areas for further research. For the moment though, we need only note that there should be more emphasis on empirical studies of democratic backsliding, which is usually understood simply as piecemeal restrictions on political and civil liberties, diminished accountability, electoral gerrymandering, and electoral fraud (Ágh 2016).

Despite using different measuring methods, the most popular indices (FH FIW, Polity, VIoD) show a high degree of mutual correlation (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, Norris 2008, Knutsen 2010, Coppedge et al. 2012, Lueder and Lust 2017). This means that while the measures differ in their methods and indicators, they actually measure the same thing. In some cases, the assessment can differ depending on the measure used to the extent that it affects the statistical significance and explanatory force of the independent variables. A strong degree of correlation between different measures of democracy does not therefore guarantee that they will produce the same results in empirical research (Högström 2013).

These inadequacies and problems with the measures are leading some theorists to become resigned to the idea that quality of democracy cannot be measured on the basis of fulfilment of substantive criteria. Instead they prefer to include various findings on governance, which are far better at distinguishing clearly and easily between different examples (e.g. Ringen 2007, Ieraci and Paulon 2008, Campbell 2008). This ‘good governance’ approach to assessing findings does produce a simpler differentiation between countries and demonstrates a certain type of quality, but it does not answer questions about the quality of democracy, which is not necessarily directly related to findings on governance.

In addition to these problems affecting most of the quantitative measures of democracy, we should also note that there has been an (undoubtedly positive) improvement in the theoretical and methodological level of the new indices, which is probably a consequence of the extensive criticism aimed at the established measures. The newer measures (BTI, EIUID) are clearly superior in this respect. The methodological criticism has not, however,
substantially affected the confidence of the scientific community in the indices (Giebler 2012: 510), which remain the most popular option in empirical and comparative research.

One consequence of the limitations of the current measurement indices is that single-case qualitative analyses continue to be important and hold weight. The comparative perspective and the possibility of making broad comparisons among a larger sample of countries may be lost, but on the other hand far deeper and more comprehensive insights into democracy are gained, including into the complex relations between a country’s institutions and practices, which cannot be obtained without knowledge of the context. This type of analysis also allows for a better assessment of aspects associated with core democratic values, for which there are as yet insufficient internationally comparable indicators, and these are essential to quantitative analyses. Equally we can avoid the frequent problems associated with aggregation or the need to assess the various areas using numerical indices. The findings of this study may provide a good basis for further comparative research or for contrasting them with the findings of the big quantitative measures.

References


7. Good Democracies Need “Good” Citizens: Citizen Dispositions and the Study of Democratic Quality

Quinton Mayne and Brigitte Geissel

“...the health and stability of a modern democracy depends not only on the justice of its ‘basic structure’ but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens”

Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (1994: 352)

1. Introduction

Large-scale, cross-national indices of democratic quality have traditionally paid little systematic attention to citizens as a constitutive component of democratic quality. In earlier work we challenged this orthodoxy by highlighting the importance of citizens as central to the conceptualization of democratic quality (Mayne and Geissel 2016). Specifically, we argued that democratic quality consists of two necessary, but independently insufficient, components. The “institutional component,” which includes the institutional and structural opportunities that allow for democratic rule, has long dominated research on democratic quality. The “citizen component,” which to date has received scant consideration by scholars of democratic quality, refers to the ways in which citizens “can and do breathe life into existing institutional opportunities for democratic rule.”

In addition to establishing the significance of citizens for the conceptualization of democratic quality, we follow recent developments in the field of quality-of-democracy research (Coppedge et al. 2011) by emphasizing the importance of a model-driven approach. We show how three different models of democracy – which have stood at the centre of debates about democratic quality in recent decades – place different demands on citizens

65 This chapter is a revised and abridged version of an article submitted for publication in Politics & Governance.

66 This should not be confused with quality-of-democracy research that takes citizens into account using data on public assessments of political actors and institutions (see, e.g., Logan and Mattes 2012, Pickel, Breustedt and Smolka 2016). Mass evaluations of the functioning of democratic institutions are conceptually distinct from what we refer to here as the citizen component of democratic quality.
as much as they do on institutions. We argue that the different demands placed on citizens by competing models of democracy fall into three broad categories of citizen dispositions. This includes citizens’ democratic commitments, their political capacities, and the rates and types of political participation that they undertake.

The principal goal of this chapter is to provide a solid analytic foundation and conceptual framework to incorporate data on the citizen component of democratic quality in future empirical research. We do this by building on our previous work in three ways. First, we provide a more fine-grained and structured conceptualization of democratic commitments, political capacities, and political participation. Second, we address the question of congruence or “fit” between the institutional and citizen components of democratic quality, distinguishing between temporally static and dynamic forms of inter-component congruence. Third, we present and develop the idea that inter-dispositional consistency – i.e., the consistency of democratic commitments, political capacities, and political participation with the same model of democracy, is an important aspect of democratic quality.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section deals with the issue of conceptualizing the core dispositions that comprise the citizen component of democratic quality. The second section addresses the concept of congruence between institutions and citizens as an indicator of democratic quality, highlighting the importance of thinking about inter-component congruence both in static terms and as a dynamic process of mutual adjustment. The third section examines the issue of inter-dispositional model consistency. The chapter ends with a discussion of the significant limitations of existing international survey programs as sources of data for measuring the citizen component of democratic quality.

2. Citizen Dispositions

Providing a fully elaborated account of the three core dispositions that comprise the citizen component of democratic quality is crucial for locating and developing appropriate empirical indicators. There is no ‘one size fits all’ understanding of these core dispositions. Different models or ontologies of democracy conceive of democratic commitments, political capacity, and political participation in different ways. After defining in more detail the conceptual content of each citizen disposition, we show how three key models of democracy understand each one. The three models in question, which have dominated academic and policy debates about democratic quality over the past quarter century, are: minimal-elitism – epitomized by the work of Joseph Schumpeter (1950) and E. E. Schattschneider (1975); liberal-pluralism, defined and developed perhaps most famously in the work of Robert
Dahl (1971: 1989); and participatory democracy, championed by scholars such as Carole Pateman (1970) and Benjamin Barber (1984).

2.1. Democratic commitments

The basic notion that democratic commitments are a necessary component of the proper functioning of democracy finds support in a long line of writing. As John Stuart Mill (2009: 7) noted, “the people for whom the (democratic) form of government is intended must be willing to accept it.” Democratic commitments refer to the political beliefs, values, principles, and norms that citizens hold dear. They are a combination of both cognitive and affective orientations, which provide citizens with a lens through which to understand and judge the political world. In the past quarter-century a sizeable body of empirical research has emerged on how citizens understand democracy (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005, Canache 2012, Carrión 2008, Dalton, Sin and Jou 2007, Fuchs and Roller 2006, Miller, Hesli and Reisinger 1997, Silveira and Heinrich 2017, Thomassen 1995). It has only been in recent years that a small but growing body of literature has appeared on the more specific question of which democratic values and principles citizens actually endorse (Carlin 2017, Carlin and Singer 2011, Kriesi, Saris and Moncagatta 2016, Geissel 2016, Schedler and Sarsfield 2007).

The concept of democratic commitment operates at two levels: at a general level in the form of citizens’ broad preference for democracy over non-democratic forms of political organization; and at a more specific level in terms of citizens’ support for particular principles and values. The idea that a citizenry’s general democratic commitment relates to the functioning or quality of a democracy finds clear support in early work on democratic consolidation as well as more recent debates on the issue of democratic deconsolidation. The basic contention here is that democratic quality is, in part, a function of (a) the proportion of citizens broadly committed to democracy, and (b) how unwavering citizens’ democratic commitments are in the face of mobilization efforts by anti-democratic forces, economic misfortune, and electoral losses.

The study of democratic quality requires going beyond an assessment of citizens’ broad commitment to democracy to understand how committed citizens are to key democratic principles. This is important for two reasons. First, it enables researchers to identify whether a broad commitment to

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67 As Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan note, “a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 16, see also Diamond 1999: 69).
democracy is in fact nominal and without meaningful content. Second, given that different models of democracy set store by different types of political values, a structured, theory-driven approach requires clarity on how the model(s) of democracy underpinning one’s assessment interpret core democratic principles, such as equal inclusion, in different ways, or even accommodate different democratic principles. To gain analytic purchase on the varied democratic commitments prized by different models of democracy, we propose that scholars focus on patterns of value beliefs related to two fundamental questions that pertain to the functioning of democracy. First, *who* gets to decide? Second, *how* are decisions to be made?

The question of *who* gets to decide is first and foremost about what citizens consider to be the proper role of elected politicians in democratic decision-making. A helpful way of thinking about this issue is in terms of the checks and balances that different models of democracy expect citizens to support. As such, the question of who gets to decide concerns the power of elected politicians relative to other “political” actors, including the judiciary, civil service, and subnational authorities. It also concerns checking and balancing among different classes of politician, most notably between the executive and legislature. Finally, the question of who gets to decide is crucially linked to what citizens see as their own role, acting individually or collectively, in democratic decision making.

The second question of how decisions are to be made relates to citizens’ settled opinions on how core democratic principles should be instantiated in the processes and structures that guide political decision making. This fundamentally concerns not just the formal rules but also the institutionalized norms of encounter and exchange between elected politicians and other social actors, including organized civil society and ordinary citizens. What is key here is that different models of democracy demand, explicitly and implicitly, different value commitments from citizens when it comes to how democratic decision-making processes should take place. As a result, judgements of a country’s democratic quality will vary greatly depending on the model used to carry out the assessment. This becomes clear by looking at the democratic commitments expected of citizens by three models of democracy that have long dominated debates on democratic quality (a summary of which is available in Table 1).

The minimal-elitist account of democracy envisages citizens to be committed to forms of decision-making dominated by parties, elected politicians, and the government of the day, with few checks and balances. Citizens are expected to willingly accept their own voluntary “retirement” (to borrow the words of Schumpeter (1950: 295)) from political life between elections. As to the question of how decisions are to be made, high-quality minimal-elitist democracy is predicated on the expectation that citizens will be
tolerant of political differences and supportive of robust competition between those differences at the ballot box. However, once votes are cast, minimal-elitism expects citizens to support winner-take-all majoritarianism, which necessarily implies that (even perennial) electoral losers accept their political marginality.

High-quality liberal-pluralist democracies are also home to citizenries that support elected politicians as the primary decision-makers. However, in contrast to the minimal-elitist account, “good” liberal-pluralist citizens are expected to be committed to the idea that politicians are checked and balanced in important ways, for example by constitutional protections and judicial oversight, or by divisions of power between the executive and legislature. The basic idea here is that liberal-pluralist citizens regard democratic decision making as involving a broad set of elected and unelected elites. A corollary of this is that citizens are expected to embrace their own role in democratic decision-making as largely mediated: on the one hand, by the parties and politicians they elect, and on the other hand, by the interest organizations who speak on their behalf. As for the kinds of democratic decision-making citizens are supposed to support, liberal-pluralists expect citizens to accept or even welcome that public policy will be influenced by processes of consultation and lobbying, involving politically independent intermediary organizations and associations. By extension, the “good” liberal-pluralist citizen is expected to see negotiation and compromise among elites of different political persuasions as a natural and proper part of the democratic process.68

The participatory model of democracy is distinct from minimal-elitism and liberal-pluralism in that it expects citizens to support unmediated forms of mass popular involvement in democratic decision-making. This might include support for direct democratic mechanisms (such as referendums and initiatives) as well as participatory innovations (such as participatory budgeting and citizen juries) that give citizens some decision-making powers. While the participatory model of democracy sets great store by the idea that final decision-making powers should lie with citizens themselves, in at least certain issue or policy areas, it also demands that where elected politicians retain decision-making powers they should undertake continuous processes of consultation with citizens between elections. This is one of the chief differences between participatory democracy and minimal-elitism and liberal-pluralism when it comes to the question of “how” decisions should be made. Minimal-elitist citizens are expected to oppose forms of direct citizen engagement between elections, while liberal-pluralist citizens are

68 Significant variations exist within the liberal-pluralist understanding of democracy, which includes so-called consensus democracy (Lijphart 1999). The liberal-pluralist understanding of democracy is characterized mainly in terms of the proper role of unelected organized interests in democratic decision making (Table 1).
<table>
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<th>Core Dispositions</th>
<th>Key elements</th>
<th>The “good” citizen according to:</th>
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<td>Minimal-elitist model</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Democratic commitments</td>
<td>Commitment regarding: • Who gets to decide? • How decisions should be made?</td>
<td>Committed to decision making dominated by parties and elected politicians, with few checks and balances.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity to: • know • choose • influence</td>
<td>Capable of selecting into their values, preferences, and interests based on menu of options provided to them by political elites in lead up to elections.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Political capacities</td>
<td>Participation that is: • Electoral vs. non-electoral • Mediated vs. direct • Other-regarding</td>
<td>Pay sufficient attention to politics during election campaign to avoid being duped and turn out to vote, if interests at stake.</td>
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expected to be primarily supportive of elected politicians’ engagement with organized interests (speaking on citizens’ behalf) rather than with citizens themselves. By contrast, the “good” participatory citizen is expected to be committed to the idea that politicians proactively and directly engage with citizens on an ongoing basis.

2.2. Political capacity
Existing cross-national indices of democratic quality rarely include indicators aimed at capturing levels of political capacity among citizenries.69 This stands in contrast to the clear statements on the importance of political capacity made by democratic theorists of all stripes. It also runs counter to everyday intuition about the nature of democracy, powerfully expressed in recent years by political commentators across the globe who worry about citizens’ incapacity to resist misinformation. Finally, the absence of direct measures of political capacity from existing quality-of-democracy indices runs counter to the large body of empirical research that has been inspired by, and engages directly with, debates on political capacity found in different accounts of democracy. In fact, over the past half-century, the study of political capacity and its implications for democratic performance has been a central concern within the field of political behaviour. Scholars have addressed the question of political capacity from a variety of angles, mainly using data from single countries and often looking at multiple types of political capacity at once. Key questions that have animated this body of research include: are citizens able to maintain internally-consistent and ideologically-structured beliefs? How politically knowledgeable and civically literate are citizens? Do citizens interrogate their own beliefs by finding and accurately processing new or unbiased sources of political information? How capable are citizens of voting for politicians and parties that will best represent their values and interests?70

Though it is important to note that most research in this area has to date focused on the United States, the findings of existing research on political capacity are sobering. Citizens report low levels of political knowledge. They systematically seek out and accept information that confirms their

69 An exception is the Democracy Ranking (Campbell 2008), which includes measures of secondary-school and university enrolment aimed at capturing the availability of “knowledge” in a society. The EIU’s Democracy Index includes data on levels of adult literacy and the share of the population that follows politics in the news.

pre-existing beliefs. And they rely heavily on partisan cues and heuristics provided by party elites, but those partisan attachments often lack ideological coherence.

The debates and divisions that exist among empirical political scientists regarding how much, and what kinds, of political capacity are required of citizens for democracy to function well is reflective of important conceptual or ontological disagreements about what makes a (high-quality) democracy a (high-quality) democracy. The point is not that some models of democracy are indifferent to the issue of political capacity, while others put political capacity centre stage. Rather, all major models of democracy clearly identify political capacity as important for the functioning of democracy; they differ significantly however in their understanding of what types and levels of political capacity matter for high-quality democracy.

How exactly then do different models of democracy understand the concept of political capacity? To answer this question, we propose that scholars of democratic quality focus on how models of democracy conceive of the following three types of political capacity. The first is the capacity of citizens to understand or know their own values, preferences, and interests that they wish to see realized through the democratic process. The second is the capacity of citizens to identify and select elites who will defend and advance those values, preferences, and interests. The third and final capacity is the capacity to influence political elites and the agendas they pursue. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to these three core democratic capacities as the capacity to know, the capacity to choose, and capacity to influence. (For a summary of how these three capacities are understood by three key models of democracy, see Table 1.)

Let us first turn to the capacity to know. How do our three key models of democracy conceive of this capacity? For advocates of minimal-elitist democracy, little is expected of citizens by way of capacity for independent thought to determine their personal values and interests. Schumpeter famously argued that citizens are “incapable of action other than a stampede” (1950: 283); what is important about this statement is that the low levels of political capacity associated with stampede-like cognition and affect are seen as in no way undermining a country’s quality of democracy. For minimal-elitists, citizens need only be capable of selecting into their values, preferences, and interests based on the menu of options provided to them by political elites during the short window of robust public debate that periodically occurs prior to elections. That said, as Schumpeter points out, for minimal-elitist democracy to work well, citizens must be on “an intellectual and moral level high enough to be proof against the offerings of the crook and the crank” (1950: 294, emphasis added). This suggests that the “good” citizen for minimal-elitists is able to process the content of pre-election
public debate in ways that allow her to identify and resist the siren call of misleading and false information.

Liberal-pluralist and participatory models of democracy are more demanding of citizens in terms of their “capacity to know” their own values and interests. Both models share an expectation that citizens should have the capacity to arrive at what Tocqueville described as “self-interest rightly understood” or what Dahl refers to as “enlightened understanding.” In *Democracy and Its Critics* (1989: 111–112), Dahl writes that “to know what it wants, and what is best, the people must be enlightened.” To achieve such enlightenment, Dahl argues that citizens must acquire “an understanding of means and ends, of one’s interests and the expected consequences of policies for interests, not only for oneself but for all other relevant persons as well.”

Dahl’s definition of self-interest forms part of a broader discussion regarding the need for a free and competitive media environment. The implication of this is that citizens are expected to be capable of finding and processing information that has been made readily intelligible by a well-functioning media. At the same time, given that citizens are expected to be able to weigh the consequences of their values and interests on those of fellow citizens, it is important to recognize that liberal-pluralists’ and participatory democrats’ expectations regarding citizens’ “capacity to know” are still fairly taxing, from a cognitive and affective point of view.

When it comes to citizens’ capacity to choose political elites who will defend and pursue their interests, minimal-elitist, liberal-pluralist, and participatory models of democracy have much in common. None of them requires citizens to be extraordinary information sleuths or indeed policy wonks; rather, they expect citizens to be capable of taking full advantage of elite-provided sources of structured information in order to choose leaders without, as Schattschneider (1975: 134) puts it, being duped by demagogues. The models diverge, however, along two dimensions: first, in terms of the range of elite actors that citizens are expected to select; and second, in terms of the period of time over which citizens are expected to select elites.

For minimal-elitists, the “good” citizen need only be able to tune into politics in short bursts at election time. Using information shortcuts generated by the process of political competition during the campaign period, citizens are expected to have the political wherewithal to select candidates and parties who will best serve their values and interests. For liberal-pluralists (see Galston 1988: 1283) and participatory democrats, citizens are

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also expected to be able to make sense of available information to select candidates and parties at election time. In addition, they must be sufficiently tuned into politics on an ongoing basis to be able to identify and support organizations and associations that will defend their values and interests (“rightly understood”), as and when the need arises, by applying pressure on elected politicians between elections.

Finally, what do the three models have to say about citizens’ capacity to influence? Minimal-elitists expect citizens to influence politics and policy making indirectly through their vote choices and certainly not between elections, when “good” citizens are supposed to desist from “back-seat driving” (Schumpeter 1950: 295). Liberal-pluralist and participatory democrats expect citizens to influence elites through forms of exit but also through voice, to borrow the words of Albert Hirschman. To influence elites via voice requires citizens to possess not just certain types and levels of cognitive capacity but expressive and organizational capacities too. This includes the ability to identify whom to target and, if need be, the capacity to work with others to influence them. For participatory democrats, who argue that high-quality democracies provide wide-ranging opportunities for citizens to get involved in shaping public policy (sometimes even deciding it for themselves), it is particularly important that citizens possess skills and knowledge that enable them to cooperate, communicate, and deliberate with fellow citizens and political elites alike (see Barber 1984: 154).

2.3. Political participation

One of the few citizen-related indicators that routinely appears in existing cross-national quality-of-democracy indices is turnout in national elections (see Bühlmann et al. 2013, EIU 2012, Levine and Molina 2011, Vanhanen 1997). This clearly points to a scholarly consensus that political participation is a core conceptual component of democratic quality. High-quality democracy cannot simply be understood in terms of the existence of particular kinds of democratic institutions, the most incontrovertible of which are free and fair elections; it is also defined by whether citizens actually turn out to vote in those elections. All major models of democracy set great store by electoral participation. They differ significantly though in the importance they attach to other forms of political participation.

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72 Existing quality-of-democracy indices also routinely include other participation-related indicators. The Democracy Barometer, for example, includes data on reported rates of petitioning and demonstrations; Levine and Molina (2011) include data on the share of citizens who report having worked for a candidate or party; the EIU incorporates information on membership of political parties and political non-governmental organizations as well as participation in demonstrations.
Over the years, normative disagreements among democratic theorists and political philosophers have inspired and echo similar debates among scholars of political behaviour. In fact, the question of what types of political participation are required for democracy to function well lies at the heart of a founding study in the field of political behaviour. In *The Civic Culture*, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba famously examine patterns of political participation in Britain, Germany, Italy, Mexico, and the United States and come to the conclusion that democracies are best served by citizens who “balance” political activity and involvement with forms of passivity, that “‘manage’ or keep in place” participatory inclinations (Almond and Verba 1989: 30). In the half-century since the publication of *The Civic Culture*, patterns of popular political participation have of course changed greatly. However, the question of how active citizens should be, and what forms political activity should take, for democracy to function well remains central to the study of political behaviour.73

To capture how different models of democracy conceive of political participation, we propose that scholars of democratic quality pay particular attention to how much weight is attached to: (1) participation focused on elections versus acts of political participation that occur between elections; (2) mediated forms of political participation where citizens seek to make their voices heard and/or influence politics through organized civil society versus direct forms of political action and participation; and (3) the extent to which political participation is “other-regarding” or public-oriented. (See Table 1 for a summary of the discussion below.)

For minimal-elitists, elections are the singular focus of citizen participation. The primary political act of the “good” citizen is therefore to turn out in periodic elections. To avoid political demagoguery, it can be assumed that minimal-elitists expect citizens to pay attention to politics during election campaign periods. This suggests that citizens should consume political news and engage in political discussions in the run-up to elections. Between elections, however, citizens are expected to engage in few, if any, political acts, leaving politics to politicians and parties.

For liberal-pluralists, citizens are under no duty to participate actively in politics (Galston 1988: 1284). That said, there is an expectation that they will turn out to vote, and when they do they will vote in line with their self-interest, rightly understood. In contrast to minimal-elitism, the liberal-pluralist model of democracy does not expect citizens to shy away from political participation between elections. The emphasis though is placed on forms of mediated political participation, most notably engagement with
organizations and associations, and by extension social movements, that will defend their interests and values in the political arena.

For participatory democrats, citizens are expected to be engaged in the electoral process in similar ways to the “good” liberal-pluralist citizen. However, whereas liberal-pluralists expect citizens to become involved in politics intermittently between elections, principally relying on intermediary organizations to defend their interests, the participatory model of democracy places a duty on citizens to be directly and actively involved in politics on an ongoing basis. As Barber (1984: 152) writes, “(participatory) democracy is the politics of amateurs, where every man is compelled to encounter every other man without the intermediary of expertise.” Finally, as these words suggest, participatory democrats also expect citizens to undertake political activities that are expressly other-regarding and public-oriented, aimed at moving beyond “competitive interest mongering” (Barber: 1984: 155).

3. Inter-component congruence between institutions and citizen dispositions

For democracy to function well, it doesn’t just need good institutions, it also needs citizens who are willing and able to breathe life into those institutions. A version of this claim stands at the heart of classic studies of democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996, Diamond 1999) as well as more recent debates about democratic deconsolidation (see, most notably, Foa and Mounk 2016, and critical responses to this work by Alexander and Welzel 2017, Inglehart 2016, Norris 2017 and Voeten 2017). The basic contention of this body of work is that democracy can be considered consolidated and stable when, among other things, democratic institutions are firmly established and citizens are meaningfully and unwaveringly supportive of democracy (as manifested in their commitment to core democratic principles and their actions to defend those principles at and beyond the ballot box).

In contrast to research on democratic consolidation, research on democratic quality has made little effort to conceptualize the relationship between institutions and citizens. The widespread inclusion of (national) electoral turnout data in existing cross-national quality-of-democracy indices points to an underlying academic consensus that citizens are conceptually constitutive of democratic quality. However, this same research has fallen short of giving any systematic conceptual consideration to how citizens matter for democratic quality beyond participation in periodic national elections. By extension, they have also failed to recognize the crucial issue that citizens matter in different ways depending on the model driving the assessment. The conceptual short shrift that researchers have given to citizens stands in marked contrast to the detailed and sophisticated discussions about how
and why different kinds of institutions and structures matter for democratic quality. In this section, we address the more general conceptual question of the relationship between the citizen and institutional components of democracy. Our goal here is to identify important considerations that can guide future empirical research.

We conceive of the relationship between institutions and citizens as it pertains to democratic quality in terms of congruence. In earlier work we described the relationship between the citizen and institutional components of democratic quality as one of mutual dependence or mutual conditionality (2016: 636). Our basic contention is that institutions and citizens represent two sides of the same democracy coin. In concrete terms, this means that democratic quality is a function of the level of model-specific congruence between institutions and citizen dispositions. The more institutions and citizen dispositions are simultaneously congruent with the demands and expectations of the same model of democracy, the higher that country’s quality of democracy, at least when judged from the viewpoint of the model in question.

Given that both the institutional and citizen components are necessary conditions of democratic quality, it is important to be clear about a key implication of our argument. If a country’s political institutions and structures accord largely with the expectations of a particular model of democracy, but citizen dispositions in that same country do not, we simply cannot say that this country has a high-quality democracy. The same is true in reverse where citizen dispositions accord with a particular model of democracy, but political institutions and structures do not. How exactly inter-component incongruence would ultimately affect a country’s overall democracy score is a question for future empirical research. The point we wish to make is that the value of one component must, in a non-negligible way, be contingent on the value of the other component. When considering this issue of mutual contingency, it is important to distinguish between two types of inter-component congruence: one static; the other dynamic.

When one thinks about democratic quality in terms of inter-component congruence, most likely one intuitively thinks about congruence at a single point in time. We refer to this as the static approach. However, over time political institutions change, as do citizen dispositions. From a long-term perspective, lowering a country’s quality-of-democracy score for lack of inter-component congruence may be misleading when both institutions and citizen dispositions are mutually adjusting over time toward a new
equilibrium. For this reason, it is crucial to make allowances for the inter-dependences and processes of mutual adjustment that may exist, to varying degrees, between the institutional and citizen components. A key analytic advantage of conceiving of inter-component congruence in both static and dynamic terms is that it allows us to distinguish between two sets of democracies. On the one hand, low-quality democracies where institutions and citizens are effectively more or less permanently out of sync with each other. And on the other hand, countries where institutions and citizen dispositions are slowly but surely moving in the same direction; and where the processes of mutual adjustment underpinning these changes are in fact a powerful positive indicator of the quality of democracy in those countries.

4. Inter-dispositional consistency
Over the years, scholars of political behaviour have studied how citizen dispositions relate to one another. One approach has been to examine the influence of certain kinds of democratic commitments on political participation. Recent work, by Åsa Bengtsson and Henrik Christensen (2016) and Sergiu Gherghina and Geissel (2017), finds clear associations between citizens’ democratic “process preferences” and how they participate in politics. For example, citizens who support a participatory model of democracy are more likely to participate in politics, both at and beyond the ballot box.75 A large body of research also exists on the question of how political capacities relate to political participation. Compared to the legion of studies that examines the impact of education (and often also income and political interest) – as broad proxies of political capacity – very little research has been done on how the cognitive, expressive, and organizational capacities specifically identified by different models of democracy relate to participation.76 This is due in no small measure to the dearth of survey data, and especially cross-national survey data, aimed at capturing information on political capacity. As a result, we still know very little about how the varied citizen dispositions prized by minimal-elitist, liberal-pluralist, and participatory democracy “move” together.

Just as we ideally expect both the institutional and citizen components of democratic quality to be congruent with the model of democracy driving the assessment, we also expect – ideally – democratic commitments, political capacities, and political participation to be consistent with each other and

75 Other research has come to similar conclusions: see, for example, Bolzendahl and Coffé 2013, Dalton 2008.
with the same model of democracy. In short, inter-dispositional consistency (or *intra*-component congruence) represents an important yardstick for evaluating democratic quality. Why does inter-dispositional consistency matter? It matters because, regardless of the model of democracy driving the assessment, the proper (high-quality) functioning of democracy depends on a particular mix and balance of commitments, capacities, and participation. For example, a high-quality participatory democracy is not just home to large numbers of citizens participating actively in politics, at and between elections, it is also home to large numbers of people who have the capacities to cooperate, communicate, and deliberate with fellow citizens. Similarly, minimal-elitists might only expect citizens to participate in periodic elections, but when they do, they are also expected to be able to use existing information shortcuts to avoid being misled or fooled by political elites vying for their votes.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have argued that democratic quality depends not only on the form and functioning of democratic institutions but also on the dispositions of citizens.\(^77\) To date, however, cross-national indices have focused predominantly on the institutional component of democratic quality. Over the years, measures of institutional quality have become increasingly multidimensional and conceptually sophisticated. The *Varieties of Democracy* program (Coppedge et al. 2011) has enriched this approach even further by making it possible to systematically evaluate democratic institutions according to different models of democracy. The same cannot be said of the citizen component of democratic quality. Cross-national indices commonly incorporate information on turnout rates in national elections, which points to an academic consensus that citizens are indeed a constitutive element of the concept of democratic quality. Few other citizen-related indicators are included in cross-national assessments of democratic quality, and when they are included it is often with little theoretical justification. The result is that citizens play conceptual second fiddle to institutions, and there is little or no recognition that different accounts of democracy demand and expect different kinds of citizen dispositions. Our aim is to challenge this orthodoxy by providing a structured account of the citizen component of democratic quality, with a focus on three models of democracy – minimal-elitism, liberal-pluralism, and participatory democracy.

\(^77\) Democratic quality also depends on the dispositions of political elites, most obviously their commitment to democracy as well as their level of political competence (see, for example, Linz and Stepan 1996, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013).
The first section of the chapter provided a fine-grained conceptualization of what we argue are the three core dispositions that make up the citizen component of democratic quality – namely, democratic commitment, political capacity, and political participation. We made the case that commitment is not just about general support for democracy but also model-specific commitments related to who gets to decide and how decisions are to be made. We defined political capacity in terms of citizens’ ability to know, choose, and influence, identifying key differences in how the three models conceive of political capacity. Finally, to capture the kinds and levels of political participation the three models expect of citizens, we argued that scholars of democratic quality should focus on the weight attached to: election-focused participation versus participation between elections; mediated versus direct forms of political action; and “other-regarding” political participation that brings together citizens with divergent political viewpoints.

The remainder of the chapter dealt with two key issues that arise when considering citizens seriously. The first is the issue of “fit” between institutions and citizens, which we refer to as inter-component congruence. We made the case that any assessment of democratic quality must consider the extent to which both institutions and citizen dispositions are congruent with the same model of democracy. We further underscored the importance of distinguishing static congruence (where democratic quality is judged according to the level of inter-component congruence at a single point in time) and dynamic congruence (where democratic quality is judged according to long-term processes of mutual adjustment between institutions and citizen dispositions). The second issue that we addressed was that of inter-dispositional consistency. Ideally, we argued, democratic commitments, political capacities, and political participation should all be consistent with the same model of democracy.

The greatest challenge moving forward with the conceptualization of democratic quality presented in the preceding pages relates to data availability. In the process of writing this paper, we undertook a systematic and broad survey of existing cross-national surveys. This included the World Values Survey, the International Social Survey Programme, the European Social Survey, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, the European Election Study, and the Latin American Public Opinion Project. In recent years the measurement of democratic commitments has improved greatly. Furthermore, the measurement of political participation is fairly strong, with information frequently being collected on a broad range of non-electoral forms of participation. That said, information is almost never collected directly on how “other-regarding” political participation is. Finally, we found that the measurement of political capacities is particularly weak. Cross-national surveys often ask citizens to self-report on their general sense of
political understanding or competence. Some surveys also gauge citizens’ level of political knowledge, but developing cross-nationally commensurable measures of political knowledge has been challenging (see, for example, Gidengil et al. 2016). Overall though, unlike some surveys carried out in individual countries, to date no direct cross-national measures have been fielded aimed at directly capturing information on citizens’ cognitive, expressive, and organizational capacities. This is not to underestimate the difficulty of developing valid and reliable empirical indicators of political capacity, but the lack of data in this area poses a real problem for quality-of-democracy research. As we have argued in this chapter, citizens’ capacity to know, choose, and influence in the political arena is central to the functioning of democracy. By detailing how different models of democracy understand these three capacities in different ways, we have sought to provide a valuable foundation for developing new survey questions to fully incorporate the citizen component in future quality-of-democracy research.

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PART III.

In Place of Conclusions: So What’s Next?
8. Do Elections Guarantee Democratic Legitimacy?

Sascha Kneip and Wolfgang Merkel

1. Introduction

Declining voter turnout, membership losses by political parties, and dwindling trust in democratically-elected representatives cast increasing doubt on the reputation of democratic elections. Yet elections continue to be the crucial mechanism of legitimation for democracy.

“In this day and age, elections are primitive. If a democracy has been reduced to elections and nothing more, then it is doomed.” This is the provocative conclusion reached by the Belgian historian David von Reybrouck in his widely praised book, *Against Elections* (van Reybrouck 2016: 61). What are we to make of that claim? If one asks the citizens of Western democracies what they associate with the idea of democracy, the first thing that usually occurs to them is the opportunity to cast a ballot in free and fair elections in which every citizen has an equal voice. And as a matter of fact, in the course of their lives as *citoyens*, the act of voting in democratic elections is about as close as most of them will ever get to participating in democratic government. By voting for their representatives they are directly involved in establishing democratic legitimacy.

In representative democracies political power is authorized primarily by the free and equal choice of political parties and officeholders through elections in which every adult is eligible to participate. Speaking with republican pathos, one could say that the act of voting brings collective democratic self-determination to its legitimate – albeit always merely preliminary – conclusion.

Still, this sort of sentimentality sometimes has a strangely hollow ring. Declining voter turnout, dwindling trust in political parties as well as their loss of power and reputation, citizens’ demands for the procedures of direct democracy and democratic innovation, decreasing accountability (as citizens see it), the partial irresponsibility of elected representatives, and falling membership in parties all raise growing doubts about whether elections continue to fulfil their democratic legitimation function adequately.

Larry M. Bartels, a leading American scholar of election studies, claims that a considerable portion of the electorate is in no position to play the
role of rational, mature voters. Either they succumb to a series of “irrational prejudices” or else they are incapable of attributing economic and social developments to specific political actors (Bartels 2008). Whereas Bartels mainly emphasizes the psychological and cognitive shortcomings of voting, other scholars such as Armin Schäfer (2015) or Bernhard Wessels (2015) stress that increasing socio-economic inequality leads to asymmetrical political participation. The upper and middle classes of society turn out to vote, while the lower classes stay home. This would appear to be a paradox that afflicts democracy, since free elections held under universal suffrage supposedly grant each citizen an equal right to vote and assign equal weight to each ballot. Yet it is quite obvious that even in the developed democracies, elections have been unable to curb the turnout-depressing power of social stratification exerted by neoliberal capitalism in the OECD world, (Merkel 2014) even though the top 1% or 0.1% benefit disproportionately from such a disparity (Piketty 2014).

David Van Reybrouck in fact argues that elections should no longer be regarded as the ultimate “crowning achievement” of democracy, but instead as the cause of the modern “democracy fatigue syndrome” (van Reybrouck 2016:46). According to Van Reybrouck, elections are elitist, aristocratic and thus represent the very opposite of political participation by equals. Variations upon this “swan song” to the legitimating power of the democratic electoral act have been aired by such prominent political scientists as Colin Crouch (2004), John Keane (2017), Pierre Rosanvallon (2011), and Wolfgang Streeck (2016).

But does their scepticism about elections get to the heart of the political problem? And is it even capable of coming up with alternatives to elections and parties? To answer those questions, we must first reach some agreement about what democratic legitimacy in the 21st century means and what roles elections, parties and inevitably also parliaments still play – or that they can and must play. Furthermore, we need to clarify how things stand with the legitimating power of alternative forms of democratic participation operating outside the electoral system.

2. How to conceptualize democratic legitimacy
Modern democracies would not work nearly as well as they do unless they were able constantly to generate a new supply of democratic legitimacy – and thus renew themselves – from out of their own internal resources. If the wellsprings of democratic legitimacy begin to run dry, or if democracies are replaced by undemocratic forms of rule, they inevitably fall victim to a crisis of legitimacy. By no means does such a crisis have to lead to regime change or even a collapse of democracy. At least in the OECD world, inter-
nal erosion of democracy, or even of certain “partial regimes of democracy” (Merkel 2004) within it, is the much more likely outcome, perhaps due to a partial shift of decision-making power from parliaments to governments and from elected representatives to experts or supranational regimes.

In abstract terms, legitimacy is characterized by the linkage between the idea of ethical individualism – the free, self-determining individual as the starting-point for all further reflections – with the idea of popular sovereignty as well as its containment by a constitutional order that treats freedom, equality as well as basic or human rights as inalienable in principle. In other words, democratic legitimacy connects the normative dimension (political authority is justified because it is democratic) with the empirical dimension of a democratic commonwealth (citizens accept being ruled when the exercise of authority is democratic). On one hand, democracy in a rule of law governed state, with its protective and participatory rights, defines the normative core of democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, by establishing an institutionalized chain of legitimacy between the people and their representatives, the exercise of popular sovereignty in elections, referenda, and various forms of political participation ensures that the democratic sovereign or its representatives will be held accountable for political decisions. Ideally then, majoritarian rule by the sovereign over itself is enabled and complemented by the hedging-in of democratic governmental power by the law and the constitution.

Thus, institutions and procedures are closely linked to the normative content of democratic orders. The former must engage in constant self-scrutiny, asking whether they are doing enough to meet those normative expectations and turning them into real policies. This is particularly the case when it comes to basic democratic procedures, actors, and institutions such as general elections, parties, and parliaments, all of which are political inventions of the 17th to 19th centuries. There is no assurance that they will last forever; on the contrary, even in the 21rst century they will have to prove that they can sustain and enhance the normative core of democratic political authority: collective self-government by individuals under the protection of fundamental rights. To put it differently, they will have to show that they are something more than vacuous façades dominated by non-legitimate actors.

Practically, democratic legitimacy is generated through the interactions of citizens and political actors, procedures and institutions, and the outcomes of political decision-making. The retrospective and prospective evaluation of such procedures, institutions, and decision-making outcomes by the citizens themselves plays a key role in the process. But it is not enough for the citizens to acquiesce in what has been done in their name. Each and every institution and political actor must submit to constant scrutiny in light of the normative assumptions of democratic rule. For example, the mere fact that
the Hungarian electorate has repeatedly given majority consent to the illiberal form of governance practiced by its prime minister, Viktor Orbán, does not mean that the current regime of defective democracy in Hungary enjoys sufficient democratic legitimacy. By the same token, the Polish electorate evidently has acquiesced in the effort by the democratically elected PiS to dismantle parts of the rule of law in Poland, but from the point of view of democratic theory such measures certainly do not count as legitimate. The same holds true with even greater force for the policies of Putin’s and Erdogan’s authoritarian governments even though they both were elected.

In themselves, free and fair elections open to all eligible voters by no means guarantee the legitimacy of a democratic system alone. Elections have to be embedded in a democratic process that links civic participation to constitutional procedures and fair political outcomes, as the process model of the democratic belief in legitimacy graphically illustrates.

If we understand the democratic political process as an interlocking sequence of input, throughput, and output, then democratic elections undoubtedly will be at the heart of the input dimension (Kneip and Merkel 2018). Supports and demands issuing from the citizenry may be identified as the most important input functions for the production of democratic legitimacy. Both find expression primarily, albeit not exclusively, in the act of voting. So-called “throughput” is located in the interstices between input and output. It applies to the core of a democracy, the state, in which binding decisions are formulated and made (the legislative branch), or where they are implemented (executive) and if necessary adjudicated (the courts). To move demands up the line in a democracy, political parties remain the most important actors, followed by interest groups, which aggregate, articulate, and represent the demands of their members and sympathizers.

During the past three decades, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and citizens’ initiatives, both specialized, normatively focused interest groups, have become important actors in the production of legitimation. They too articulate citizens’ preferences, but represent them in very different ways. In contrast to parties or political elites, NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, BUND and other civil society associations enjoy high approval ratings and moral authority among the populace. But of course elections are an act of legitimation that empowers political actors to make decisions that are binding on society. The same cannot be said of the moral authority claimed by NGOs.

Whether these various modes of interest-articulation and representation generate more or less democratic legitimacy and whether they can complement or replace the classical representative institutions and procedures of democracy remain unresolved questions. The same holds true of the activities engaged in by the citizens themselves when they signal their needs by
means of citizens’ initiatives, petitions, referenda and protests rather than through elections. We would like to discuss two examples below designed to test whether these alternative forms of participation can generate additional belief in the worth of democracy by those who participate in it.

3. On the power of legitimation latent in alternative forms of participation

Of the numerous variants of alternative forms of participation beyond democratic elections, two have been singled out as especially promising in our time: referenda as expressions of direct democracy as well as forms of deliberative participation, either via consultation or decision-making, through citizens’ assemblies and councils, citizens’ budgets, or “mini-publics.” How do these alternatives look when seen from a democratic legitimacy perspective?

3.1. Referenda

Of these options, referenda are the most likely to elicit citizens’ consent to the political system. When decisions are made directly by the demos, as in this case, they have indisputable legitimacy from the perspective of popular sovereignty. In terms of legitimacy theory, decisions made directly by the citizens are superior to those reached indirectly by elected representatives of the people. However, when it comes to the question of democratic legitimacy, it is crucially important to specify the extent to which the demos actually take part in referenda (Merkel and Ritzi 2017). If fewer than 50% of eligible voters participate in a plebiscite or if 25% of eligible voters reject a law that had been approved previously by 75% of the members of parliament – who may have been elected in a voter turnout of just 75% – then the argument in favor of the superiority of direct popular referendums looks much shakier. Speaking of voter turnout, unless high quorum requirements are attached to referenda and popular decision-making, plebiscites will be less able to confer legitimacy. From the perspective of democratic theory, Italy’s “abrogative” referendum provides an excellent model, since high hurdles are set to put a measure on the ballot and voters are asked to abolish an existing law or provision in a law rather than to make new laws. Less desirable institutional arrangements are evident in the absent or relatively weak quorum requirements for referenda in Switzerland, California, and most German federal states. Compared to the Italian paradigm and practice, most of those models are inferior due to their diminished power to confer legitimacy (Merkel 2004). Empirical studies reveal that plebiscites are by no means the way to alleviate the problem of declining voter turnout and
increasing social selectivity. The very opposite is more likely to happen: it will not be “the people” who decide; instead a fairly thin cross-section or “rump” version of demos actually will go to the polls. In that rump electorate, the better-educated, high-earners, and males will be over-represented. Thus, the demos in referenda is more strongly skewed in social terms than the electorate that turns out to vote in parliamentary elections, even though the latter has drawn the lion’s share of criticism. Direct democracy often exacerbates the previously diagnosed illness of social selection rather than alleviating it.

Even policies, which could be considered the “bottom line” of popular decision-making, fall short when it comes to legitimation. In countries or individual states that hold frequent referenda, e.g., Switzerland or California, conservative and neoliberal economic and social interests tend to prevail on budgetary matters. That is the reason that neo-classical economists such as Bruno Frey and Gebhard Kirchgässner like them so much (Frey 1994, Feld and Kirchgässner 2000). In broad terms, referenda on matters such as equal rights and recognition of religious, ethnic, or sexual minorities tend to produce more conservative, illiberal outcomes than is – or would be – the case with decisions made by parliaments. Thus, it is no mere coincidence that the right-wing populists, of all political movements, should now be the most determined advocates of plebiscites. Furthermore, the populations of some European countries (e.g., France, the Netherlands, Great Britain, or the Visegrad states) have far stronger reservations about European integration than do their respective national parliaments, which is another reason that the toolkit of direct democracy appeals to right-wing populists. In any case referenda are incapable of solving essential problems of legitimation in contemporary democracies such as asymmetrical political participation or the growing trend toward illiberality. Indeed, the very opposite is true.

3.2. Deliberation

If a new paradigm in the theory of democracy has emerged in the last three decades, then it would be that of deliberation. More than anyone else, Jürgen Habermas has laid down its theoretical foundations. The renowned political philosopher has sketched out the contours and rationale of the
theory of deliberative democracy in three of his most important books. He began to elaborate it in an early work, *The Structural Transformation of the Public* (1962), then developed it further in his monumental *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1981), and applied it to democracy under the rule of law in *Between Facts and Norms* (1992) (Habermas 1998). The “deliberation industry” in political science has often copied and added to the theory of deliberative democracy, but rarely achieved its level of sophistication and never truly called it into question. In the process its leading figures have developed notions of deliberative democracy or democratic deliberation with a variety of assumptions. These share at least the following three supporting elements or conditions:

- free and non-discriminatory access for all to the arenas of deliberation (*inclusion*);
- a moderator or facilitator who makes sure that all participants are granted the same opportunity to contribute to the discussion and sees to it that patterns of domination are prevented from crystallizing;
- randomness in the selection of the participants in the discussion in order to accommodate a representative cross section of the populace.

The overarching idea that informs all of these conditions is that reason should be introduced into politics via procedures. A great deal is at stake here: ways in which the common good might be secured and the conditions under which reasonable and fair politics could be made possible. Strategic action, i.e., that driven by power and interests, is to be replaced by communicative action committed to seeking consensus. We certainly should not overlook the possibility that deliberative democracy will bring about positive, legitimizing effects. On the contrary, we ought to be on the lookout for such effects particularly when the outcomes of democratic deliberation “pass through the (legitimacy-enhancing) portals of democratic and juridical procedures at the entrance to the parliamentary complex or the courts...” (Habermans 1998). Nevertheless, a set of critical reservations should be noted concerning deliberative assemblies, especially when they are granted decision-making authority and not merely consultative responsibilities.

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81 The various concepts, procedures, assumptions, and effects cannot be elucidated further in this article. Cf. also the rather critical treatments of these schemes offered by Adam Przeworski (1998), Ian Shapiro (2003), Claudia Landwehr (2012), Danny Michelsen and Franz Walter (2013), Wolfgang Merkel (2015).
• **Interests:** The plea that particular interests should be excluded from the discourse is not persuasive. Pluralists from Ernst Fraenkel to Seymour Martin Lipset believe that the essence of pluralist democracy is to be sought precisely in the free and orderly, yet still conflictual tug-of-war among competing interests. The dénouement of that process is not usually consensus but rather compromise. Chantal Mouffe too sees in conflict the “characteristic feature of the political sphere.” To suppress it would mean to aid and abet the concealment of the economic contradictions of capitalism (Mouffe 2000). Ian Shapiro argues in a similar vein. He doubts that deliberation ever could identify the common consensus position behind glaring differences of interest and world-view (Shapiro 2003: 10, Note 18). Such doubts would apply to a variety of distinct issue-areas such as the termination of pregnancy, assisted suicide, and policies on taxes, tariffs and social welfare.

• **Knowledge:** It is hard to avoid the suspicion that it will be very difficult to bridge the information gap between citizens with different levels of education when it comes to issues of taxation and budgetary policy, the regulation of international financial markets, or climate, industrial, and research policy. Even hearings attended by experts may not be enough to impart the necessary information.

• The same is true of **rhetoric:** Simply on account of their professions, attorneys, public prosecutor, professors of cognitive psychology, and TV journalists will have greater rhetorical persuasive skills than stonemasons, sanitation workers and cashiers, whose vocational abilities have nothing to do with their discursive competence. On the other hand, the latter group knows full well what their interests are.

• **Facilitator:** The facilitator is supposed to see to it that differences in information resources and rhetorical skill do not distort the symmetry of the discourse. Even assuming that we could find such impressive individuals in numbers large enough to make a difference, the old question immediately comes to mind: who will guard the guardians, or put checks on the facilitators, given that they are endowed with potentially enormous power (of manipulation).

• **Organization:** How many deliberative (mini-) publics can and should there be? And what topics should they be able to consider? To have any real political significance, thousands of them would have to be institutionalized at various levels of de-
cision-making, a scheme that does not seem very practicable. Conversely, if only one national deliberation were to take place each year, it would tend to be a participatory placebo rather than a relevant contribution to the mass-production of policies. **82**

- **Acceptance**: There are no particularly convincing arguments for claiming that citizens would have deeper belief in the legitimacy and efficiency of laypersons’ assemblies chosen by lot than they have in the parliaments and representatives that they themselves have elected. This is all the more true when we remember that the latter have political experience and are subject to the requirements of accountability and transparency.

In short, deliberative procedures theoretically enjoy impressive powers of legitimation, but in practice the quality of that legitimation is quite limited if deliberative procedures go beyond democratic participation and are entitled to authoritatively binding decisions. Thus, a high value should be placed on deliberation as long as it takes place within democratic organizations and institutions. Outside of those institutions it should be accorded only consultative responsibilities. Such deliberative bodies are not cut out for real alternatives to representative policymaking. **83**

4. **No swan song for voting**

While alternative forms of participation and procedures do indeed possess a moderate power to confer legitimation, their modest role should not be taken to mean that all is well with democratic elections. It is undoubtedly a serious problem for the democratic legitimacy of current representative democracies that the traditional actors (parties) and forms of participation (elections) are losing the trust and support of the citizenry. Yet, despite their dwindling prestige, parties remain the most important institutional guardians of the production of policies and decisions in all established democracies. Furthermore, political parties still possess more extensive forms of ex-ante legitimacy (via free elections open to all) and of ex-post responsibility (for government policy vis-à-vis the opposition, the media,

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82 It is no coincidence that, in recent years, the same deliberative assemblies have been cited over and over again as models: The Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform in British Columbia in 2004; The Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform in Ontario of 2006–2007; the Constitutional Convention of Iceland from 2010 to 2012; and the Convention on the Constitution in Ireland of 2013.

83 Thus, there is a striking discrepancy between the meaning attached to the production of deliberative theories on one hand and the fairly insignificant de facto role that deliberative procedures in representative democracies (can) play outside of the parliamentary arena.
and the voters) than any NGO or unelected body has or could have. In other words, political parties are caught in a kind of squeeze as far as their legitimation is concerned. On one hand, they are confronted with weakened moorings in society and waning trust on the part of citizens. On the other, due to the legitimacy that accrues to them from elections, they have nearly monopolistic access to the arenas of state in which decisions are made and resources allocated. As has been demonstrated in this essay, the much-discussed “democratic innovations” have only a limited capacity to bridge the legitimation gap.

Therefore, the reflections offered here should not be taken as a swan song for elections, parties or even representative democracy. For representative, democratic regimes, equal and free elections open to all are the preferred procedures for conferring legitimation and authorizing decision-making. In the theory of popular sovereignty at least, plebiscites are the only procedures that might claim superior legitimacy. However, in practice they generate unintended side-effects that can be highly problematic for democracy. Certainly, democratic innovations such as citizens’ councils or digital platforms for campaigns and polls can supplement and invigorate representative democracy. But as things now stand, that observation holds true only for the input side of democracy. The power of referenda to confer democratic legitimacy upon decisions meant to be binding across the entire society is decidedly tenuous if the popular turnout is as low as it is often the case.

Thus, the foundations of representative democracy – elections, parties, parliaments – are by no means threatened with destruction, but they do face great challenges. To address them, the first step is to reform and revitalize parties, parliaments and government. Democratic innovations can supplement but rarely supplant those efforts. The point here is not primarily about replacing the old with the new. The old needs to remain in place until the new can show that it will lead to more rather than less democratic legitimacy. And that is not the least significant of the foundational principles behind deliberative debates.

References


List of abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BTI</td>
<td>Bertelsmann Transformation Index</td>
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<td>CE</td>
<td>Central Europe</td>
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<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>EES</td>
<td>European Election Study</td>
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<td>EIUID</td>
<td>Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of Democracy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Social Survey</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
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<td>FH</td>
<td>Freedom House in the US</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GRECO</td>
<td>Group of States against Corruption of the Council of Europe</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ISSP</td>
<td>International Social Survey Programme</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PiS</td>
<td>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PO</td>
<td>Civic Platform (political party in Poland)</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WVS</td>
<td>World Value Survey</td>
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About the authors

Baboš, Pavol is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Comenius University in Bratislava. He teaches courses focused on methodology, economics and social policy.

Brusis, Martin works as a political analyst, researcher, associate professor and policy advisor affiliated with Babeș-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca and Ludwig-Maximilian University Munich. His professional interests focus on the quality of government and democracy in Eastern Europe.

Dolný, Branislav is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava. His research centres on the quality of democracy, democratic representation and the performance of democratic institutions.

Geissel, Brigitte is professor of political science and sociology at Goethe University Frankfurt. Her research interests include democratic innovations, new forms of governance and political actors (new social movements, associations, civil society, parties, political elites, citizens).

Guasti, Petra is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Research Unit “Democratic Innovations” at Goethe University Frankfurt (Germany). Her main research focus is democracy, more specifically the growing tension within the system of representative democracy in respect to its legitimacy.

Kneip, Sascha is senior research fellow of the Research Unit “Democracy and Democratization” at the WZB – Berlin Social Science Center. His research interests include constitutionalism, constitutional courts, democratic theory and empirical democracy research, theories of justice, and modern political theory.

Malová, Darina is Professor at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava. Her research interests include the democratization, Europeanization, ethnic and minority issues, gender, nationalism and extremism.

Mansfeldová, Zdenka is a senior research fellow and head of the Department of political sociology at the Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences. In her research, she focuses on the functioning of modern democracies and their institutions, political and non-political forms of interest representation.
Markowski, Radoslaw is Professor of Political Science, Director of Center for the Study of Democracy, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw and Principal Investigator in Polish National Election Study.

Mayne, Quinton is associate professor of public policy at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. His research lies at the intersection of comparative and urban politics, with a focus on political behaviour and social policy in advanced industrial democracies.

Merkel, Wolfgang is Director of the research unit “Democracy and Democratization” at the WZB – Berlin Social Science Center, Professor of Comparative Political Science and Democracy Research at the Humboldt-University Berlin, and member of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities.
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Petra Guasti and Zdenka Mansfeldová (eds.)

Democracy Under Stress
Changing Perspectives on Democracy, Governance and Their Measurement

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Democracy, defined as liberal pluralism, is under stress worldwide. Pluralistic democratic institutions: a free press, civil society and the rule of law all seem to be under attack. Democracies are being hollowed out from within while preserving the fundamental facade of elections.

The strength of this book is in providing a range of perspectives on the study of democracy under stress. The authors, renown scholars of democratic theory and democracy in the Central and Eastern Europe, highlight the potential of different approaches – from comparative meta-assessment using indices and survey data, to case studies focused on understanding context and causal processes – for a better grasp of the loci of the stress.

Together, we offer the reader the opportunity to assess different conceptual frameworks and approaches, to reflect on their strengths and weaknesses, to advance the study of democracy in the future. This volume is also an invitation for scholars to redirect their attention to the Central and Eastern Europe, which offers an opportunity to deepen our understanding of democracy.

We see the democracy in Central and Eastern Europe under stress but avoid general labels such as the crisis of democracy and deconsolidation. Instead, we argue that to understand the contemporary situation in the CEE region, we need to move beyond the assessment of institutional frameworks and to include citizens in our understanding and measurement of democracy.